From: "Mike Pagano" <mpagano@gentoo.org>
To: gentoo-commits@lists.gentoo.org
Subject: [gentoo-commits] proj/linux-patches:4.19 commit in: /
Date: Sat, 25 Jun 2022 10:22:36 +0000 (UTC) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1656152542.05804623611103d533e73623346a4c790451607a.mpagano@gentoo> (raw)
commit: 05804623611103d533e73623346a4c790451607a
Author: Mike Pagano <mpagano <AT> gentoo <DOT> org>
AuthorDate: Sat Jun 25 10:22:22 2022 +0000
Commit: Mike Pagano <mpagano <AT> gentoo <DOT> org>
CommitDate: Sat Jun 25 10:22:22 2022 +0000
URL: https://gitweb.gentoo.org/proj/linux-patches.git/commit/?id=05804623
Linux patch 4.19.249
Signed-off-by: Mike Pagano <mpagano <AT> gentoo.org>
0000_README | 4 +
1248_linux-4.19.249.patch | 7929 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 7933 insertions(+)
diff --git a/0000_README b/0000_README
index e2ee3819..de0e7128 100644
--- a/0000_README
+++ b/0000_README
@@ -1031,6 +1031,10 @@ Patch: 1247_linux-4.19.248.patch
From: https://www.kernel.org
Desc: Linux 4.19.248
+Patch: 1248_linux-4.19.249.patch
+From: https://www.kernel.org
+Desc: Linux 4.19.249
+
Patch: 1500_XATTR_USER_PREFIX.patch
From: https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=470644
Desc: Support for namespace user.pax.* on tmpfs.
diff --git a/1248_linux-4.19.249.patch b/1248_linux-4.19.249.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d2d01e98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/1248_linux-4.19.249.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,7929 @@
+diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+index 1dea3d23fc4ca..500032af01927 100644
+--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+@@ -3697,6 +3697,12 @@
+ fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
+ by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU.
+
++ random.trust_bootloader={on,off}
++ [KNL] Enable or disable trusting the use of a
++ seed passed by the bootloader (if available) to
++ fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
++ by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
++
+ ras=option[,option,...] [KNL] RAS-specific options
+
+ cec_disable [X86]
+diff --git a/Documentation/hwmon/hwmon-kernel-api.txt b/Documentation/hwmon/hwmon-kernel-api.txt
+index 4981df157b04a..eb7a78aebb380 100644
+--- a/Documentation/hwmon/hwmon-kernel-api.txt
++++ b/Documentation/hwmon/hwmon-kernel-api.txt
+@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ hwmon_device_register_with_info is the most comprehensive and preferred means
+ to register a hardware monitoring device. It creates the standard sysfs
+ attributes in the hardware monitoring core, letting the driver focus on reading
+ from and writing to the chip instead of having to bother with sysfs attributes.
+-The parent device parameter as well as the chip parameter must not be NULL. Its
++The parent device parameter cannot be NULL with non-NULL chip info. Its
+ parameters are described in more detail below.
+
+ devm_hwmon_device_register_with_info is similar to
+diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+index 8bd3b01539593..db1676525ca35 100644
+--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
++++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+@@ -821,9 +821,40 @@ The kernel command line parameter printk.devkmsg= overrides this and is
+ a one-time setting until next reboot: once set, it cannot be changed by
+ this sysctl interface anymore.
+
+-==============================================================
++pty
++===
++
++See Documentation/filesystems/devpts.rst.
++
++
++random
++======
++
++This is a directory, with the following entries:
++
++* ``boot_id``: a UUID generated the first time this is retrieved, and
++ unvarying after that;
++
++* ``uuid``: a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can
++ thus be used to generate UUIDs at will);
++
++* ``entropy_avail``: the pool's entropy count, in bits;
++
++* ``poolsize``: the entropy pool size, in bits;
++
++* ``urandom_min_reseed_secs``: obsolete (used to determine the minimum
++ number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding). This file is
++ writable for compatibility purposes, but writing to it has no effect
++ on any RNG behavior;
++
++* ``write_wakeup_threshold``: when the entropy count drops below this
++ (as a number of bits), processes waiting to write to ``/dev/random``
++ are woken up. This file is writable for compatibility purposes, but
++ writing to it has no effect on any RNG behavior.
++
+
+-randomize_va_space:
++randomize_va_space
++==================
+
+ This option can be used to select the type of process address
+ space randomization that is used in the system, for architectures
+diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
+index 1061db6fbc326..af0f322cf2f7c 100644
+--- a/MAINTAINERS
++++ b/MAINTAINERS
+@@ -12239,6 +12239,7 @@ F: arch/mips/configs/generic/board-ranchu.config
+
+ RANDOM NUMBER DRIVER
+ M: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
++M: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
+ S: Maintained
+ F: drivers/char/random.c
+
+diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
+index afb8b46398da6..14ba089d5b016 100644
+--- a/Makefile
++++ b/Makefile
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+ VERSION = 4
+ PATCHLEVEL = 19
+-SUBLEVEL = 248
++SUBLEVEL = 249
+ EXTRAVERSION =
+ NAME = "People's Front"
+
+diff --git a/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h
+index b565cc6f408e9..f89798da8a147 100644
+--- a/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h
++++ b/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h
+@@ -28,5 +28,6 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
+ __asm__ __volatile__ ("rpcc %0" : "=r"(ret));
+ return ret;
+ }
++#define get_cycles get_cycles
+
+ #endif
+diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h
+index f6fcc67ef06ef..c06d38f0df8ec 100644
+--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h
++++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h
+@@ -14,5 +14,6 @@
+
+ typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
+ #define get_cycles() ({ cycles_t c; read_current_timer(&c) ? 0 : c; })
++#define random_get_entropy() (((unsigned long)get_cycles()) ?: random_get_entropy_fallback())
+
+ #endif
+diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c
+index b6618391be8c6..4254d7808def1 100644
+--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c
++++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c
+@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ int ftrace_make_call(struct dyn_ftrace *rec, unsigned long addr)
+ {
+ unsigned long pc = rec->ip;
+ u32 old, new;
+- long offset = (long)pc - (long)addr;
++ long offset = (long)addr - (long)pc;
+
+ if (offset < -SZ_128M || offset >= SZ_128M) {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MODULE_PLTS
+@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ int ftrace_make_nop(struct module *mod, struct dyn_ftrace *rec,
+ unsigned long pc = rec->ip;
+ bool validate = true;
+ u32 old = 0, new;
+- long offset = (long)pc - (long)addr;
++ long offset = (long)addr - (long)pc;
+
+ if (offset < -SZ_128M || offset >= SZ_128M) {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MODULE_PLTS
+diff --git a/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h
+index 869a3ac6bf23a..7ccc077a60bed 100644
+--- a/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h
++++ b/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h
+@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ get_cycles (void)
+ ret = ia64_getreg(_IA64_REG_AR_ITC);
+ return ret;
+ }
++#define get_cycles get_cycles
+
+ extern void ia64_cpu_local_tick (void);
+ extern unsigned long long ia64_native_sched_clock (void);
+diff --git a/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h
+index 6a21d93582805..f4a7a340f4cae 100644
+--- a/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h
++++ b/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h
+@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
+ {
+ if (mach_random_get_entropy)
+ return mach_random_get_entropy();
+- return 0;
++ return random_get_entropy_fallback();
+ }
+ #define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy
+
+diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h
+index 8026baf46e729..2e107886f97ac 100644
+--- a/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h
++++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h
+@@ -76,25 +76,24 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
+ else
+ return 0; /* no usable counter */
+ }
++#define get_cycles get_cycles
+
+ /*
+ * Like get_cycles - but where c0_count is not available we desperately
+ * use c0_random in an attempt to get at least a little bit of entropy.
+- *
+- * R6000 and R6000A neither have a count register nor a random register.
+- * That leaves no entropy source in the CPU itself.
+ */
+ static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
+ {
+- unsigned int prid = read_c0_prid();
+- unsigned int imp = prid & PRID_IMP_MASK;
++ unsigned int c0_random;
+
+- if (can_use_mips_counter(prid))
++ if (can_use_mips_counter(read_c0_prid()))
+ return read_c0_count();
+- else if (likely(imp != PRID_IMP_R6000 && imp != PRID_IMP_R6000A))
+- return read_c0_random();
++
++ if (cpu_has_3kex)
++ c0_random = (read_c0_random() >> 8) & 0x3f;
+ else
+- return 0; /* no usable register */
++ c0_random = read_c0_random() & 0x3f;
++ return (random_get_entropy_fallback() << 6) | (0x3f - c0_random);
+ }
+ #define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy
+
+diff --git a/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h
+index 2f2abb28ec2fd..9c9b50599ea30 100644
+--- a/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h
++++ b/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h
+@@ -20,5 +20,8 @@
+ typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
+
+ extern cycles_t get_cycles(void);
++#define get_cycles get_cycles
++
++#define random_get_entropy() (((unsigned long)get_cycles()) ?: random_get_entropy_fallback())
+
+ #endif
+diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h
+index 45537cd4d1d39..1cd2bd3eef33b 100644
+--- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h
++++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h
+@@ -12,9 +12,10 @@
+
+ typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
+
+-static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
++static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
+ {
+ return mfctl(16);
+ }
++#define get_cycles get_cycles
+
+ #endif
+diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h
+index a09595f00cabe..f0f16b4fc5ea1 100644
+--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h
++++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h
+@@ -6,27 +6,28 @@
+
+ #include <asm/machdep.h>
+
+-static inline int arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
++static inline bool arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
+ {
+- return 0;
++ return false;
+ }
+
+-static inline int arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
++static inline bool arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
+ {
+- return 0;
++ return false;
+ }
+
+-static inline int arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
++static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
+ {
+ if (ppc_md.get_random_seed)
+ return ppc_md.get_random_seed(v);
+
+- return 0;
++ return false;
+ }
+-static inline int arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
++
++static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
+ {
+ unsigned long val;
+- int rc;
++ bool rc;
+
+ rc = arch_get_random_seed_long(&val);
+ if (rc)
+@@ -34,16 +35,6 @@ static inline int arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
+
+ return rc;
+ }
+-
+-static inline int arch_has_random(void)
+-{
+- return 0;
+-}
+-
+-static inline int arch_has_random_seed(void)
+-{
+- return !!ppc_md.get_random_seed;
+-}
+ #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_POWERNV
+diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ppc-opcode.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ppc-opcode.h
+index d9d5391b2af6f..d0d3dab56225f 100644
+--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ppc-opcode.h
++++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ppc-opcode.h
+@@ -207,6 +207,7 @@
+ #define PPC_INST_ICBT 0x7c00002c
+ #define PPC_INST_ICSWX 0x7c00032d
+ #define PPC_INST_ICSWEPX 0x7c00076d
++#define PPC_INST_DSSALL 0x7e00066c
+ #define PPC_INST_ISEL 0x7c00001e
+ #define PPC_INST_ISEL_MASK 0xfc00003e
+ #define PPC_INST_LDARX 0x7c0000a8
+@@ -424,6 +425,7 @@
+ __PPC_RA(a) | __PPC_RB(b))
+ #define PPC_DCBZL(a, b) stringify_in_c(.long PPC_INST_DCBZL | \
+ __PPC_RA(a) | __PPC_RB(b))
++#define PPC_DSSALL stringify_in_c(.long PPC_INST_DSSALL)
+ #define PPC_LQARX(t, a, b, eh) stringify_in_c(.long PPC_INST_LQARX | \
+ ___PPC_RT(t) | ___PPC_RA(a) | \
+ ___PPC_RB(b) | __PPC_EH(eh))
+diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h
+index 926b9f91a3ef2..7401d6a684c55 100644
+--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h
++++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h
+@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
+ return ret;
+ #endif
+ }
++#define get_cycles get_cycles
+
+ #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
+ #endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_TIMEX_H */
+diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/idle_6xx.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/idle_6xx.S
+index ff026c9d3cab4..75de66acc3d1b 100644
+--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/idle_6xx.S
++++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/idle_6xx.S
+@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
+ END_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(CPU_FTR_NO_DPM)
+ mtspr SPRN_HID0,r4
+ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
+- DSSALL
++ PPC_DSSALL
+ sync
+ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC)
+ CURRENT_THREAD_INFO(r9, r1)
+diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/l2cr_6xx.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/l2cr_6xx.S
+index 6e7dbb7d527c8..9d4b42d115cdd 100644
+--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/l2cr_6xx.S
++++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/l2cr_6xx.S
+@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(CPU_FTR_L2CR)
+
+ /* Stop DST streams */
+ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
+- DSSALL
++ PPC_DSSALL
+ sync
+ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC)
+
+@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(CPU_FTR_L3CR)
+ isync
+
+ /* Stop DST streams */
+- DSSALL
++ PPC_DSSALL
+ sync
+
+ /* Get the current enable bit of the L3CR into r4 */
+@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_L3CR)
+ _GLOBAL(__flush_disable_L1)
+ /* Stop pending alitvec streams and memory accesses */
+ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
+- DSSALL
++ PPC_DSSALL
+ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC)
+ sync
+
+diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c
+index 02b69a68139cc..56c33285b1dfd 100644
+--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c
++++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c
+@@ -2017,12 +2017,12 @@ unsigned long get_wchan(struct task_struct *p)
+ return 0;
+
+ do {
+- sp = *(unsigned long *)sp;
++ sp = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(*(unsigned long *)sp);
+ if (!validate_sp(sp, p, STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD) ||
+ p->state == TASK_RUNNING)
+ return 0;
+ if (count > 0) {
+- ip = ((unsigned long *)sp)[STACK_FRAME_LR_SAVE];
++ ip = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(((unsigned long *)sp)[STACK_FRAME_LR_SAVE]);
+ if (!in_sched_functions(ip))
+ return ip;
+ }
+diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_32.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_32.S
+index cbdf86228eaaa..54c44aea338c4 100644
+--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_32.S
++++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_32.S
+@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ _GLOBAL(swsusp_arch_resume)
+ #ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
+ /* Stop pending alitvec streams and memory accesses */
+ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
+- DSSALL
++ PPC_DSSALL
+ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC)
+ #endif
+ sync
+diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_asm64.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_asm64.S
+index f83bf6f72cb0e..0af06f3dbb25a 100644
+--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_asm64.S
++++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_asm64.S
+@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ END_FW_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(FW_FEATURE_LPAR)
+ _GLOBAL(swsusp_arch_resume)
+ /* Stop pending alitvec streams and memory accesses */
+ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
+- DSSALL
++ PPC_DSSALL
+ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC)
+ sync
+
+diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_context.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_context.c
+index f84e14f23e50a..78a638ccc70fc 100644
+--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_context.c
++++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_context.c
+@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
+ * context
+ */
+ if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC))
+- asm volatile ("dssall");
++ asm volatile (PPC_DSSALL);
+
+ if (new_on_cpu)
+ radix_kvm_prefetch_workaround(next);
+diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/cache.S b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/cache.S
+index 27862feee4a57..0dde4a7a60166 100644
+--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/cache.S
++++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/cache.S
+@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ flush_disable_75x:
+
+ /* Stop DST streams */
+ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
+- DSSALL
++ PPC_DSSALL
+ sync
+ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC)
+
+@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ flush_disable_745x:
+ isync
+
+ /* Stop prefetch streams */
+- DSSALL
++ PPC_DSSALL
+ sync
+
+ /* Disable L2 prefetching */
+diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/processor.h
+index c23578a37b443..fdcc34b4f65bc 100644
+--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/processor.h
++++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/processor.h
+@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
+
+ #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
++#include <asm/barrier.h>
++
+ struct task_struct;
+ struct pt_regs;
+
+diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h
+index c67b82dfa558e..9a6835137a164 100644
+--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h
++++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h
+@@ -21,18 +21,6 @@ extern atomic64_t s390_arch_random_counter;
+
+ bool s390_arch_random_generate(u8 *buf, unsigned int nbytes);
+
+-static inline bool arch_has_random(void)
+-{
+- return false;
+-}
+-
+-static inline bool arch_has_random_seed(void)
+-{
+- if (static_branch_likely(&s390_arch_random_available))
+- return true;
+- return false;
+-}
+-
+ static inline bool arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
+ {
+ return false;
+diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h
+index b6a4ce9dafafb..99a7e028232d8 100644
+--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h
++++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h
+@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
+ {
+ return (cycles_t) get_tod_clock() >> 2;
+ }
++#define get_cycles get_cycles
+
+ int get_phys_clock(unsigned long *clock);
+ void init_cpu_timer(void);
+diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c
+index 4354ac6077503..9f39030898694 100644
+--- a/arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c
++++ b/arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c
+@@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ void ptep_zap_key(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
+ pgste_val(pgste) |= PGSTE_GR_BIT | PGSTE_GC_BIT;
+ ptev = pte_val(*ptep);
+ if (!(ptev & _PAGE_INVALID) && (ptev & _PAGE_WRITE))
+- page_set_storage_key(ptev & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_DEFAULT_KEY, 1);
++ page_set_storage_key(ptev & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_DEFAULT_KEY, 0);
+ pgste_set_unlock(ptep, pgste);
+ preempt_enable();
+ }
+diff --git a/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h b/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h
+index 542915b462097..f86326a6f89e0 100644
+--- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h
++++ b/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h
+@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@
+
+ #define CLOCK_TICK_RATE 1193180 /* Underlying HZ */
+
+-/* XXX Maybe do something better at some point... -DaveM */
+-typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
+-#define get_cycles() (0)
++#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
+
+ #endif
+diff --git a/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h
+index e392a9a5bc9bd..9f27176adb26d 100644
+--- a/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h
++++ b/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h
+@@ -2,13 +2,8 @@
+ #ifndef __UM_TIMEX_H
+ #define __UM_TIMEX_H
+
+-typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
+-
+-static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
+-{
+- return 0;
+-}
+-
+ #define CLOCK_TICK_RATE (HZ)
+
++#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
++
+ #endif
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h
+index 3ac991d81e74d..4d3cac3c9b250 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h
+@@ -86,10 +86,6 @@ static inline bool rdseed_int(unsigned int *v)
+ return ok;
+ }
+
+-/* Conditional execution based on CPU type */
+-#define arch_has_random() static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)
+-#define arch_has_random_seed() static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)
+-
+ /*
+ * These are the generic interfaces; they must not be declared if the
+ * stubs in <linux/random.h> are to be invoked,
+@@ -99,22 +95,22 @@ static inline bool rdseed_int(unsigned int *v)
+
+ static inline bool arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
+ {
+- return arch_has_random() ? rdrand_long(v) : false;
++ return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ? rdrand_long(v) : false;
+ }
+
+ static inline bool arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
+ {
+- return arch_has_random() ? rdrand_int(v) : false;
++ return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ? rdrand_int(v) : false;
+ }
+
+ static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
+ {
+- return arch_has_random_seed() ? rdseed_long(v) : false;
++ return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED) ? rdseed_long(v) : false;
+ }
+
+ static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
+ {
+- return arch_has_random_seed() ? rdseed_int(v) : false;
++ return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED) ? rdseed_int(v) : false;
+ }
+
+ extern void x86_init_rdrand(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h
+index a4a8b1b16c0c1..956e4145311b1 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h
+@@ -5,6 +5,15 @@
+ #include <asm/processor.h>
+ #include <asm/tsc.h>
+
++static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
++{
++ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_TSC) &&
++ !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
++ return random_get_entropy_fallback();
++ return rdtsc();
++}
++#define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy
++
+ /* Assume we use the PIT time source for the clock tick */
+ #define CLOCK_TICK_RATE PIT_TICK_RATE
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h
+index eb5bbfeccb661..196cf01f58fdf 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h
+@@ -22,13 +22,12 @@ extern void disable_TSC(void);
+
+ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
+ {
+-#ifndef CONFIG_X86_TSC
+- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
++ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_TSC) &&
++ !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
+ return 0;
+-#endif
+-
+ return rdtsc();
+ }
++#define get_cycles get_cycles
+
+ extern struct system_counterval_t convert_art_to_tsc(u64 art);
+ extern struct system_counterval_t convert_art_ns_to_tsc(u64 art_ns);
+diff --git a/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h
+index f9b389d4e9739..d866bc847d8dc 100644
+--- a/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h
++++ b/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h
+@@ -30,10 +30,6 @@
+
+ extern unsigned long ccount_freq;
+
+-typedef unsigned long long cycles_t;
+-
+-#define get_cycles() (0)
+-
+ void local_timer_setup(unsigned cpu);
+
+ /*
+@@ -69,4 +65,6 @@ static inline void set_linux_timer (unsigned long ccompare)
+ WSR_CCOMPARE(LINUX_TIMER, ccompare);
+ }
+
++#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
++
+ #endif /* _XTENSA_TIMEX_H */
+diff --git a/certs/blacklist_hashes.c b/certs/blacklist_hashes.c
+index 344892337be07..d5961aa3d3380 100644
+--- a/certs/blacklist_hashes.c
++++ b/certs/blacklist_hashes.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+ #include "blacklist.h"
+
+-const char __initdata *const blacklist_hashes[] = {
++const char __initconst *const blacklist_hashes[] = {
+ #include CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST
+ , NULL
+ };
+diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c
+index bc52d95626110..c8c56763dfded 100644
+--- a/crypto/drbg.c
++++ b/crypto/drbg.c
+@@ -219,6 +219,57 @@ static inline unsigned short drbg_sec_strength(drbg_flag_t flags)
+ }
+ }
+
++/*
++ * FIPS 140-2 continuous self test for the noise source
++ * The test is performed on the noise source input data. Thus, the function
++ * implicitly knows the size of the buffer to be equal to the security
++ * strength.
++ *
++ * Note, this function disregards the nonce trailing the entropy data during
++ * initial seeding.
++ *
++ * drbg->drbg_mutex must have been taken.
++ *
++ * @drbg DRBG handle
++ * @entropy buffer of seed data to be checked
++ *
++ * return:
++ * 0 on success
++ * -EAGAIN on when the CTRNG is not yet primed
++ * < 0 on error
++ */
++static int drbg_fips_continuous_test(struct drbg_state *drbg,
++ const unsigned char *entropy)
++{
++ unsigned short entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags);
++ int ret = 0;
++
++ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS))
++ return 0;
++
++ /* skip test if we test the overall system */
++ if (list_empty(&drbg->test_data.list))
++ return 0;
++ /* only perform test in FIPS mode */
++ if (!fips_enabled)
++ return 0;
++
++ if (!drbg->fips_primed) {
++ /* Priming of FIPS test */
++ memcpy(drbg->prev, entropy, entropylen);
++ drbg->fips_primed = true;
++ /* priming: another round is needed */
++ return -EAGAIN;
++ }
++ ret = memcmp(drbg->prev, entropy, entropylen);
++ if (!ret)
++ panic("DRBG continuous self test failed\n");
++ memcpy(drbg->prev, entropy, entropylen);
++
++ /* the test shall pass when the two values are not equal */
++ return 0;
++}
++
+ /*
+ * Convert an integer into a byte representation of this integer.
+ * The byte representation is big-endian
+@@ -984,55 +1035,79 @@ static const struct drbg_state_ops drbg_hash_ops = {
+ ******************************************************************/
+
+ static inline int __drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct list_head *seed,
+- int reseed)
++ int reseed, enum drbg_seed_state new_seed_state)
+ {
+ int ret = drbg->d_ops->update(drbg, seed, reseed);
+
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+- drbg->seeded = true;
++ drbg->seeded = new_seed_state;
+ /* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 5 */
+ drbg->reseed_ctr = 1;
+
++ switch (drbg->seeded) {
++ case DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED:
++ /* Impossible, but handle it to silence compiler warnings. */
++ case DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL:
++ /*
++ * Require frequent reseeds until the seed source is
++ * fully initialized.
++ */
++ drbg->reseed_threshold = 50;
++ break;
++
++ case DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL:
++ /*
++ * Seed source has become fully initialized, frequent
++ * reseeds no longer required.
++ */
++ drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
++ break;
++ }
++
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+-static void drbg_async_seed(struct work_struct *work)
++static inline int drbg_get_random_bytes(struct drbg_state *drbg,
++ unsigned char *entropy,
++ unsigned int entropylen)
++{
++ int ret;
++
++ do {
++ get_random_bytes(entropy, entropylen);
++ ret = drbg_fips_continuous_test(drbg, entropy);
++ if (ret && ret != -EAGAIN)
++ return ret;
++ } while (ret);
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++static int drbg_seed_from_random(struct drbg_state *drbg)
+ {
+ struct drbg_string data;
+ LIST_HEAD(seedlist);
+- struct drbg_state *drbg = container_of(work, struct drbg_state,
+- seed_work);
+ unsigned int entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags);
+ unsigned char entropy[32];
++ int ret;
+
+ BUG_ON(!entropylen);
+ BUG_ON(entropylen > sizeof(entropy));
+- get_random_bytes(entropy, entropylen);
+
+ drbg_string_fill(&data, entropy, entropylen);
+ list_add_tail(&data.list, &seedlist);
+
+- mutex_lock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
+-
+- /* If nonblocking pool is initialized, deactivate Jitter RNG */
+- crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent);
+- drbg->jent = NULL;
+-
+- /* Set seeded to false so that if __drbg_seed fails the
+- * next generate call will trigger a reseed.
+- */
+- drbg->seeded = false;
+-
+- __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, true);
+-
+- if (drbg->seeded)
+- drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
++ ret = drbg_get_random_bytes(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
++ if (ret)
++ goto out;
+
+- mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
++ ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, true, DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL);
+
++out:
+ memzero_explicit(entropy, entropylen);
++ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -1054,6 +1129,7 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
+ unsigned int entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags);
+ struct drbg_string data1;
+ LIST_HEAD(seedlist);
++ enum drbg_seed_state new_seed_state = DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL;
+
+ /* 9.1 / 9.2 / 9.3.1 step 3 */
+ if (pers && pers->len > (drbg_max_addtl(drbg))) {
+@@ -1081,7 +1157,12 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
+ BUG_ON((entropylen * 2) > sizeof(entropy));
+
+ /* Get seed from in-kernel /dev/urandom */
+- get_random_bytes(entropy, entropylen);
++ if (!rng_is_initialized())
++ new_seed_state = DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL;
++
++ ret = drbg_get_random_bytes(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
++ if (ret)
++ goto out;
+
+ if (!drbg->jent) {
+ drbg_string_fill(&data1, entropy, entropylen);
+@@ -1094,7 +1175,23 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
+ entropylen);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_devel("DRBG: jent failed with %d\n", ret);
+- return ret;
++
++ /*
++ * Do not treat the transient failure of the
++ * Jitter RNG as an error that needs to be
++ * reported. The combined number of the
++ * maximum reseed threshold times the maximum
++ * number of Jitter RNG transient errors is
++ * less than the reseed threshold required by
++ * SP800-90A allowing us to treat the
++ * transient errors as such.
++ *
++ * However, we mandate that at least the first
++ * seeding operation must succeed with the
++ * Jitter RNG.
++ */
++ if (!reseed || ret != -EAGAIN)
++ goto out;
+ }
+
+ drbg_string_fill(&data1, entropy, entropylen * 2);
+@@ -1119,8 +1216,9 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
+ memset(drbg->C, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+ }
+
+- ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, reseed);
++ ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, reseed, new_seed_state);
+
++out:
+ memzero_explicit(entropy, entropylen * 2);
+
+ return ret;
+@@ -1142,6 +1240,11 @@ static inline void drbg_dealloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
+ drbg->reseed_ctr = 0;
+ drbg->d_ops = NULL;
+ drbg->core = NULL;
++ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS)) {
++ kzfree(drbg->prev);
++ drbg->prev = NULL;
++ drbg->fips_primed = false;
++ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -1211,6 +1314,14 @@ static inline int drbg_alloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
+ drbg->scratchpad = PTR_ALIGN(drbg->scratchpadbuf, ret + 1);
+ }
+
++ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS)) {
++ drbg->prev = kzalloc(drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags),
++ GFP_KERNEL);
++ if (!drbg->prev)
++ goto fini;
++ drbg->fips_primed = false;
++ }
++
+ return 0;
+
+ fini:
+@@ -1283,19 +1394,25 @@ static int drbg_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg,
+ * here. The spec is a bit convoluted here, we make it simpler.
+ */
+ if (drbg->reseed_threshold < drbg->reseed_ctr)
+- drbg->seeded = false;
++ drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED;
+
+- if (drbg->pr || !drbg->seeded) {
++ if (drbg->pr || drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED) {
+ pr_devel("DRBG: reseeding before generation (prediction "
+ "resistance: %s, state %s)\n",
+ drbg->pr ? "true" : "false",
+- drbg->seeded ? "seeded" : "unseeded");
++ (drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL ?
++ "seeded" : "unseeded"));
+ /* 9.3.1 steps 7.1 through 7.3 */
+ len = drbg_seed(drbg, addtl, true);
+ if (len)
+ goto err;
+ /* 9.3.1 step 7.4 */
+ addtl = NULL;
++ } else if (rng_is_initialized() &&
++ drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL) {
++ len = drbg_seed_from_random(drbg);
++ if (len)
++ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (addtl && 0 < addtl->len)
+@@ -1388,51 +1505,15 @@ static int drbg_generate_long(struct drbg_state *drbg,
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-static void drbg_schedule_async_seed(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
+-{
+- struct drbg_state *drbg = container_of(rdy, struct drbg_state,
+- random_ready);
+-
+- schedule_work(&drbg->seed_work);
+-}
+-
+ static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg)
+ {
+- int err;
+-
+ /* We do not need an HRNG in test mode. */
+ if (list_empty(&drbg->test_data.list))
+ return 0;
+
+- INIT_WORK(&drbg->seed_work, drbg_async_seed);
+-
+- drbg->random_ready.owner = THIS_MODULE;
+- drbg->random_ready.func = drbg_schedule_async_seed;
+-
+- err = add_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
+-
+- switch (err) {
+- case 0:
+- break;
+-
+- case -EALREADY:
+- err = 0;
+- /* fall through */
+-
+- default:
+- drbg->random_ready.func = NULL;
+- return err;
+- }
+-
+ drbg->jent = crypto_alloc_rng("jitterentropy_rng", 0, 0);
+
+- /*
+- * Require frequent reseeds until the seed source is fully
+- * initialized.
+- */
+- drbg->reseed_threshold = 50;
+-
+- return err;
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -1475,7 +1556,7 @@ static int drbg_instantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
+ if (!drbg->core) {
+ drbg->core = &drbg_cores[coreref];
+ drbg->pr = pr;
+- drbg->seeded = false;
++ drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED;
+ drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
+
+ ret = drbg_alloc_state(drbg);
+@@ -1526,12 +1607,9 @@ free_everything:
+ */
+ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)
+ {
+- if (drbg->random_ready.func) {
+- del_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
+- cancel_work_sync(&drbg->seed_work);
++ if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(drbg->jent))
+ crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent);
+- drbg->jent = NULL;
+- }
++ drbg->jent = NULL;
+
+ if (drbg->d_ops)
+ drbg->d_ops->crypto_fini(drbg);
+diff --git a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
+index 0c10d95577542..b0dea0702c748 100644
+--- a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
++++ b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
+@@ -6253,7 +6253,7 @@ struct ata_host *ata_host_alloc_pinfo(struct device *dev,
+ const struct ata_port_info * const * ppi,
+ int n_ports)
+ {
+- const struct ata_port_info *pi;
++ const struct ata_port_info *pi = &ata_dummy_port_info;
+ struct ata_host *host;
+ int i, j;
+
+@@ -6261,7 +6261,7 @@ struct ata_host *ata_host_alloc_pinfo(struct device *dev,
+ if (!host)
+ return NULL;
+
+- for (i = 0, j = 0, pi = NULL; i < host->n_ports; i++) {
++ for (i = 0, j = 0; i < host->n_ports; i++) {
+ struct ata_port *ap = host->ports[i];
+
+ if (ppi[j])
+diff --git a/drivers/char/Kconfig b/drivers/char/Kconfig
+index 1df9cb8e659e2..f55c9bbd58fba 100644
+--- a/drivers/char/Kconfig
++++ b/drivers/char/Kconfig
+@@ -552,19 +552,41 @@ config ADI
+ and SSM (Silicon Secured Memory). Intended consumers of this
+ driver include crash and makedumpfile.
+
+-endmenu
+-
+ config RANDOM_TRUST_CPU
+- bool "Trust the CPU manufacturer to initialize Linux's CRNG"
+- depends on X86 || S390 || PPC
+- default n
++ bool "Initialize RNG using CPU RNG instructions"
++ default y
++ depends on ARCH_RANDOM
+ help
+- Assume that CPU manufacturer (e.g., Intel or AMD for RDSEED or
+- RDRAND, IBM for the S390 and Power PC architectures) is trustworthy
+- for the purposes of initializing Linux's CRNG. Since this is not
+- something that can be independently audited, this amounts to trusting
+- that CPU manufacturer (perhaps with the insistence or mandate
+- of a Nation State's intelligence or law enforcement agencies)
+- has not installed a hidden back door to compromise the CPU's
+- random number generation facilities. This can also be configured
+- at boot with "random.trust_cpu=on/off".
++ Initialize the RNG using random numbers supplied by the CPU's
++ RNG instructions (e.g. RDRAND), if supported and available. These
++ random numbers are never used directly, but are rather hashed into
++ the main input pool, and this happens regardless of whether or not
++ this option is enabled. Instead, this option controls whether the
++ they are credited and hence can initialize the RNG. Additionally,
++ other sources of randomness are always used, regardless of this
++ setting. Enabling this implies trusting that the CPU can supply high
++ quality and non-backdoored random numbers.
++
++ Say Y here unless you have reason to mistrust your CPU or believe
++ its RNG facilities may be faulty. This may also be configured at
++ boot time with "random.trust_cpu=on/off".
++
++config RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER
++ bool "Initialize RNG using bootloader-supplied seed"
++ default y
++ help
++ Initialize the RNG using a seed supplied by the bootloader or boot
++ environment (e.g. EFI or a bootloader-generated device tree). This
++ seed is not used directly, but is rather hashed into the main input
++ pool, and this happens regardless of whether or not this option is
++ enabled. Instead, this option controls whether the seed is credited
++ and hence can initialize the RNG. Additionally, other sources of
++ randomness are always used, regardless of this setting. Enabling
++ this implies trusting that the bootloader can supply high quality and
++ non-backdoored seeds.
++
++ Say Y here unless you have reason to mistrust your bootloader or
++ believe its RNG facilities may be faulty. This may also be configured
++ at boot time with "random.trust_bootloader=on/off".
++
++endmenu
+diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
+index 0ef7cb0448e86..c9757fa2d3081 100644
+--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
++++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
+ #include <linux/err.h>
+ #include <linux/fs.h>
+ #include <linux/hw_random.h>
++#include <linux/random.h>
+ #include <linux/kernel.h>
+ #include <linux/kthread.h>
+ #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
+index 1127343781465..55b23104fe33d 100644
+--- a/drivers/char/random.c
++++ b/drivers/char/random.c
+@@ -1,242 +1,29 @@
++// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause)
+ /*
+- * random.c -- A strong random number generator
+- *
+- * Copyright (C) 2017 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All
+- * Rights Reserved.
+- *
++ * Copyright (C) 2017-2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>, 2003, 2004, 2005
+- *
+- * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. All
+- * rights reserved.
+- *
+- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+- * are met:
+- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+- * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+- * including the disclaimer of warranties.
+- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+- * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+- * products derived from this software without specific prior
+- * written permission.
+- *
+- * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+- * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+- * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
+- * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+- * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+- *
+- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+- * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
+- * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
+- * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+- * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
+- * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+- * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
+- * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
+- * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
+- * DAMAGE.
++ * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * This driver produces cryptographically secure pseudorandom data. It is divided
++ * into roughly six sections, each with a section header:
++ *
++ * - Initialization and readiness waiting.
++ * - Fast key erasure RNG, the "crng".
++ * - Entropy accumulation and extraction routines.
++ * - Entropy collection routines.
++ * - Userspace reader/writer interfaces.
++ * - Sysctl interface.
++ *
++ * The high level overview is that there is one input pool, into which
++ * various pieces of data are hashed. Prior to initialization, some of that
++ * data is then "credited" as having a certain number of bits of entropy.
++ * When enough bits of entropy are available, the hash is finalized and
++ * handed as a key to a stream cipher that expands it indefinitely for
++ * various consumers. This key is periodically refreshed as the various
++ * entropy collectors, described below, add data to the input pool.
+ */
+
+-/*
+- * (now, with legal B.S. out of the way.....)
+- *
+- * This routine gathers environmental noise from device drivers, etc.,
+- * and returns good random numbers, suitable for cryptographic use.
+- * Besides the obvious cryptographic uses, these numbers are also good
+- * for seeding TCP sequence numbers, and other places where it is
+- * desirable to have numbers which are not only random, but hard to
+- * predict by an attacker.
+- *
+- * Theory of operation
+- * ===================
+- *
+- * Computers are very predictable devices. Hence it is extremely hard
+- * to produce truly random numbers on a computer --- as opposed to
+- * pseudo-random numbers, which can easily generated by using a
+- * algorithm. Unfortunately, it is very easy for attackers to guess
+- * the sequence of pseudo-random number generators, and for some
+- * applications this is not acceptable. So instead, we must try to
+- * gather "environmental noise" from the computer's environment, which
+- * must be hard for outside attackers to observe, and use that to
+- * generate random numbers. In a Unix environment, this is best done
+- * from inside the kernel.
+- *
+- * Sources of randomness from the environment include inter-keyboard
+- * timings, inter-interrupt timings from some interrupts, and other
+- * events which are both (a) non-deterministic and (b) hard for an
+- * outside observer to measure. Randomness from these sources are
+- * added to an "entropy pool", which is mixed using a CRC-like function.
+- * This is not cryptographically strong, but it is adequate assuming
+- * the randomness is not chosen maliciously, and it is fast enough that
+- * the overhead of doing it on every interrupt is very reasonable.
+- * As random bytes are mixed into the entropy pool, the routines keep
+- * an *estimate* of how many bits of randomness have been stored into
+- * the random number generator's internal state.
+- *
+- * When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the SHA
+- * hash of the contents of the "entropy pool". The SHA hash avoids
+- * exposing the internal state of the entropy pool. It is believed to
+- * be computationally infeasible to derive any useful information
+- * about the input of SHA from its output. Even if it is possible to
+- * analyze SHA in some clever way, as long as the amount of data
+- * returned from the generator is less than the inherent entropy in
+- * the pool, the output data is totally unpredictable. For this
+- * reason, the routine decreases its internal estimate of how many
+- * bits of "true randomness" are contained in the entropy pool as it
+- * outputs random numbers.
+- *
+- * If this estimate goes to zero, the routine can still generate
+- * random numbers; however, an attacker may (at least in theory) be
+- * able to infer the future output of the generator from prior
+- * outputs. This requires successful cryptanalysis of SHA, which is
+- * not believed to be feasible, but there is a remote possibility.
+- * Nonetheless, these numbers should be useful for the vast majority
+- * of purposes.
+- *
+- * Exported interfaces ---- output
+- * ===============================
+- *
+- * There are three exported interfaces; the first is one designed to
+- * be used from within the kernel:
+- *
+- * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
+- *
+- * This interface will return the requested number of random bytes,
+- * and place it in the requested buffer.
+- *
+- * The two other interfaces are two character devices /dev/random and
+- * /dev/urandom. /dev/random is suitable for use when very high
+- * quality randomness is desired (for example, for key generation or
+- * one-time pads), as it will only return a maximum of the number of
+- * bits of randomness (as estimated by the random number generator)
+- * contained in the entropy pool.
+- *
+- * The /dev/urandom device does not have this limit, and will return
+- * as many bytes as are requested. As more and more random bytes are
+- * requested without giving time for the entropy pool to recharge,
+- * this will result in random numbers that are merely cryptographically
+- * strong. For many applications, however, this is acceptable.
+- *
+- * Exported interfaces ---- input
+- * ==============================
+- *
+- * The current exported interfaces for gathering environmental noise
+- * from the devices are:
+- *
+- * void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size);
+- * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+- * unsigned int value);
+- * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags);
+- * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
+- *
+- * add_device_randomness() is for adding data to the random pool that
+- * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot).
+- * This would be things like MAC addresses or serial numbers, or the
+- * read-out of the RTC. This does *not* add any actual entropy to the
+- * pool, but it initializes the pool to different values for devices
+- * that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy
+- * available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).
+- *
+- * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well as
+- * the event type information from the hardware.
+- *
+- * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the interrupt timing as random
+- * inputs to the entropy pool. Using the cycle counters and the irq source
+- * as inputs, it feeds the randomness roughly once a second.
+- *
+- * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block
+- * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the
+- * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low
+- * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek
+- * times are usually fairly consistent.
+- *
+- * All of these routines try to estimate how many bits of randomness a
+- * particular randomness source. They do this by keeping track of the
+- * first and second order deltas of the event timings.
+- *
+- * Ensuring unpredictability at system startup
+- * ============================================
+- *
+- * When any operating system starts up, it will go through a sequence
+- * of actions that are fairly predictable by an adversary, especially
+- * if the start-up does not involve interaction with a human operator.
+- * This reduces the actual number of bits of unpredictability in the
+- * entropy pool below the value in entropy_count. In order to
+- * counteract this effect, it helps to carry information in the
+- * entropy pool across shut-downs and start-ups. To do this, put the
+- * following lines an appropriate script which is run during the boot
+- * sequence:
+- *
+- * echo "Initializing random number generator..."
+- * random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
+- * # Carry a random seed from start-up to start-up
+- * # Load and then save the whole entropy pool
+- * if [ -f $random_seed ]; then
+- * cat $random_seed >/dev/urandom
+- * else
+- * touch $random_seed
+- * fi
+- * chmod 600 $random_seed
+- * dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=512
+- *
+- * and the following lines in an appropriate script which is run as
+- * the system is shutdown:
+- *
+- * # Carry a random seed from shut-down to start-up
+- * # Save the whole entropy pool
+- * echo "Saving random seed..."
+- * random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
+- * touch $random_seed
+- * chmod 600 $random_seed
+- * dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=512
+- *
+- * For example, on most modern systems using the System V init
+- * scripts, such code fragments would be found in
+- * /etc/rc.d/init.d/random. On older Linux systems, the correct script
+- * location might be in /etc/rcb.d/rc.local or /etc/rc.d/rc.0.
+- *
+- * Effectively, these commands cause the contents of the entropy pool
+- * to be saved at shut-down time and reloaded into the entropy pool at
+- * start-up. (The 'dd' in the addition to the bootup script is to
+- * make sure that /etc/random-seed is different for every start-up,
+- * even if the system crashes without executing rc.0.) Even with
+- * complete knowledge of the start-up activities, predicting the state
+- * of the entropy pool requires knowledge of the previous history of
+- * the system.
+- *
+- * Configuring the /dev/random driver under Linux
+- * ==============================================
+- *
+- * The /dev/random driver under Linux uses minor numbers 8 and 9 of
+- * the /dev/mem major number (#1). So if your system does not have
+- * /dev/random and /dev/urandom created already, they can be created
+- * by using the commands:
+- *
+- * mknod /dev/random c 1 8
+- * mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9
+- *
+- * Acknowledgements:
+- * =================
+- *
+- * Ideas for constructing this random number generator were derived
+- * from Pretty Good Privacy's random number generator, and from private
+- * discussions with Phil Karn. Colin Plumb provided a faster random
+- * number generator, which speed up the mixing function of the entropy
+- * pool, taken from PGPfone. Dale Worley has also contributed many
+- * useful ideas and suggestions to improve this driver.
+- *
+- * Any flaws in the design are solely my responsibility, and should
+- * not be attributed to the Phil, Colin, or any of authors of PGP.
+- *
+- * Further background information on this topic may be obtained from
+- * RFC 1750, "Randomness Recommendations for Security", by Donald
+- * Eastlake, Steve Crocker, and Jeff Schiller.
+- */
++#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+ #include <linux/utsname.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
+@@ -256,8 +43,6 @@
+ #include <linux/spinlock.h>
+ #include <linux/kthread.h>
+ #include <linux/percpu.h>
+-#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
+-#include <linux/fips.h>
+ #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+ #include <linux/workqueue.h>
+ #include <linux/irq.h>
+@@ -265,1636 +50,1067 @@
+ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+ #include <linux/completion.h>
+ #include <linux/uuid.h>
++#include <linux/uaccess.h>
++#include <linux/siphash.h>
++#include <linux/uio.h>
+ #include <crypto/chacha20.h>
+-
++#include <crypto/blake2s.h>
+ #include <asm/processor.h>
+-#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/irq.h>
+ #include <asm/irq_regs.h>
+ #include <asm/io.h>
+
+-#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+-#include <trace/events/random.h>
+-
+-/* #define ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH */
++/*********************************************************************
++ *
++ * Initialization and readiness waiting.
++ *
++ * Much of the RNG infrastructure is devoted to various dependencies
++ * being able to wait until the RNG has collected enough entropy and
++ * is ready for safe consumption.
++ *
++ *********************************************************************/
+
+ /*
+- * Configuration information
++ * crng_init is protected by base_crng->lock, and only increases
++ * its value (from empty->early->ready).
+ */
+-#define INPUT_POOL_SHIFT 12
+-#define INPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
+-#define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT 10
+-#define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
+-#define SEC_XFER_SIZE 512
+-#define EXTRACT_SIZE 10
+-
++static enum {
++ CRNG_EMPTY = 0, /* Little to no entropy collected */
++ CRNG_EARLY = 1, /* At least POOL_EARLY_BITS collected */
++ CRNG_READY = 2 /* Fully initialized with POOL_READY_BITS collected */
++} crng_init __read_mostly = CRNG_EMPTY;
++#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init >= CRNG_READY))
++/* Various types of waiters for crng_init->CRNG_READY transition. */
++static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
++static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
++static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_chain_lock);
++static RAW_NOTIFIER_HEAD(random_ready_chain);
+
+-#define LONGS(x) (((x) + sizeof(unsigned long) - 1)/sizeof(unsigned long))
++/* Control how we warn userspace. */
++static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning =
++ RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_urandom_randomness", HZ, 3);
++static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly =
++ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM);
++module_param_named(ratelimit_disable, ratelimit_disable, int, 0644);
++MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression");
+
+ /*
+- * To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is
+- * denominated in units of 1/8th bits.
++ * Returns whether or not the input pool has been seeded and thus guaranteed
++ * to supply cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the
++ * /dev/urandom device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,
++ * ,u64,int,long} family of functions.
+ *
+- * 2*(ENTROPY_SHIFT + log2(poolbits)) must <= 31, or the multiply in
+- * credit_entropy_bits() needs to be 64 bits wide.
++ * Returns: true if the input pool has been seeded.
++ * false if the input pool has not been seeded.
+ */
+-#define ENTROPY_SHIFT 3
+-#define ENTROPY_BITS(r) ((r)->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT)
++bool rng_is_initialized(void)
++{
++ return crng_ready();
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized);
+
+-/*
+- * The minimum number of bits of entropy before we wake up a read on
+- * /dev/random. Should be enough to do a significant reseed.
+- */
+-static int random_read_wakeup_bits = 64;
++/* Used by wait_for_random_bytes(), and considered an entropy collector, below. */
++static void try_to_generate_entropy(void);
+
+ /*
+- * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we
+- * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write
+- * access to /dev/random.
++ * Wait for the input pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply
++ * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom
++ * device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,u64,int,long}
++ * family of functions. Using any of these functions without first calling
++ * this function forfeits the guarantee of security.
++ *
++ * Returns: 0 if the input pool has been seeded.
++ * -ERESTARTSYS if the function was interrupted by a signal.
+ */
+-static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS;
++int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
++{
++ while (!crng_ready()) {
++ int ret;
++
++ try_to_generate_entropy();
++ ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
++ if (ret)
++ return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
++ }
++ return 0;
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
+
+ /*
+- * Originally, we used a primitive polynomial of degree .poolwords
+- * over GF(2). The taps for various sizes are defined below. They
+- * were chosen to be evenly spaced except for the last tap, which is 1
+- * to get the twisting happening as fast as possible.
+- *
+- * For the purposes of better mixing, we use the CRC-32 polynomial as
+- * well to make a (modified) twisted Generalized Feedback Shift
+- * Register. (See M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1992. Twisted GFSR
+- * generators. ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation
+- * 2(3):179-194. Also see M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1994. Twisted
+- * GFSR generators II. ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer
+- * Simulation 4:254-266)
+- *
+- * Thanks to Colin Plumb for suggesting this.
+- *
+- * The mixing operation is much less sensitive than the output hash,
+- * where we use SHA-1. All that we want of mixing operation is that
+- * it be a good non-cryptographic hash; i.e. it not produce collisions
+- * when fed "random" data of the sort we expect to see. As long as
+- * the pool state differs for different inputs, we have preserved the
+- * input entropy and done a good job. The fact that an intelligent
+- * attacker can construct inputs that will produce controlled
+- * alterations to the pool's state is not important because we don't
+- * consider such inputs to contribute any randomness. The only
+- * property we need with respect to them is that the attacker can't
+- * increase his/her knowledge of the pool's state. Since all
+- * additions are reversible (knowing the final state and the input,
+- * you can reconstruct the initial state), if an attacker has any
+- * uncertainty about the initial state, he/she can only shuffle that
+- * uncertainty about, but never cause any collisions (which would
+- * decrease the uncertainty).
++ * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the input
++ * pool is initialised.
+ *
+- * Our mixing functions were analyzed by Lacharme, Roeck, Strubel, and
+- * Videau in their paper, "The Linux Pseudorandom Number Generator
+- * Revisited" (see: http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/251.pdf). In their
+- * paper, they point out that we are not using a true Twisted GFSR,
+- * since Matsumoto & Kurita used a trinomial feedback polynomial (that
+- * is, with only three taps, instead of the six that we are using).
+- * As a result, the resulting polynomial is neither primitive nor
+- * irreducible, and hence does not have a maximal period over
+- * GF(2**32). They suggest a slight change to the generator
+- * polynomial which improves the resulting TGFSR polynomial to be
+- * irreducible, which we have made here.
++ * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added
++ * -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called)
+ */
+-static struct poolinfo {
+- int poolbitshift, poolwords, poolbytes, poolbits, poolfracbits;
+-#define S(x) ilog2(x)+5, (x), (x)*4, (x)*32, (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5)
+- int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
+-} poolinfo_table[] = {
+- /* was: x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */
+- /* x^128 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */
+- { S(128), 104, 76, 51, 25, 1 },
+- /* was: x^32 + x^26 + x^20 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */
+- /* x^32 + x^26 + x^19 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */
+- { S(32), 26, 19, 14, 7, 1 },
+-#if 0
+- /* x^2048 + x^1638 + x^1231 + x^819 + x^411 + x + 1 -- 115 */
+- { S(2048), 1638, 1231, 819, 411, 1 },
+-
+- /* x^1024 + x^817 + x^615 + x^412 + x^204 + x + 1 -- 290 */
+- { S(1024), 817, 615, 412, 204, 1 },
+-
+- /* x^1024 + x^819 + x^616 + x^410 + x^207 + x^2 + 1 -- 115 */
+- { S(1024), 819, 616, 410, 207, 2 },
+-
+- /* x^512 + x^411 + x^308 + x^208 + x^104 + x + 1 -- 225 */
+- { S(512), 411, 308, 208, 104, 1 },
+-
+- /* x^512 + x^409 + x^307 + x^206 + x^102 + x^2 + 1 -- 95 */
+- { S(512), 409, 307, 206, 102, 2 },
+- /* x^512 + x^409 + x^309 + x^205 + x^103 + x^2 + 1 -- 95 */
+- { S(512), 409, 309, 205, 103, 2 },
+-
+- /* x^256 + x^205 + x^155 + x^101 + x^52 + x + 1 -- 125 */
+- { S(256), 205, 155, 101, 52, 1 },
+-
+- /* x^128 + x^103 + x^78 + x^51 + x^27 + x^2 + 1 -- 70 */
+- { S(128), 103, 78, 51, 27, 2 },
+-
+- /* x^64 + x^52 + x^39 + x^26 + x^14 + x + 1 -- 15 */
+- { S(64), 52, 39, 26, 14, 1 },
+-#endif
+-};
++int __cold register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
++{
++ unsigned long flags;
++ int ret = -EALREADY;
++
++ if (crng_ready())
++ return ret;
++
++ spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
++ if (!crng_ready())
++ ret = raw_notifier_chain_register(&random_ready_chain, nb);
++ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
++ return ret;
++}
+
+ /*
+- * Static global variables
++ * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function.
+ */
+-static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_read_wait);
+-static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);
+-static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
+-
+-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock);
+-static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list);
++int __cold unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
++{
++ unsigned long flags;
++ int ret;
+
+-struct crng_state {
+- __u32 state[16];
+- unsigned long init_time;
+- spinlock_t lock;
+-};
++ spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
++ ret = raw_notifier_chain_unregister(&random_ready_chain, nb);
++ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
++ return ret;
++}
+
+-struct crng_state primary_crng = {
+- .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(primary_crng.lock),
+-};
++static void __cold process_random_ready_list(void)
++{
++ unsigned long flags;
+
+-/*
+- * crng_init = 0 --> Uninitialized
+- * 1 --> Initialized
+- * 2 --> Initialized from input_pool
+- *
+- * crng_init is protected by primary_crng->lock, and only increases
+- * its value (from 0->1->2).
+- */
+-static int crng_init = 0;
+-#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
+-static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
+-static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0;
+-#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE)
+-static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
+- __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]);
+-static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
+- __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used);
+-static void process_random_ready_list(void);
+-static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
+-
+-static struct ratelimit_state unseeded_warning =
+- RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_unseeded_randomness", HZ, 3);
+-static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning =
+- RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_urandom_randomness", HZ, 3);
++ spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
++ raw_notifier_call_chain(&random_ready_chain, 0, NULL);
++ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
++}
+
+-static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly;
++#define warn_unseeded_randomness() \
++ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM) && !crng_ready()) \
++ pr_notice("%s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n", \
++ __func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, crng_init)
+
+-module_param_named(ratelimit_disable, ratelimit_disable, int, 0644);
+-MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression");
+
+-/**********************************************************************
++/*********************************************************************
+ *
+- * OS independent entropy store. Here are the functions which handle
+- * storing entropy in an entropy pool.
++ * Fast key erasure RNG, the "crng".
+ *
+- **********************************************************************/
++ * These functions expand entropy from the entropy extractor into
++ * long streams for external consumption using the "fast key erasure"
++ * RNG described at <https://blog.cr.yp.to/20170723-random.html>.
++ *
++ * There are a few exported interfaces for use by other drivers:
++ *
++ * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
++ * u32 get_random_u32()
++ * u64 get_random_u64()
++ * unsigned int get_random_int()
++ * unsigned long get_random_long()
++ *
++ * These interfaces will return the requested number of random bytes
++ * into the given buffer or as a return value. This is equivalent to
++ * a read from /dev/urandom. The u32, u64, int, and long family of
++ * functions may be higher performance for one-off random integers,
++ * because they do a bit of buffering and do not invoke reseeding
++ * until the buffer is emptied.
++ *
++ *********************************************************************/
+
+-struct entropy_store;
+-struct entropy_store {
+- /* read-only data: */
+- const struct poolinfo *poolinfo;
+- __u32 *pool;
+- const char *name;
+- struct entropy_store *pull;
+- struct work_struct push_work;
+-
+- /* read-write data: */
+- unsigned long last_pulled;
+- spinlock_t lock;
+- unsigned short add_ptr;
+- unsigned short input_rotate;
+- int entropy_count;
+- int entropy_total;
+- unsigned int initialized:1;
+- unsigned int last_data_init:1;
+- __u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE];
++enum {
++ CRNG_RESEED_START_INTERVAL = HZ,
++ CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL = 60 * HZ
+ };
+
+-static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
+- size_t nbytes, int min, int rsvd);
+-static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
+- size_t nbytes, int fips);
+-
+-static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r);
+-static void push_to_pool(struct work_struct *work);
+-static __u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;
+-static __u32 blocking_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;
+-
+-static struct entropy_store input_pool = {
+- .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0],
+- .name = "input",
+- .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
+- .pool = input_pool_data
++static struct {
++ u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(long));
++ unsigned long birth;
++ unsigned long generation;
++ spinlock_t lock;
++} base_crng = {
++ .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(base_crng.lock)
+ };
+
+-static struct entropy_store blocking_pool = {
+- .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[1],
+- .name = "blocking",
+- .pull = &input_pool,
+- .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(blocking_pool.lock),
+- .pool = blocking_pool_data,
+- .push_work = __WORK_INITIALIZER(blocking_pool.push_work,
+- push_to_pool),
++struct crng {
++ u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE];
++ unsigned long generation;
+ };
+
+-static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
+- 0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
+- 0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 };
+-
+-/*
+- * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool". It does not
+- * update the entropy estimate. The caller should call
+- * credit_entropy_bits if this is appropriate.
+- *
+- * The pool is stirred with a primitive polynomial of the appropriate
+- * degree, and then twisted. We twist by three bits at a time because
+- * it's cheap to do so and helps slightly in the expected case where
+- * the entropy is concentrated in the low-order bits.
+- */
+-static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
+- int nbytes)
+-{
+- unsigned long i, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
+- int input_rotate;
+- int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords - 1;
+- const char *bytes = in;
+- __u32 w;
+-
+- tap1 = r->poolinfo->tap1;
+- tap2 = r->poolinfo->tap2;
+- tap3 = r->poolinfo->tap3;
+- tap4 = r->poolinfo->tap4;
+- tap5 = r->poolinfo->tap5;
+-
+- input_rotate = r->input_rotate;
+- i = r->add_ptr;
+-
+- /* mix one byte at a time to simplify size handling and churn faster */
+- while (nbytes--) {
+- w = rol32(*bytes++, input_rotate);
+- i = (i - 1) & wordmask;
+-
+- /* XOR in the various taps */
+- w ^= r->pool[i];
+- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap1) & wordmask];
+- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap2) & wordmask];
+- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap3) & wordmask];
+- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap4) & wordmask];
+- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap5) & wordmask];
+-
+- /* Mix the result back in with a twist */
+- r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7];
+-
+- /*
+- * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool.
+- * At the beginning of the pool, add an extra 7 bits
+- * rotation, so that successive passes spread the
+- * input bits across the pool evenly.
+- */
+- input_rotate = (input_rotate + (i ? 7 : 14)) & 31;
+- }
+-
+- r->input_rotate = input_rotate;
+- r->add_ptr = i;
+-}
++static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs) = {
++ .generation = ULONG_MAX
++};
+
+-static void __mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
+- int nbytes)
+-{
+- trace_mix_pool_bytes_nolock(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_);
+- _mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes);
+-}
++/* Used by crng_reseed() and crng_make_state() to extract a new seed from the input pool. */
++static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len);
+
+-static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
+- int nbytes)
++/* This extracts a new crng key from the input pool. */
++static void crng_reseed(void)
+ {
+ unsigned long flags;
++ unsigned long next_gen;
++ u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE];
+
+- trace_mix_pool_bytes(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_);
+- spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
+- _mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes);
+- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
+-}
++ extract_entropy(key, sizeof(key));
+
+-struct fast_pool {
+- __u32 pool[4];
+- unsigned long last;
+- unsigned short reg_idx;
+- unsigned char count;
+-};
++ /*
++ * We copy the new key into the base_crng, overwriting the old one,
++ * and update the generation counter. We avoid hitting ULONG_MAX,
++ * because the per-cpu crngs are initialized to ULONG_MAX, so this
++ * forces new CPUs that come online to always initialize.
++ */
++ spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
++ memcpy(base_crng.key, key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
++ next_gen = base_crng.generation + 1;
++ if (next_gen == ULONG_MAX)
++ ++next_gen;
++ WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen);
++ WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.birth, jiffies);
++ if (!crng_ready())
++ crng_init = CRNG_READY;
++ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
++ memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(key));
++}
+
+ /*
+- * This is a fast mixing routine used by the interrupt randomness
+- * collector. It's hardcoded for an 128 bit pool and assumes that any
+- * locks that might be needed are taken by the caller.
++ * This generates a ChaCha block using the provided key, and then
++ * immediately overwites that key with half the block. It returns
++ * the resultant ChaCha state to the user, along with the second
++ * half of the block containing 32 bytes of random data that may
++ * be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32.
++ *
++ * The returned ChaCha state contains within it a copy of the old
++ * key value, at index 4, so the state should always be zeroed out
++ * immediately after using in order to maintain forward secrecy.
++ * If the state cannot be erased in a timely manner, then it is
++ * safer to set the random_data parameter to &chacha_state[4] so
++ * that this function overwrites it before returning.
+ */
+-static void fast_mix(struct fast_pool *f)
++static void crng_fast_key_erasure(u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE],
++ u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)],
++ u8 *random_data, size_t random_data_len)
+ {
+- __u32 a = f->pool[0], b = f->pool[1];
+- __u32 c = f->pool[2], d = f->pool[3];
++ u8 first_block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+- a += b; c += d;
+- b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27);
+- d ^= a; b ^= c;
++ BUG_ON(random_data_len > 32);
+
+- a += b; c += d;
+- b = rol32(b, 16); d = rol32(d, 14);
+- d ^= a; b ^= c;
++ chacha_init_consts(chacha_state);
++ memcpy(&chacha_state[4], key, CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE);
++ memset(&chacha_state[12], 0, sizeof(u32) * 4);
++ chacha20_block(chacha_state, first_block);
+
+- a += b; c += d;
+- b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27);
+- d ^= a; b ^= c;
+-
+- a += b; c += d;
+- b = rol32(b, 16); d = rol32(d, 14);
+- d ^= a; b ^= c;
+-
+- f->pool[0] = a; f->pool[1] = b;
+- f->pool[2] = c; f->pool[3] = d;
+- f->count++;
++ memcpy(key, first_block, CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE);
++ memcpy(random_data, first_block + CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, random_data_len);
++ memzero_explicit(first_block, sizeof(first_block));
+ }
+
+-static void process_random_ready_list(void)
+-{
+- unsigned long flags;
+- struct random_ready_callback *rdy, *tmp;
+-
+- spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+- list_for_each_entry_safe(rdy, tmp, &random_ready_list, list) {
+- struct module *owner = rdy->owner;
+-
+- list_del_init(&rdy->list);
+- rdy->func(rdy);
+- module_put(owner);
++/*
++ * Return whether the crng seed is considered to be sufficiently old
++ * that a reseeding is needed. This happens if the last reseeding
++ * was CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL ago, or during early boot, at an interval
++ * proportional to the uptime.
++ */
++static bool crng_has_old_seed(void)
++{
++ static bool early_boot = true;
++ unsigned long interval = CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL;
++
++ if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(early_boot))) {
++ time64_t uptime = ktime_get_seconds();
++ if (uptime >= CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL / HZ * 2)
++ WRITE_ONCE(early_boot, false);
++ else
++ interval = max_t(unsigned int, CRNG_RESEED_START_INTERVAL,
++ (unsigned int)uptime / 2 * HZ);
+ }
+- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
++ return time_is_before_jiffies(READ_ONCE(base_crng.birth) + interval);
+ }
+
+ /*
+- * Credit (or debit) the entropy store with n bits of entropy.
+- * Use credit_entropy_bits_safe() if the value comes from userspace
+- * or otherwise should be checked for extreme values.
++ * This function returns a ChaCha state that you may use for generating
++ * random data. It also returns up to 32 bytes on its own of random data
++ * that may be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32.
+ */
+-static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
++static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)],
++ u8 *random_data, size_t random_data_len)
+ {
+- int entropy_count, orig;
+- const int pool_size = r->poolinfo->poolfracbits;
+- int nfrac = nbits << ENTROPY_SHIFT;
+-
+- if (!nbits)
+- return;
++ unsigned long flags;
++ struct crng *crng;
+
+-retry:
+- entropy_count = orig = READ_ONCE(r->entropy_count);
+- if (nfrac < 0) {
+- /* Debit */
+- entropy_count += nfrac;
+- } else {
+- /*
+- * Credit: we have to account for the possibility of
+- * overwriting already present entropy. Even in the
+- * ideal case of pure Shannon entropy, new contributions
+- * approach the full value asymptotically:
+- *
+- * entropy <- entropy + (pool_size - entropy) *
+- * (1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size))
+- *
+- * For add_entropy <= pool_size/2 then
+- * (1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size)) >=
+- * (add_entropy/pool_size)*0.7869...
+- * so we can approximate the exponential with
+- * 3/4*add_entropy/pool_size and still be on the
+- * safe side by adding at most pool_size/2 at a time.
+- *
+- * The use of pool_size-2 in the while statement is to
+- * prevent rounding artifacts from making the loop
+- * arbitrarily long; this limits the loop to log2(pool_size)*2
+- * turns no matter how large nbits is.
+- */
+- int pnfrac = nfrac;
+- const int s = r->poolinfo->poolbitshift + ENTROPY_SHIFT + 2;
+- /* The +2 corresponds to the /4 in the denominator */
+-
+- do {
+- unsigned int anfrac = min(pnfrac, pool_size/2);
+- unsigned int add =
+- ((pool_size - entropy_count)*anfrac*3) >> s;
+-
+- entropy_count += add;
+- pnfrac -= anfrac;
+- } while (unlikely(entropy_count < pool_size-2 && pnfrac));
+- }
++ BUG_ON(random_data_len > 32);
+
+- if (unlikely(entropy_count < 0)) {
+- pr_warn("random: negative entropy/overflow: pool %s count %d\n",
+- r->name, entropy_count);
+- WARN_ON(1);
+- entropy_count = 0;
+- } else if (entropy_count > pool_size)
+- entropy_count = pool_size;
+- if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
+- goto retry;
+-
+- r->entropy_total += nbits;
+- if (!r->initialized && r->entropy_total > 128) {
+- r->initialized = 1;
+- r->entropy_total = 0;
++ /*
++ * For the fast path, we check whether we're ready, unlocked first, and
++ * then re-check once locked later. In the case where we're really not
++ * ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, extracting
++ * when crng_init is CRNG_EMPTY.
++ */
++ if (!crng_ready()) {
++ bool ready;
++
++ spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
++ ready = crng_ready();
++ if (!ready) {
++ if (crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY)
++ extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
++ crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state,
++ random_data, random_data_len);
++ }
++ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
++ if (!ready)
++ return;
+ }
+
+- trace_credit_entropy_bits(r->name, nbits,
+- entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT,
+- r->entropy_total, _RET_IP_);
+-
+- if (r == &input_pool) {
+- int entropy_bits = entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT;
++ /*
++ * If the base_crng is old enough, we reseed, which in turn bumps the
++ * generation counter that we check below.
++ */
++ if (unlikely(crng_has_old_seed()))
++ crng_reseed();
+
+- if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_bits >= 128) {
+- crng_reseed(&primary_crng, r);
+- entropy_bits = r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT;
+- }
++ local_irq_save(flags);
++ crng = raw_cpu_ptr(&crngs);
+
+- /* should we wake readers? */
+- if (entropy_bits >= random_read_wakeup_bits &&
+- wq_has_sleeper(&random_read_wait)) {
+- wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait);
+- kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
+- }
+- /* If the input pool is getting full, send some
+- * entropy to the blocking pool until it is 75% full.
+- */
+- if (entropy_bits > random_write_wakeup_bits &&
+- r->initialized &&
+- r->entropy_total >= 2*random_read_wakeup_bits) {
+- struct entropy_store *other = &blocking_pool;
+-
+- if (other->entropy_count <=
+- 3 * other->poolinfo->poolfracbits / 4) {
+- schedule_work(&other->push_work);
+- r->entropy_total = 0;
+- }
+- }
++ /*
++ * If our per-cpu crng is older than the base_crng, then it means
++ * somebody reseeded the base_crng. In that case, we do fast key
++ * erasure on the base_crng, and use its output as the new key
++ * for our per-cpu crng. This brings us up to date with base_crng.
++ */
++ if (unlikely(crng->generation != READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation))) {
++ spin_lock(&base_crng.lock);
++ crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state,
++ crng->key, sizeof(crng->key));
++ crng->generation = base_crng.generation;
++ spin_unlock(&base_crng.lock);
+ }
++
++ /*
++ * Finally, when we've made it this far, our per-cpu crng has an up
++ * to date key, and we can do fast key erasure with it to produce
++ * some random data and a ChaCha state for the caller. All other
++ * branches of this function are "unlikely", so most of the time we
++ * should wind up here immediately.
++ */
++ crng_fast_key_erasure(crng->key, chacha_state, random_data, random_data_len);
++ local_irq_restore(flags);
+ }
+
+-static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
++static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+- const int nbits_max = r->poolinfo->poolwords * 32;
+-
+- if (nbits < 0)
+- return -EINVAL;
++ u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
++ u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
++ size_t first_block_len;
+
+- /* Cap the value to avoid overflows */
+- nbits = min(nbits, nbits_max);
++ if (!len)
++ return;
+
+- credit_entropy_bits(r, nbits);
+- return 0;
+-}
++ first_block_len = min_t(size_t, 32, len);
++ crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, first_block_len);
++ len -= first_block_len;
++ buf += first_block_len;
+
+-/*********************************************************************
+- *
+- * CRNG using CHACHA20
+- *
+- *********************************************************************/
++ while (len) {
++ if (len < CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) {
++ chacha20_block(chacha_state, tmp);
++ memcpy(buf, tmp, len);
++ memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
++ break;
++ }
+
+-#define CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL (300*HZ)
++ chacha20_block(chacha_state, buf);
++ if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
++ ++chacha_state[13];
++ len -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
++ buf += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
++ }
+
+-static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
++ memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
++}
+
+-#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
+ /*
+- * Hack to deal with crazy userspace progams when they are all trying
+- * to access /dev/urandom in parallel. The programs are almost
+- * certainly doing something terribly wrong, but we'll work around
+- * their brain damage.
++ * This function is the exported kernel interface. It returns some
++ * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding
++ * TCP sequence numbers, etc. It does not rely on the hardware random
++ * number generator. For random bytes direct from the hardware RNG
++ * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch(). In order to ensure
++ * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
++ * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once
++ * at any point prior.
+ */
+-static struct crng_state **crng_node_pool __read_mostly;
+-#endif
+-
+-static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void);
+-static void numa_crng_init(void);
+-
+-static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU);
+-static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg)
++void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+- return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu);
++ warn_unseeded_randomness();
++ _get_random_bytes(buf, len);
+ }
+-early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
+
+-static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng)
++static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(struct iov_iter *iter)
+ {
+- int i;
+- int arch_init = 1;
+- unsigned long rv;
+-
+- memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16);
+- if (crng == &primary_crng)
+- _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4],
+- sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0);
+- else
+- _get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12);
+- for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
+- if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
+- !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) {
+- rv = random_get_entropy();
+- arch_init = 0;
+- }
+- crng->state[i] ^= rv;
+- }
+- if (trust_cpu && arch_init && crng == &primary_crng) {
+- invalidate_batched_entropy();
+- numa_crng_init();
+- crng_init = 2;
+- pr_notice("random: crng done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n");
+- }
+- crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
+-}
++ u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
++ u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
++ size_t ret = 0, copied;
+
+-#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
+-static void do_numa_crng_init(struct work_struct *work)
+-{
+- int i;
+- struct crng_state *crng;
+- struct crng_state **pool;
+-
+- pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL);
+- for_each_online_node(i) {
+- crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state),
+- GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i);
+- spin_lock_init(&crng->lock);
+- crng_initialize(crng);
+- pool[i] = crng;
+- }
+- /* pairs with READ_ONCE() in select_crng() */
+- if (cmpxchg_release(&crng_node_pool, NULL, pool) != NULL) {
+- for_each_node(i)
+- kfree(pool[i]);
+- kfree(pool);
+- }
+-}
++ if (unlikely(!iov_iter_count(iter)))
++ return 0;
+
+-static DECLARE_WORK(numa_crng_init_work, do_numa_crng_init);
++ /*
++ * Immediately overwrite the ChaCha key at index 4 with random
++ * bytes, in case userspace causes copy_to_user() below to sleep
++ * forever, so that we still retain forward secrecy in that case.
++ */
++ crng_make_state(chacha_state, (u8 *)&chacha_state[4], CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE);
++ /*
++ * However, if we're doing a read of len <= 32, we don't need to
++ * use chacha_state after, so we can simply return those bytes to
++ * the user directly.
++ */
++ if (iov_iter_count(iter) <= CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE) {
++ ret = copy_to_iter(&chacha_state[4], CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, iter);
++ goto out_zero_chacha;
++ }
+
+-static void numa_crng_init(void)
+-{
+- schedule_work(&numa_crng_init_work);
+-}
++ for (;;) {
++ chacha20_block(chacha_state, block);
++ if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
++ ++chacha_state[13];
+
+-static struct crng_state *select_crng(void)
+-{
+- struct crng_state **pool;
+- int nid = numa_node_id();
++ copied = copy_to_iter(block, sizeof(block), iter);
++ ret += copied;
++ if (!iov_iter_count(iter) || copied != sizeof(block))
++ break;
+
+- /* pairs with cmpxchg_release() in do_numa_crng_init() */
+- pool = READ_ONCE(crng_node_pool);
+- if (pool && pool[nid])
+- return pool[nid];
++ BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % sizeof(block) != 0);
++ if (ret % PAGE_SIZE == 0) {
++ if (signal_pending(current))
++ break;
++ cond_resched();
++ }
++ }
+
+- return &primary_crng;
++ memzero_explicit(block, sizeof(block));
++out_zero_chacha:
++ memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
++ return ret ? ret : -EFAULT;
+ }
+-#else
+-static void numa_crng_init(void) {}
+
+-static struct crng_state *select_crng(void)
++/*
++ * Batched entropy returns random integers. The quality of the random
++ * number is good as /dev/urandom. In order to ensure that the randomness
++ * provided by this function is okay, the function wait_for_random_bytes()
++ * should be called and return 0 at least once at any point prior.
++ */
++
++#define DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(type) \
++struct batch_ ##type { \
++ /* \
++ * We make this 1.5x a ChaCha block, so that we get the \
++ * remaining 32 bytes from fast key erasure, plus one full \
++ * block from the detached ChaCha state. We can increase \
++ * the size of this later if needed so long as we keep the \
++ * formula of (integer_blocks + 0.5) * CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE. \
++ */ \
++ type entropy[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(type))]; \
++ unsigned long generation; \
++ unsigned int position; \
++}; \
++ \
++static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batch_ ##type, batched_entropy_ ##type) = { \
++ .position = UINT_MAX \
++}; \
++ \
++type get_random_ ##type(void) \
++{ \
++ type ret; \
++ unsigned long flags; \
++ struct batch_ ##type *batch; \
++ unsigned long next_gen; \
++ \
++ warn_unseeded_randomness(); \
++ \
++ if (!crng_ready()) { \
++ _get_random_bytes(&ret, sizeof(ret)); \
++ return ret; \
++ } \
++ \
++ local_irq_save(flags); \
++ batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_##type); \
++ \
++ next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation); \
++ if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy) || \
++ next_gen != batch->generation) { \
++ _get_random_bytes(batch->entropy, sizeof(batch->entropy)); \
++ batch->position = 0; \
++ batch->generation = next_gen; \
++ } \
++ \
++ ret = batch->entropy[batch->position]; \
++ batch->entropy[batch->position] = 0; \
++ ++batch->position; \
++ local_irq_restore(flags); \
++ return ret; \
++} \
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_ ##type);
++
++DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(u64)
++DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(u32)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
++/*
++ * This function is called when the CPU is coming up, with entry
++ * CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE, which comes before CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP.
++ */
++int __cold random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
+ {
+- return &primary_crng;
++ /*
++ * When the cpu comes back online, immediately invalidate both
++ * the per-cpu crng and all batches, so that we serve fresh
++ * randomness.
++ */
++ per_cpu_ptr(&crngs, cpu)->generation = ULONG_MAX;
++ per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu)->position = UINT_MAX;
++ per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64, cpu)->position = UINT_MAX;
++ return 0;
+ }
+ #endif
+
+ /*
+- * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service
+- * path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally.
++ * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random
++ * number generator if it is available. It is not recommended for
++ * use. Use get_random_bytes() instead. It returns the number of
++ * bytes filled in.
+ */
+-static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
++size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+- unsigned long flags;
+- char *p;
++ size_t left = len;
++ u8 *p = buf;
+
+- if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
+- return 0;
+- if (crng_init != 0) {
+- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+- return 0;
+- }
+- p = (unsigned char *) &primary_crng.state[4];
+- while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
+- p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp;
+- cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--;
+- }
+- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+- if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
+- invalidate_batched_entropy();
+- crng_init = 1;
+- wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
+- pr_notice("random: fast init done\n");
+- }
+- return 1;
+-}
+-
+-/*
+- * crng_slow_load() is called by add_device_randomness, which has two
+- * attributes. (1) We can't trust the buffer passed to it is
+- * guaranteed to be unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at
+- * all), and (2) it doesn't have the performance constraints of
+- * crng_fast_load().
+- *
+- * So we do something more comprehensive which is guaranteed to touch
+- * all of the primary_crng's state, and which uses a LFSR with a
+- * period of 255 as part of the mixing algorithm. Finally, we do
+- * *not* advance crng_init_cnt since buffer we may get may be something
+- * like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very well be
+- * unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying.
+- */
+-static int crng_slow_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
+-{
+- unsigned long flags;
+- static unsigned char lfsr = 1;
+- unsigned char tmp;
+- unsigned i, max = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE;
+- const char * src_buf = cp;
+- char * dest_buf = (char *) &primary_crng.state[4];
+-
+- if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
+- return 0;
+- if (crng_init != 0) {
+- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+- return 0;
+- }
+- if (len > max)
+- max = len;
+-
+- for (i = 0; i < max ; i++) {
+- tmp = lfsr;
+- lfsr >>= 1;
+- if (tmp & 1)
+- lfsr ^= 0xE1;
+- tmp = dest_buf[i % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE];
+- dest_buf[i % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] ^= src_buf[i % len] ^ lfsr;
+- lfsr += (tmp << 3) | (tmp >> 5);
+- }
+- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+- return 1;
+-}
+-
+-static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
+-{
+- unsigned long flags;
+- int i, num;
+- union {
+- __u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
+- __u32 key[8];
+- } buf;
+-
+- if (r) {
+- num = extract_entropy(r, &buf, 32, 16, 0);
+- if (num == 0)
+- return;
+- } else {
+- _extract_crng(&primary_crng, buf.block);
+- _crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block,
+- CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE);
+- }
+- spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
+- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+- unsigned long rv;
+- if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
+- !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
+- rv = random_get_entropy();
+- crng->state[i+4] ^= buf.key[i] ^ rv;
+- }
+- memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf));
+- WRITE_ONCE(crng->init_time, jiffies);
+- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
+- if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2) {
+- invalidate_batched_entropy();
+- numa_crng_init();
+- crng_init = 2;
+- process_random_ready_list();
+- wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
+- pr_notice("random: crng init done\n");
+- if (unseeded_warning.missed) {
+- pr_notice("random: %d get_random_xx warning(s) missed "
+- "due to ratelimiting\n",
+- unseeded_warning.missed);
+- unseeded_warning.missed = 0;
+- }
+- if (urandom_warning.missed) {
+- pr_notice("random: %d urandom warning(s) missed "
+- "due to ratelimiting\n",
+- urandom_warning.missed);
+- urandom_warning.missed = 0;
+- }
+- }
+-}
+-
+-static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
+- __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE])
+-{
+- unsigned long v, flags, init_time;
+-
+- if (crng_ready()) {
+- init_time = READ_ONCE(crng->init_time);
+- if (time_after(READ_ONCE(crng_global_init_time), init_time) ||
+- time_after(jiffies, init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))
+- crng_reseed(crng, crng == &primary_crng ?
+- &input_pool : NULL);
+- }
+- spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
+- if (arch_get_random_long(&v))
+- crng->state[14] ^= v;
+- chacha20_block(&crng->state[0], out);
+- if (crng->state[12] == 0)
+- crng->state[13]++;
+- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
+-}
+-
+-static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE])
+-{
+- _extract_crng(select_crng(), out);
+-}
+-
+-/*
+- * Use the leftover bytes from the CRNG block output (if there is
+- * enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection.
+- */
+-static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
+- __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
+-{
+- unsigned long flags;
+- __u32 *s, *d;
+- int i;
+-
+- used = round_up(used, sizeof(__u32));
+- if (used + CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE > CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+- extract_crng(tmp);
+- used = 0;
+- }
+- spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
+- s = (__u32 *) &tmp[used];
+- d = &crng->state[4];
+- for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
+- *d++ ^= *s++;
+- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
+-}
+-
+-static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
+-{
+- _crng_backtrack_protect(select_crng(), tmp, used);
+-}
+-
+-static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
+-{
+- ssize_t ret = 0, i = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
+- __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
+- int large_request = (nbytes > 256);
+-
+- while (nbytes) {
+- if (large_request && need_resched()) {
+- if (signal_pending(current)) {
+- if (ret == 0)
+- ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+- break;
+- }
+- schedule();
+- }
++ while (left) {
++ unsigned long v;
++ size_t block_len = min_t(size_t, left, sizeof(unsigned long));
+
+- extract_crng(tmp);
+- i = min_t(int, nbytes, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE);
+- if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
+- ret = -EFAULT;
++ if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
+ break;
+- }
+
+- nbytes -= i;
+- buf += i;
+- ret += i;
++ memcpy(p, &v, block_len);
++ p += block_len;
++ left -= block_len;
+ }
+- crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, i);
+-
+- /* Wipe data just written to memory */
+- memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+
+- return ret;
++ return len - left;
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
+
+
+-/*********************************************************************
++/**********************************************************************
+ *
+- * Entropy input management
++ * Entropy accumulation and extraction routines.
+ *
+- *********************************************************************/
++ * Callers may add entropy via:
++ *
++ * static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
++ *
++ * After which, if added entropy should be credited:
++ *
++ * static void credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
++ *
++ * Finally, extract entropy via:
++ *
++ * static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)
++ *
++ **********************************************************************/
+
+-/* There is one of these per entropy source */
+-struct timer_rand_state {
+- cycles_t last_time;
+- long last_delta, last_delta2;
++enum {
++ POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8,
++ POOL_READY_BITS = POOL_BITS, /* When crng_init->CRNG_READY */
++ POOL_EARLY_BITS = POOL_READY_BITS / 2 /* When crng_init->CRNG_EARLY */
++};
++
++static struct {
++ struct blake2s_state hash;
++ spinlock_t lock;
++ unsigned int init_bits;
++} input_pool = {
++ .hash.h = { BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ (0x01010000 | BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE),
++ BLAKE2S_IV1, BLAKE2S_IV2, BLAKE2S_IV3, BLAKE2S_IV4,
++ BLAKE2S_IV5, BLAKE2S_IV6, BLAKE2S_IV7 },
++ .hash.outlen = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE,
++ .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
+ };
+
+-#define INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE { INITIAL_JIFFIES, };
++static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
++{
++ blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, buf, len);
++}
+
+ /*
+- * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help
+- * initialize it.
+- *
+- * None of this adds any entropy; it is meant to avoid the problem of
+- * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely
+- * identical devices.
++ * This function adds bytes into the input pool. It does not
++ * update the initialization bit counter; the caller should call
++ * credit_init_bits if this is appropriate.
+ */
+-void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size)
++static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+- unsigned long time = random_get_entropy() ^ jiffies;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+- if (!crng_ready() && size)
+- crng_slow_load(buf, size);
+-
+- trace_add_device_randomness(size, _RET_IP_);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+- _mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, buf, size);
+- _mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &time, sizeof(time));
++ _mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ }
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
+-
+-static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE;
+
+ /*
+- * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
+- * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
+- * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool.
+- *
+- * The number "num" is also added to the pool - it should somehow describe
+- * the type of event which just happened. This is currently 0-255 for
+- * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts.
+- *
++ * This is an HKDF-like construction for using the hashed collected entropy
++ * as a PRF key, that's then expanded block-by-block.
+ */
+-static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
++static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+- struct entropy_store *r;
++ unsigned long flags;
++ u8 seed[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE], next_key[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
+ struct {
+- long jiffies;
+- unsigned cycles;
+- unsigned num;
+- } sample;
+- long delta, delta2, delta3;
+-
+- sample.jiffies = jiffies;
+- sample.cycles = random_get_entropy();
+- sample.num = num;
+- r = &input_pool;
+- mix_pool_bytes(r, &sample, sizeof(sample));
+-
+- /*
+- * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
+- * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas
+- * in order to make our estimate.
+- */
+- delta = sample.jiffies - READ_ONCE(state->last_time);
+- WRITE_ONCE(state->last_time, sample.jiffies);
+-
+- delta2 = delta - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta);
+- WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta, delta);
+-
+- delta3 = delta2 - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta2);
+- WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta2, delta2);
+-
+- if (delta < 0)
+- delta = -delta;
+- if (delta2 < 0)
+- delta2 = -delta2;
+- if (delta3 < 0)
+- delta3 = -delta3;
+- if (delta > delta2)
+- delta = delta2;
+- if (delta > delta3)
+- delta = delta3;
+-
+- /*
+- * delta is now minimum absolute delta.
+- * Round down by 1 bit on general principles,
+- * and limit entropy entimate to 12 bits.
+- */
+- credit_entropy_bits(r, min_t(int, fls(delta>>1), 11));
+-}
+-
+-void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+- unsigned int value)
+-{
+- static unsigned char last_value;
+-
+- /* ignore autorepeat and the like */
+- if (value == last_value)
+- return;
++ unsigned long rdseed[32 / sizeof(long)];
++ size_t counter;
++ } block;
++ size_t i;
++
++ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(block.rdseed); ++i) {
++ if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&block.rdseed[i]) &&
++ !arch_get_random_long(&block.rdseed[i]))
++ block.rdseed[i] = random_get_entropy();
++ }
+
+- last_value = value;
+- add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state,
+- (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value);
+- trace_add_input_randomness(ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness);
++ spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+
+-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness);
++ /* seed = HASHPRF(last_key, entropy_input) */
++ blake2s_final(&input_pool.hash, seed);
+
+-#ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH
+-static unsigned long avg_cycles, avg_deviation;
++ /* next_key = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || 0) */
++ block.counter = 0;
++ blake2s(next_key, (u8 *)&block, seed, sizeof(next_key), sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
++ blake2s_init_key(&input_pool.hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, next_key, sizeof(next_key));
+
+-#define AVG_SHIFT 8 /* Exponential average factor k=1/256 */
+-#define FIXED_1_2 (1 << (AVG_SHIFT-1))
++ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
++ memzero_explicit(next_key, sizeof(next_key));
++
++ while (len) {
++ i = min_t(size_t, len, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
++ /* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || ++counter) */
++ ++block.counter;
++ blake2s(buf, (u8 *)&block, seed, i, sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
++ len -= i;
++ buf += i;
++ }
+
+-static void add_interrupt_bench(cycles_t start)
+-{
+- long delta = random_get_entropy() - start;
+-
+- /* Use a weighted moving average */
+- delta = delta - ((avg_cycles + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT);
+- avg_cycles += delta;
+- /* And average deviation */
+- delta = abs(delta) - ((avg_deviation + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT);
+- avg_deviation += delta;
++ memzero_explicit(seed, sizeof(seed));
++ memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block));
+ }
+-#else
+-#define add_interrupt_bench(x)
+-#endif
+
+-static __u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs)
+-{
+- __u32 *ptr = (__u32 *) regs;
+- unsigned int idx;
+-
+- if (regs == NULL)
+- return 0;
+- idx = READ_ONCE(f->reg_idx);
+- if (idx >= sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(__u32))
+- idx = 0;
+- ptr += idx++;
+- WRITE_ONCE(f->reg_idx, idx);
+- return *ptr;
+-}
++#define credit_init_bits(bits) if (!crng_ready()) _credit_init_bits(bits)
+
+-void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)
++static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
+ {
+- struct entropy_store *r;
+- struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness);
+- struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs();
+- unsigned long now = jiffies;
+- cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy();
+- __u32 c_high, j_high;
+- __u64 ip;
+- unsigned long seed;
+- int credit = 0;
+-
+- if (cycles == 0)
+- cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
+- c_high = (sizeof(cycles) > 4) ? cycles >> 32 : 0;
+- j_high = (sizeof(now) > 4) ? now >> 32 : 0;
+- fast_pool->pool[0] ^= cycles ^ j_high ^ irq;
+- fast_pool->pool[1] ^= now ^ c_high;
+- ip = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_;
+- fast_pool->pool[2] ^= ip;
+- fast_pool->pool[3] ^= (sizeof(ip) > 4) ? ip >> 32 :
+- get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
+-
+- fast_mix(fast_pool);
+- add_interrupt_bench(cycles);
+-
+- if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
+- if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) &&
+- crng_fast_load((char *) fast_pool->pool,
+- sizeof(fast_pool->pool))) {
+- fast_pool->count = 0;
+- fast_pool->last = now;
+- }
+- return;
+- }
++ unsigned int new, orig, add;
++ unsigned long flags;
+
+- if ((fast_pool->count < 64) &&
+- !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ))
++ if (!bits)
+ return;
+
+- r = &input_pool;
+- if (!spin_trylock(&r->lock))
+- return;
++ add = min_t(size_t, bits, POOL_BITS);
+
+- fast_pool->last = now;
+- __mix_pool_bytes(r, &fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool));
++ do {
++ orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.init_bits);
++ new = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add);
++ } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.init_bits, orig, new) != orig);
+
+- /*
+- * If we have architectural seed generator, produce a seed and
+- * add it to the pool. For the sake of paranoia don't let the
+- * architectural seed generator dominate the input from the
+- * interrupt noise.
+- */
+- if (arch_get_random_seed_long(&seed)) {
+- __mix_pool_bytes(r, &seed, sizeof(seed));
+- credit = 1;
++ if (orig < POOL_READY_BITS && new >= POOL_READY_BITS) {
++ crng_reseed(); /* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */
++ process_random_ready_list();
++ wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
++ kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
++ pr_notice("crng init done\n");
++ if (urandom_warning.missed)
++ pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
++ urandom_warning.missed);
++ } else if (orig < POOL_EARLY_BITS && new >= POOL_EARLY_BITS) {
++ spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
++ /* Check if crng_init is CRNG_EMPTY, to avoid race with crng_reseed(). */
++ if (crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY) {
++ extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
++ crng_init = CRNG_EARLY;
++ }
++ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ }
+- spin_unlock(&r->lock);
+-
+- fast_pool->count = 0;
+-
+- /* award one bit for the contents of the fast pool */
+- credit_entropy_bits(r, credit + 1);
+ }
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness);
+
+-#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
+-void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
+-{
+- if (!disk || !disk->random)
+- return;
+- /* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */
+- add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk));
+- trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);
+-#endif
+
+-/*********************************************************************
++/**********************************************************************
+ *
+- * Entropy extraction routines
++ * Entropy collection routines.
+ *
+- *********************************************************************/
+-
+-/*
+- * This utility inline function is responsible for transferring entropy
+- * from the primary pool to the secondary extraction pool. We make
+- * sure we pull enough for a 'catastrophic reseed'.
+- */
+-static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes);
+-static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
+-{
+- if (!r->pull ||
+- r->entropy_count >= (nbytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3)) ||
+- r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits)
+- return;
+-
+- _xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
+-}
++ * The following exported functions are used for pushing entropy into
++ * the above entropy accumulation routines:
++ *
++ * void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
++ * void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy);
++ * void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
++ * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
++ * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value);
++ * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
++ *
++ * add_device_randomness() adds data to the input pool that
++ * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot).
++ * This would be things like MAC addresses or serial numbers, or the
++ * read-out of the RTC. This does *not* credit any actual entropy to
++ * the pool, but it initializes the pool to different values for devices
++ * that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy
++ * available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).
++ *
++ * add_hwgenerator_randomness() is for true hardware RNGs, and will credit
++ * entropy as specified by the caller. If the entropy pool is full it will
++ * block until more entropy is needed.
++ *
++ * add_bootloader_randomness() is called by bootloader drivers, such as EFI
++ * and device tree, and credits its input depending on whether or not the
++ * configuration option CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
++ *
++ * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the interrupt timing as random
++ * inputs to the entropy pool. Using the cycle counters and the irq source
++ * as inputs, it feeds the input pool roughly once a second or after 64
++ * interrupts, crediting 1 bit of entropy for whichever comes first.
++ *
++ * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well
++ * as the event type information from the hardware.
++ *
++ * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block
++ * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the
++ * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low
++ * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek
++ * times are usually fairly consistent.
++ *
++ * The last two routines try to estimate how many bits of entropy
++ * to credit. They do this by keeping track of the first and second
++ * order deltas of the event timings.
++ *
++ **********************************************************************/
+
+-static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
++static bool trust_cpu __initdata = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU);
++static bool trust_bootloader __initdata = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER);
++static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg)
+ {
+- __u32 tmp[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
+-
+- int bytes = nbytes;
+-
+- /* pull at least as much as a wakeup */
+- bytes = max_t(int, bytes, random_read_wakeup_bits / 8);
+- /* but never more than the buffer size */
+- bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(tmp));
+-
+- trace_xfer_secondary_pool(r->name, bytes * 8, nbytes * 8,
+- ENTROPY_BITS(r), ENTROPY_BITS(r->pull));
+- bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes,
+- random_read_wakeup_bits / 8, 0);
+- mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes);
+- credit_entropy_bits(r, bytes*8);
++ return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu);
+ }
+-
+-/*
+- * Used as a workqueue function so that when the input pool is getting
+- * full, we can "spill over" some entropy to the output pools. That
+- * way the output pools can store some of the excess entropy instead
+- * of letting it go to waste.
+- */
+-static void push_to_pool(struct work_struct *work)
++static int __init parse_trust_bootloader(char *arg)
+ {
+- struct entropy_store *r = container_of(work, struct entropy_store,
+- push_work);
+- BUG_ON(!r);
+- _xfer_secondary_pool(r, random_read_wakeup_bits/8);
+- trace_push_to_pool(r->name, r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT,
+- r->pull->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT);
++ return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_bootloader);
+ }
++early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu);
++early_param("random.trust_bootloader", parse_trust_bootloader);
+
+ /*
+- * This function decides how many bytes to actually take from the
+- * given pool, and also debits the entropy count accordingly.
++ * The first collection of entropy occurs at system boot while interrupts
++ * are still turned off. Here we push in latent entropy, RDSEED, a timestamp,
++ * utsname(), and the command line. Depending on the above configuration knob,
++ * RDSEED may be considered sufficient for initialization. Note that much
++ * earlier setup may already have pushed entropy into the input pool by the
++ * time we get here.
+ */
+-static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes, int min,
+- int reserved)
++int __init random_init(const char *command_line)
+ {
+- int entropy_count, orig, have_bytes;
+- size_t ibytes, nfrac;
+-
+- BUG_ON(r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits);
+-
+- /* Can we pull enough? */
+-retry:
+- entropy_count = orig = READ_ONCE(r->entropy_count);
+- ibytes = nbytes;
+- /* never pull more than available */
+- have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
+-
+- if ((have_bytes -= reserved) < 0)
+- have_bytes = 0;
+- ibytes = min_t(size_t, ibytes, have_bytes);
+- if (ibytes < min)
+- ibytes = 0;
+-
+- if (unlikely(entropy_count < 0)) {
+- pr_warn("random: negative entropy count: pool %s count %d\n",
+- r->name, entropy_count);
+- WARN_ON(1);
+- entropy_count = 0;
+- }
+- nfrac = ibytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
+- if ((size_t) entropy_count > nfrac)
+- entropy_count -= nfrac;
+- else
+- entropy_count = 0;
++ ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
++ unsigned int i, arch_bits;
++ unsigned long entropy;
+
+- if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
+- goto retry;
++#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN)
++ static const u8 compiletime_seed[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __initconst __latent_entropy;
++ _mix_pool_bytes(compiletime_seed, sizeof(compiletime_seed));
++#endif
+
+- trace_debit_entropy(r->name, 8 * ibytes);
+- if (ibytes &&
+- (r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT) < random_write_wakeup_bits) {
+- wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
+- kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
++ for (i = 0, arch_bits = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
++ i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(entropy)) {
++ if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&entropy) &&
++ !arch_get_random_long_early(&entropy)) {
++ entropy = random_get_entropy();
++ arch_bits -= sizeof(entropy) * 8;
++ }
++ _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+ }
++ _mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now));
++ _mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
++ _mix_pool_bytes(command_line, strlen(command_line));
++ add_latent_entropy();
+
+- return ibytes;
++ if (crng_ready())
++ crng_reseed();
++ else if (trust_cpu)
++ _credit_init_bits(arch_bits);
++
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+- * This function does the actual extraction for extract_entropy and
+- * extract_entropy_user.
++ * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help
++ * initialize it.
+ *
+- * Note: we assume that .poolwords is a multiple of 16 words.
++ * None of this adds any entropy; it is meant to avoid the problem of
++ * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely
++ * identical devices.
+ */
+-static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out)
+-{
+- int i;
+- union {
+- __u32 w[5];
+- unsigned long l[LONGS(20)];
+- } hash;
+- __u32 workspace[SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
+- unsigned long flags;
+-
+- /*
+- * If we have an architectural hardware random number
+- * generator, use it for SHA's initial vector
+- */
+- sha_init(hash.w);
+- for (i = 0; i < LONGS(20); i++) {
+- unsigned long v;
+- if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
+- break;
+- hash.l[i] = v;
+- }
+-
+- /* Generate a hash across the pool, 16 words (512 bits) at a time */
+- spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
+- for (i = 0; i < r->poolinfo->poolwords; i += 16)
+- sha_transform(hash.w, (__u8 *)(r->pool + i), workspace);
+-
+- /*
+- * We mix the hash back into the pool to prevent backtracking
+- * attacks (where the attacker knows the state of the pool
+- * plus the current outputs, and attempts to find previous
+- * ouputs), unless the hash function can be inverted. By
+- * mixing at least a SHA1 worth of hash data back, we make
+- * brute-forcing the feedback as hard as brute-forcing the
+- * hash.
+- */
+- __mix_pool_bytes(r, hash.w, sizeof(hash.w));
+- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
+-
+- memzero_explicit(workspace, sizeof(workspace));
+-
+- /*
+- * In case the hash function has some recognizable output
+- * pattern, we fold it in half. Thus, we always feed back
+- * twice as much data as we output.
+- */
+- hash.w[0] ^= hash.w[3];
+- hash.w[1] ^= hash.w[4];
+- hash.w[2] ^= rol32(hash.w[2], 16);
+-
+- memcpy(out, &hash, EXTRACT_SIZE);
+- memzero_explicit(&hash, sizeof(hash));
+-}
+-
+-static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
+- size_t nbytes, int fips)
++void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+- ssize_t ret = 0, i;
+- __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
++ unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy();
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+- while (nbytes) {
+- extract_buf(r, tmp);
+-
+- if (fips) {
+- spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
+- if (!memcmp(tmp, r->last_data, EXTRACT_SIZE))
+- panic("Hardware RNG duplicated output!\n");
+- memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE);
+- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
+- }
+- i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE);
+- memcpy(buf, tmp, i);
+- nbytes -= i;
+- buf += i;
+- ret += i;
+- }
+-
+- /* Wipe data just returned from memory */
+- memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+-
+- return ret;
++ spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
++ _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
++ _mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
++ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
+
+ /*
+- * This function extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and
+- * returns it in a buffer.
+- *
+- * The min parameter specifies the minimum amount we can pull before
+- * failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding while the
+- * reserved parameter indicates how much entropy we must leave in the
+- * pool after each pull to avoid starving other readers.
++ * Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs.
++ * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled
++ * when our pool is full.
+ */
+-static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
+- size_t nbytes, int min, int reserved)
++void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy)
+ {
+- __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
+- unsigned long flags;
++ mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
++ credit_init_bits(entropy);
+
+- /* if last_data isn't primed, we need EXTRACT_SIZE extra bytes */
+- if (fips_enabled) {
+- spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
+- if (!r->last_data_init) {
+- r->last_data_init = 1;
+- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
+- trace_extract_entropy(r->name, EXTRACT_SIZE,
+- ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_);
+- xfer_secondary_pool(r, EXTRACT_SIZE);
+- extract_buf(r, tmp);
+- spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
+- memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE);
+- }
+- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
+- }
+-
+- trace_extract_entropy(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_);
+- xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
+- nbytes = account(r, nbytes, min, reserved);
+-
+- return _extract_entropy(r, buf, nbytes, fips_enabled);
++ /*
++ * Throttle writing to once every CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL, unless
++ * we're not yet initialized.
++ */
++ if (!kthread_should_stop() && crng_ready())
++ schedule_timeout_interruptible(CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL);
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);
+
+ /*
+- * This function extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and
+- * returns it in a userspace buffer.
++ * Handle random seed passed by bootloader, and credit it if
++ * CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
+ */
+-static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf,
+- size_t nbytes)
++void __init add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+- ssize_t ret = 0, i;
+- __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
+- int large_request = (nbytes > 256);
+-
+- trace_extract_entropy_user(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_);
+- xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
+- nbytes = account(r, nbytes, 0, 0);
+-
+- while (nbytes) {
+- if (large_request && need_resched()) {
+- if (signal_pending(current)) {
+- if (ret == 0)
+- ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+- break;
+- }
+- schedule();
+- }
+-
+- extract_buf(r, tmp);
+- i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE);
+- if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
+- ret = -EFAULT;
+- break;
+- }
+-
+- nbytes -= i;
+- buf += i;
+- ret += i;
+- }
+-
+- /* Wipe data just returned from memory */
+- memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+-
+- return ret;
++ mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
++ if (trust_bootloader)
++ credit_init_bits(len * 8);
+ }
+
+-#define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \
+- _warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *) _RET_IP_, (previous))
++struct fast_pool {
++ struct work_struct mix;
++ unsigned long pool[4];
++ unsigned long last;
++ unsigned int count;
++};
+
+-static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller,
+- void **previous)
+-{
+-#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
+- const bool print_once = false;
++static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness) = {
++#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
++#define FASTMIX_PERM SIPHASH_PERMUTATION
++ .pool = { SIPHASH_CONST_0, SIPHASH_CONST_1, SIPHASH_CONST_2, SIPHASH_CONST_3 }
+ #else
+- static bool print_once __read_mostly;
+-#endif
+-
+- if (print_once ||
+- crng_ready() ||
+- (previous && (caller == READ_ONCE(*previous))))
+- return;
+- WRITE_ONCE(*previous, caller);
+-#ifndef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
+- print_once = true;
++#define FASTMIX_PERM HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION
++ .pool = { HSIPHASH_CONST_0, HSIPHASH_CONST_1, HSIPHASH_CONST_2, HSIPHASH_CONST_3 }
+ #endif
+- if (__ratelimit(&unseeded_warning))
+- pr_notice("random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n",
+- func_name, caller, crng_init);
+-}
++};
+
+ /*
+- * This function is the exported kernel interface. It returns some
+- * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding
+- * TCP sequence numbers, etc. It does not rely on the hardware random
+- * number generator. For random bytes direct from the hardware RNG
+- * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch(). In order to ensure
+- * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
+- * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once
+- * at any point prior.
++ * This is [Half]SipHash-1-x, starting from an empty key. Because
++ * the key is fixed, it assumes that its inputs are non-malicious,
++ * and therefore this has no security on its own. s represents the
++ * four-word SipHash state, while v represents a two-word input.
+ */
+-static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
+-{
+- __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
+-
+- trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
+-
+- while (nbytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+- extract_crng(buf);
+- buf += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
+- nbytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
+- }
+-
+- if (nbytes > 0) {
+- extract_crng(tmp);
+- memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes);
+- crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, nbytes);
+- } else
+- crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE);
+- memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+-}
+-
+-void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
++static void fast_mix(unsigned long s[4], unsigned long v1, unsigned long v2)
+ {
+- static void *previous;
+-
+- warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
+- _get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
++ s[3] ^= v1;
++ FASTMIX_PERM(s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3]);
++ s[0] ^= v1;
++ s[3] ^= v2;
++ FASTMIX_PERM(s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3]);
++ s[0] ^= v2;
+ }
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
+-
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ /*
+- * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable
+- * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another
+- * CPU, the timer activity will be touching the stack of the CPU that is
+- * generating entropy..
+- *
+- * Note that we don't re-arm the timer in the timer itself - we are
+- * happy to be scheduled away, since that just makes the load more
+- * complex, but we do not want the timer to keep ticking unless the
+- * entropy loop is running.
+- *
+- * So the re-arming always happens in the entropy loop itself.
++ * This function is called when the CPU has just come online, with
++ * entry CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE, just after CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE.
+ */
+-static void entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t)
++int __cold random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
+ {
+- credit_entropy_bits(&input_pool, 1);
++ /*
++ * During CPU shutdown and before CPU onlining, add_interrupt_
++ * randomness() may schedule mix_interrupt_randomness(), and
++ * set the MIX_INFLIGHT flag. However, because the worker can
++ * be scheduled on a different CPU during this period, that
++ * flag will never be cleared. For that reason, we zero out
++ * the flag here, which runs just after workqueues are onlined
++ * for the CPU again. This also has the effect of setting the
++ * irq randomness count to zero so that new accumulated irqs
++ * are fresh.
++ */
++ per_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness, cpu)->count = 0;
++ return 0;
+ }
++#endif
+
+-/*
+- * If we have an actual cycle counter, see if we can
+- * generate enough entropy with timing noise
+- */
+-static void try_to_generate_entropy(void)
++static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work)
+ {
+- struct {
+- unsigned long now;
+- struct timer_list timer;
+- } stack;
+-
+- stack.now = random_get_entropy();
++ struct fast_pool *fast_pool = container_of(work, struct fast_pool, mix);
++ /*
++ * The size of the copied stack pool is explicitly 2 longs so that we
++ * only ever ingest half of the siphash output each time, retaining
++ * the other half as the next "key" that carries over. The entropy is
++ * supposed to be sufficiently dispersed between bits so on average
++ * we don't wind up "losing" some.
++ */
++ unsigned long pool[2];
++ unsigned int count;
+
+- /* Slow counter - or none. Don't even bother */
+- if (stack.now == random_get_entropy())
++ /* Check to see if we're running on the wrong CPU due to hotplug. */
++ local_irq_disable();
++ if (fast_pool != this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)) {
++ local_irq_enable();
+ return;
+-
+- timer_setup_on_stack(&stack.timer, entropy_timer, 0);
+- while (!crng_ready()) {
+- if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer))
+- mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies+1);
+- mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
+- schedule();
+- stack.now = random_get_entropy();
+ }
+
+- del_timer_sync(&stack.timer);
+- destroy_timer_on_stack(&stack.timer);
+- mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
+-}
+-
+-/*
+- * Wait for the urandom pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply
+- * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom
+- * device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,u64,int,long}
+- * family of functions. Using any of these functions without first calling
+- * this function forfeits the guarantee of security.
+- *
+- * Returns: 0 if the urandom pool has been seeded.
+- * -ERESTARTSYS if the function was interrupted by a signal.
+- */
+-int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
+-{
+- if (likely(crng_ready()))
+- return 0;
+-
+- do {
+- int ret;
+- ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
+- if (ret)
+- return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
++ /*
++ * Copy the pool to the stack so that the mixer always has a
++ * consistent view, before we reenable irqs again.
++ */
++ memcpy(pool, fast_pool->pool, sizeof(pool));
++ count = fast_pool->count;
++ fast_pool->count = 0;
++ fast_pool->last = jiffies;
++ local_irq_enable();
+
+- try_to_generate_entropy();
+- } while (!crng_ready());
++ mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool));
++ credit_init_bits(max(1u, (count & U16_MAX) / 64));
+
+- return 0;
++ memzero_explicit(pool, sizeof(pool));
+ }
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
+
+-/*
+- * Returns whether or not the urandom pool has been seeded and thus guaranteed
+- * to supply cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the
+- * /dev/urandom device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,
+- * ,u64,int,long} family of functions.
+- *
+- * Returns: true if the urandom pool has been seeded.
+- * false if the urandom pool has not been seeded.
+- */
+-bool rng_is_initialized(void)
++void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
+ {
+- return crng_ready();
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized);
++ enum { MIX_INFLIGHT = 1U << 31 };
++ unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy();
++ struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness);
++ struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs();
++ unsigned int new_count;
+
+-/*
+- * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the nonblocking
+- * pool is initialised.
+- *
+- * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added
+- * -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called)
+- * -ENOENT if module for callback is not alive
+- */
+-int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
+-{
+- struct module *owner;
+- unsigned long flags;
+- int err = -EALREADY;
+-
+- if (crng_ready())
+- return err;
+-
+- owner = rdy->owner;
+- if (!try_module_get(owner))
+- return -ENOENT;
+-
+- spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+- if (crng_ready())
+- goto out;
+-
+- owner = NULL;
+-
+- list_add(&rdy->list, &random_ready_list);
+- err = 0;
++ fast_mix(fast_pool->pool, entropy,
++ (regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_) ^ swab(irq));
++ new_count = ++fast_pool->count;
+
+-out:
+- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
++ if (new_count & MIX_INFLIGHT)
++ return;
+
+- module_put(owner);
++ if (new_count < 64 && !time_is_before_jiffies(fast_pool->last + HZ))
++ return;
+
+- return err;
++ if (unlikely(!fast_pool->mix.func))
++ INIT_WORK(&fast_pool->mix, mix_interrupt_randomness);
++ fast_pool->count |= MIX_INFLIGHT;
++ queue_work_on(raw_smp_processor_id(), system_highpri_wq, &fast_pool->mix);
+ }
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_random_ready_callback);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness);
++
++/* There is one of these per entropy source */
++struct timer_rand_state {
++ unsigned long last_time;
++ long last_delta, last_delta2;
++};
+
+ /*
+- * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function.
++ * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
++ * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
++ * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool. The
++ * value "num" is also added to the pool; it should somehow describe
++ * the type of event that just happened.
+ */
+-void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
++static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int num)
+ {
+- unsigned long flags;
+- struct module *owner = NULL;
++ unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy(), now = jiffies, flags;
++ long delta, delta2, delta3;
++ unsigned int bits;
+
+- spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+- if (!list_empty(&rdy->list)) {
+- list_del_init(&rdy->list);
+- owner = rdy->owner;
++ /*
++ * If we're in a hard IRQ, add_interrupt_randomness() will be called
++ * sometime after, so mix into the fast pool.
++ */
++ if (in_irq()) {
++ fast_mix(this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)->pool, entropy, num);
++ } else {
++ spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
++ _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
++ _mix_pool_bytes(&num, sizeof(num));
++ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ }
+- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+
+- module_put(owner);
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback);
++ if (crng_ready())
++ return;
+
+-/*
+- * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random
+- * number generator if it is available. The arch-specific hw RNG will
+- * almost certainly be faster than what we can do in software, but it
+- * is impossible to verify that it is implemented securely (as
+- * opposed, to, say, the AES encryption of a sequence number using a
+- * key known by the NSA). So it's useful if we need the speed, but
+- * only if we're willing to trust the hardware manufacturer not to
+- * have put in a back door.
+- *
+- * Return number of bytes filled in.
+- */
+-int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
+-{
+- int left = nbytes;
+- char *p = buf;
++ /*
++ * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
++ * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas
++ * in order to make our estimate.
++ */
++ delta = now - READ_ONCE(state->last_time);
++ WRITE_ONCE(state->last_time, now);
+
+- trace_get_random_bytes_arch(left, _RET_IP_);
+- while (left) {
+- unsigned long v;
+- int chunk = min_t(int, left, sizeof(unsigned long));
++ delta2 = delta - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta);
++ WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta, delta);
+
+- if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
+- break;
++ delta3 = delta2 - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta2);
++ WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta2, delta2);
+
+- memcpy(p, &v, chunk);
+- p += chunk;
+- left -= chunk;
+- }
++ if (delta < 0)
++ delta = -delta;
++ if (delta2 < 0)
++ delta2 = -delta2;
++ if (delta3 < 0)
++ delta3 = -delta3;
++ if (delta > delta2)
++ delta = delta2;
++ if (delta > delta3)
++ delta = delta3;
+
+- return nbytes - left;
++ /*
++ * delta is now minimum absolute delta. Round down by 1 bit
++ * on general principles, and limit entropy estimate to 11 bits.
++ */
++ bits = min(fls(delta >> 1), 11);
++
++ /*
++ * As mentioned above, if we're in a hard IRQ, add_interrupt_randomness()
++ * will run after this, which uses a different crediting scheme of 1 bit
++ * per every 64 interrupts. In order to let that function do accounting
++ * close to the one in this function, we credit a full 64/64 bit per bit,
++ * and then subtract one to account for the extra one added.
++ */
++ if (in_irq())
++ this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)->count += max(1u, bits * 64) - 1;
++ else
++ _credit_init_bits(bits);
+ }
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
+
+-/*
+- * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data
+- *
+- * @r: pool to initialize
+- *
+- * This function clears the pool's entropy count and mixes some system
+- * data into the pool to prepare it for use. The pool is not cleared
+- * as that can only decrease the entropy in the pool.
+- */
+-static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
++void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value)
+ {
+- int i;
+- ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
+- unsigned long rv;
+-
+- r->last_pulled = jiffies;
+- mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now));
+- for (i = r->poolinfo->poolbytes; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) {
+- if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
+- !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
+- rv = random_get_entropy();
+- mix_pool_bytes(r, &rv, sizeof(rv));
+- }
+- mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
++ static unsigned char last_value;
++ static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = { INITIAL_JIFFIES };
++
++ /* Ignore autorepeat and the like. */
++ if (value == last_value)
++ return;
++
++ last_value = value;
++ add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state,
++ (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value);
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness);
+
+-/*
+- * Note that setup_arch() may call add_device_randomness()
+- * long before we get here. This allows seeding of the pools
+- * with some platform dependent data very early in the boot
+- * process. But it limits our options here. We must use
+- * statically allocated structures that already have all
+- * initializations complete at compile time. We should also
+- * take care not to overwrite the precious per platform data
+- * we were given.
+- */
+-static int rand_initialize(void)
++#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
++void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
+ {
+- init_std_data(&input_pool);
+- init_std_data(&blocking_pool);
+- crng_initialize(&primary_crng);
+- crng_global_init_time = jiffies;
+- if (ratelimit_disable) {
+- urandom_warning.interval = 0;
+- unseeded_warning.interval = 0;
+- }
+- return 0;
++ if (!disk || !disk->random)
++ return;
++ /* First major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here. */
++ add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk));
+ }
+-early_initcall(rand_initialize);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);
+
+-#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
+-void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
++void __cold rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
+ {
+ struct timer_rand_state *state;
+
+@@ -1910,134 +1126,189 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
+ }
+ #endif
+
+-static ssize_t
+-_random_read(int nonblock, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
++/*
++ * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable
++ * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another
++ * CPU, the timer activity will be touching the stack of the CPU that is
++ * generating entropy..
++ *
++ * Note that we don't re-arm the timer in the timer itself - we are
++ * happy to be scheduled away, since that just makes the load more
++ * complex, but we do not want the timer to keep ticking unless the
++ * entropy loop is running.
++ *
++ * So the re-arming always happens in the entropy loop itself.
++ */
++static void __cold entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t)
+ {
+- ssize_t n;
++ credit_init_bits(1);
++}
+
+- if (nbytes == 0)
+- return 0;
++/*
++ * If we have an actual cycle counter, see if we can
++ * generate enough entropy with timing noise
++ */
++static void __cold try_to_generate_entropy(void)
++{
++ struct {
++ unsigned long entropy;
++ struct timer_list timer;
++ } stack;
+
+- nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, SEC_XFER_SIZE);
+- while (1) {
+- n = extract_entropy_user(&blocking_pool, buf, nbytes);
+- if (n < 0)
+- return n;
+- trace_random_read(n*8, (nbytes-n)*8,
+- ENTROPY_BITS(&blocking_pool),
+- ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
+- if (n > 0)
+- return n;
+-
+- /* Pool is (near) empty. Maybe wait and retry. */
+- if (nonblock)
+- return -EAGAIN;
++ stack.entropy = random_get_entropy();
++
++ /* Slow counter - or none. Don't even bother */
++ if (stack.entropy == random_get_entropy())
++ return;
+
+- wait_event_interruptible(random_read_wait,
+- ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >=
+- random_read_wakeup_bits);
+- if (signal_pending(current))
+- return -ERESTARTSYS;
++ timer_setup_on_stack(&stack.timer, entropy_timer, 0);
++ while (!crng_ready() && !signal_pending(current)) {
++ if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer))
++ mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies + 1);
++ mix_pool_bytes(&stack.entropy, sizeof(stack.entropy));
++ schedule();
++ stack.entropy = random_get_entropy();
+ }
+-}
+
+-static ssize_t
+-random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
+-{
+- return _random_read(file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK, buf, nbytes);
++ del_timer_sync(&stack.timer);
++ destroy_timer_on_stack(&stack.timer);
++ mix_pool_bytes(&stack.entropy, sizeof(stack.entropy));
+ }
+
+-static ssize_t
+-urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
++
++/**********************************************************************
++ *
++ * Userspace reader/writer interfaces.
++ *
++ * getrandom(2) is the primary modern interface into the RNG and should
++ * be used in preference to anything else.
++ *
++ * Reading from /dev/random has the same functionality as calling
++ * getrandom(2) with flags=0. In earlier versions, however, it had
++ * vastly different semantics and should therefore be avoided, to
++ * prevent backwards compatibility issues.
++ *
++ * Reading from /dev/urandom has the same functionality as calling
++ * getrandom(2) with flags=GRND_INSECURE. Because it does not block
++ * waiting for the RNG to be ready, it should not be used.
++ *
++ * Writing to either /dev/random or /dev/urandom adds entropy to
++ * the input pool but does not credit it.
++ *
++ * Polling on /dev/random indicates when the RNG is initialized, on
++ * the read side, and when it wants new entropy, on the write side.
++ *
++ * Both /dev/random and /dev/urandom have the same set of ioctls for
++ * adding entropy, getting the entropy count, zeroing the count, and
++ * reseeding the crng.
++ *
++ **********************************************************************/
++
++SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, ubuf, size_t, len, unsigned int, flags)
+ {
+- unsigned long flags;
+- static int maxwarn = 10;
++ struct iov_iter iter;
++ struct iovec iov;
+ int ret;
+
+- if (!crng_ready() && maxwarn > 0) {
+- maxwarn--;
+- if (__ratelimit(&urandom_warning))
+- printk(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s: uninitialized "
+- "urandom read (%zd bytes read)\n",
+- current->comm, nbytes);
+- spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+- crng_init_cnt = 0;
+- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
++ if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE))
++ return -EINVAL;
++
++ /*
++ * Requesting insecure and blocking randomness at the same time makes
++ * no sense.
++ */
++ if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM))
++ return -EINVAL;
++
++ if (!crng_ready() && !(flags & GRND_INSECURE)) {
++ if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
++ return -EAGAIN;
++ ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
++ if (unlikely(ret))
++ return ret;
+ }
+- nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3));
+- ret = extract_crng_user(buf, nbytes);
+- trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
+- return ret;
++
++ ret = import_single_range(READ, ubuf, len, &iov, &iter);
++ if (unlikely(ret))
++ return ret;
++ return get_random_bytes_user(&iter);
+ }
+
+-static __poll_t
+-random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
++static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+ {
+- __poll_t mask;
+-
+- poll_wait(file, &random_read_wait, wait);
+- poll_wait(file, &random_write_wait, wait);
+- mask = 0;
+- if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >= random_read_wakeup_bits)
+- mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
+- if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) < random_write_wakeup_bits)
+- mask |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
+- return mask;
++ poll_wait(file, &crng_init_wait, wait);
++ return crng_ready() ? EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM : EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
+ }
+
+-static int
+-write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
++static ssize_t write_pool_user(struct iov_iter *iter)
+ {
+- size_t bytes;
+- __u32 t, buf[16];
+- const char __user *p = buffer;
++ u8 block[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE];
++ ssize_t ret = 0;
++ size_t copied;
+
+- while (count > 0) {
+- int b, i = 0;
++ if (unlikely(!iov_iter_count(iter)))
++ return 0;
+
+- bytes = min(count, sizeof(buf));
+- if (copy_from_user(&buf, p, bytes))
+- return -EFAULT;
++ for (;;) {
++ copied = copy_from_iter(block, sizeof(block), iter);
++ ret += copied;
++ mix_pool_bytes(block, copied);
++ if (!iov_iter_count(iter) || copied != sizeof(block))
++ break;
+
+- for (b = bytes ; b > 0 ; b -= sizeof(__u32), i++) {
+- if (!arch_get_random_int(&t))
++ BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % sizeof(block) != 0);
++ if (ret % PAGE_SIZE == 0) {
++ if (signal_pending(current))
+ break;
+- buf[i] ^= t;
++ cond_resched();
+ }
++ }
++
++ memzero_explicit(block, sizeof(block));
++ return ret ? ret : -EFAULT;
++}
++
++static ssize_t random_write_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
++{
++ return write_pool_user(iter);
++}
+
+- count -= bytes;
+- p += bytes;
++static ssize_t urandom_read_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
++{
++ static int maxwarn = 10;
+
+- mix_pool_bytes(r, buf, bytes);
+- cond_resched();
++ if (!crng_ready()) {
++ if (!ratelimit_disable && maxwarn <= 0)
++ ++urandom_warning.missed;
++ else if (ratelimit_disable || __ratelimit(&urandom_warning)) {
++ --maxwarn;
++ pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zu bytes read)\n",
++ current->comm, iov_iter_count(iter));
++ }
+ }
+
+- return 0;
++ return get_random_bytes_user(iter);
+ }
+
+-static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
+- size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
++static ssize_t random_read_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
+ {
+- size_t ret;
++ int ret;
+
+- ret = write_pool(&input_pool, buffer, count);
+- if (ret)
++ ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
++ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
+-
+- return (ssize_t)count;
++ return get_random_bytes_user(iter);
+ }
+
+ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+ {
+- int size, ent_count;
+ int __user *p = (int __user *)arg;
+- int retval;
++ int ent_count;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case RNDGETENTCNT:
+- /* inherently racy, no point locking */
+- ent_count = ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool);
+- if (put_user(ent_count, p))
++ /* Inherently racy, no point locking. */
++ if (put_user(input_pool.init_bits, p))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ return 0;
+ case RNDADDTOENTCNT:
+@@ -2045,39 +1316,48 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (get_user(ent_count, p))
+ return -EFAULT;
+- return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count);
+- case RNDADDENTROPY:
++ if (ent_count < 0)
++ return -EINVAL;
++ credit_init_bits(ent_count);
++ return 0;
++ case RNDADDENTROPY: {
++ struct iov_iter iter;
++ struct iovec iov;
++ ssize_t ret;
++ int len;
++
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (get_user(ent_count, p++))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ if (ent_count < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+- if (get_user(size, p++))
++ if (get_user(len, p++))
++ return -EFAULT;
++ ret = import_single_range(WRITE, p, len, &iov, &iter);
++ if (unlikely(ret))
++ return ret;
++ ret = write_pool_user(&iter);
++ if (unlikely(ret < 0))
++ return ret;
++ /* Since we're crediting, enforce that it was all written into the pool. */
++ if (unlikely(ret != len))
+ return -EFAULT;
+- retval = write_pool(&input_pool, (const char __user *)p,
+- size);
+- if (retval < 0)
+- return retval;
+- return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count);
++ credit_init_bits(ent_count);
++ return 0;
++ }
+ case RNDZAPENTCNT:
+ case RNDCLEARPOOL:
+- /*
+- * Clear the entropy pool counters. We no longer clear
+- * the entropy pool, as that's silly.
+- */
++ /* No longer has any effect. */
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+- input_pool.entropy_count = 0;
+- blocking_pool.entropy_count = 0;
+ return 0;
+ case RNDRESEEDCRNG:
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+- if (crng_init < 2)
++ if (!crng_ready())
+ return -ENODATA;
+- crng_reseed(&primary_crng, &input_pool);
+- WRITE_ONCE(crng_global_init_time, jiffies - 1);
++ crng_reseed();
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+@@ -2090,49 +1370,54 @@ static int random_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
+ }
+
+ const struct file_operations random_fops = {
+- .read = random_read,
+- .write = random_write,
+- .poll = random_poll,
++ .read_iter = random_read_iter,
++ .write_iter = random_write_iter,
++ .poll = random_poll,
+ .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
+ .fasync = random_fasync,
+ .llseek = noop_llseek,
++ .splice_read = generic_file_splice_read,
++ .splice_write = iter_file_splice_write,
+ };
+
+ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
+- .read = urandom_read,
+- .write = random_write,
++ .read_iter = urandom_read_iter,
++ .write_iter = random_write_iter,
+ .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
+ .fasync = random_fasync,
+ .llseek = noop_llseek,
++ .splice_read = generic_file_splice_read,
++ .splice_write = iter_file_splice_write,
+ };
+
+-SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
+- unsigned int, flags)
+-{
+- int ret;
+-
+- if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM))
+- return -EINVAL;
+-
+- if (count > INT_MAX)
+- count = INT_MAX;
+-
+- if (flags & GRND_RANDOM)
+- return _random_read(flags & GRND_NONBLOCK, buf, count);
+-
+- if (!crng_ready()) {
+- if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
+- return -EAGAIN;
+- ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
+- if (unlikely(ret))
+- return ret;
+- }
+- return urandom_read(NULL, buf, count, NULL);
+-}
+
+ /********************************************************************
+ *
+- * Sysctl interface
++ * Sysctl interface.
++ *
++ * These are partly unused legacy knobs with dummy values to not break
++ * userspace and partly still useful things. They are usually accessible
++ * in /proc/sys/kernel/random/ and are as follows:
++ *
++ * - boot_id - a UUID representing the current boot.
++ *
++ * - uuid - a random UUID, different each time the file is read.
++ *
++ * - poolsize - the number of bits of entropy that the input pool can
++ * hold, tied to the POOL_BITS constant.
++ *
++ * - entropy_avail - the number of bits of entropy currently in the
++ * input pool. Always <= poolsize.
++ *
++ * - write_wakeup_threshold - the amount of entropy in the input pool
++ * below which write polls to /dev/random will unblock, requesting
++ * more entropy, tied to the POOL_READY_BITS constant. It is writable
++ * to avoid breaking old userspaces, but writing to it does not
++ * change any behavior of the RNG.
++ *
++ * - urandom_min_reseed_secs - fixed to the value CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL.
++ * It is writable to avoid breaking old userspaces, but writing
++ * to it does not change any behavior of the RNG.
+ *
+ ********************************************************************/
+
+@@ -2140,26 +1425,28 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
+
+ #include <linux/sysctl.h>
+
+-static int min_read_thresh = 8, min_write_thresh;
+-static int max_read_thresh = OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
+-static int max_write_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
+-static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60;
+-static char sysctl_bootid[16];
++static int sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed = CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL / HZ;
++static int sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_READY_BITS;
++static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS;
++static u8 sysctl_bootid[UUID_SIZE];
+
+ /*
+ * This function is used to return both the bootid UUID, and random
+- * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is,
++ * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is,
+ * then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user.
+- *
+- * If the user accesses this via the proc interface, the UUID will be
+- * returned as an ASCII string in the standard UUID format; if via the
+- * sysctl system call, as 16 bytes of binary data.
+ */
+-static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+- void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+-{
+- struct ctl_table fake_table;
+- unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
++static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buf,
++ size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
++{
++ u8 tmp_uuid[UUID_SIZE], *uuid;
++ char uuid_string[UUID_STRING_LEN + 1];
++ struct ctl_table fake_table = {
++ .data = uuid_string,
++ .maxlen = UUID_STRING_LEN
++ };
++
++ if (write)
++ return -EPERM;
+
+ uuid = table->data;
+ if (!uuid) {
+@@ -2174,32 +1461,17 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ spin_unlock(&bootid_spinlock);
+ }
+
+- sprintf(buf, "%pU", uuid);
+-
+- fake_table.data = buf;
+- fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(buf);
+-
+- return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
++ snprintf(uuid_string, sizeof(uuid_string), "%pU", uuid);
++ return proc_dostring(&fake_table, 0, buf, lenp, ppos);
+ }
+
+-/*
+- * Return entropy available scaled to integral bits
+- */
+-static int proc_do_entropy(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+- void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
++/* The same as proc_dointvec, but writes don't change anything. */
++static int proc_do_rointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buf,
++ size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+ {
+- struct ctl_table fake_table;
+- int entropy_count;
+-
+- entropy_count = *(int *)table->data >> ENTROPY_SHIFT;
+-
+- fake_table.data = &entropy_count;
+- fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(entropy_count);
+-
+- return proc_dointvec(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
++ return write ? 0 : proc_dointvec(table, 0, buf, lenp, ppos);
+ }
+
+-static int sysctl_poolsize = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
+ extern struct ctl_table random_table[];
+ struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
+ {
+@@ -2211,213 +1483,36 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
+ },
+ {
+ .procname = "entropy_avail",
++ .data = &input_pool.init_bits,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0444,
+- .proc_handler = proc_do_entropy,
+- .data = &input_pool.entropy_count,
+- },
+- {
+- .procname = "read_wakeup_threshold",
+- .data = &random_read_wakeup_bits,
+- .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+- .mode = 0644,
+- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+- .extra1 = &min_read_thresh,
+- .extra2 = &max_read_thresh,
++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
+ },
+ {
+ .procname = "write_wakeup_threshold",
+- .data = &random_write_wakeup_bits,
++ .data = &sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+- .extra1 = &min_write_thresh,
+- .extra2 = &max_write_thresh,
++ .proc_handler = proc_do_rointvec,
+ },
+ {
+ .procname = "urandom_min_reseed_secs",
+- .data = &random_min_urandom_seed,
++ .data = &sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
++ .proc_handler = proc_do_rointvec,
+ },
+ {
+ .procname = "boot_id",
+ .data = &sysctl_bootid,
+- .maxlen = 16,
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .proc_handler = proc_do_uuid,
+ },
+ {
+ .procname = "uuid",
+- .maxlen = 16,
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .proc_handler = proc_do_uuid,
+ },
+-#ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH
+- {
+- .procname = "add_interrupt_avg_cycles",
+- .data = &avg_cycles,
+- .maxlen = sizeof(avg_cycles),
+- .mode = 0444,
+- .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
+- },
+- {
+- .procname = "add_interrupt_avg_deviation",
+- .data = &avg_deviation,
+- .maxlen = sizeof(avg_deviation),
+- .mode = 0444,
+- .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
+- },
+-#endif
+ { }
+ };
+-#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
+-
+-struct batched_entropy {
+- union {
+- u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u64)];
+- u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
+- };
+- unsigned int position;
+- spinlock_t batch_lock;
+-};
+-
+-/*
+- * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random
+- * number is good as /dev/urandom, but there is no backtrack protection, with
+- * the goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy. In order to ensure
+- * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
+- * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once at any
+- * point prior.
+- */
+-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = {
+- .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u64.lock),
+-};
+-
+-u64 get_random_u64(void)
+-{
+- u64 ret;
+- unsigned long flags;
+- struct batched_entropy *batch;
+- static void *previous;
+-
+- warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
+-
+- batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64);
+- spin_lock_irqsave(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
+- if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0) {
+- extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64);
+- batch->position = 0;
+- }
+- ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++];
+- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
+- return ret;
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64);
+-
+-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = {
+- .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u32.lock),
+-};
+-u32 get_random_u32(void)
+-{
+- u32 ret;
+- unsigned long flags;
+- struct batched_entropy *batch;
+- static void *previous;
+-
+- warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
+-
+- batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32);
+- spin_lock_irqsave(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
+- if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0) {
+- extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32);
+- batch->position = 0;
+- }
+- ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++];
+- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
+- return ret;
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32);
+-
+-/* It's important to invalidate all potential batched entropy that might
+- * be stored before the crng is initialized, which we can do lazily by
+- * simply resetting the counter to zero so that it's re-extracted on the
+- * next usage. */
+-static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void)
+-{
+- int cpu;
+- unsigned long flags;
+-
+- for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) {
+- struct batched_entropy *batched_entropy;
+-
+- batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu);
+- spin_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags);
+- batched_entropy->position = 0;
+- spin_unlock(&batched_entropy->batch_lock);
+-
+- batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64, cpu);
+- spin_lock(&batched_entropy->batch_lock);
+- batched_entropy->position = 0;
+- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags);
+- }
+-}
+-
+-/**
+- * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address
+- * @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
+- * @range: The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the
+- * random address must fall.
+- *
+- * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped.
+- *
+- * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that
+- * @start was already page aligned. We now align it regardless.
+- *
+- * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range). On error,
+- * @start is returned.
+- */
+-unsigned long
+-randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
+-{
+- if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) {
+- range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start;
+- start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
+- }
+-
+- if (start > ULONG_MAX - range)
+- range = ULONG_MAX - start;
+-
+- range >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
+-
+- if (range == 0)
+- return start;
+-
+- return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT);
+-}
+-
+-/* Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs.
+- * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled
+- * when our pool is full.
+- */
+-void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
+- size_t entropy)
+-{
+- struct entropy_store *poolp = &input_pool;
+-
+- if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
+- crng_fast_load(buffer, count);
+- return;
+- }
+-
+- /* Suspend writing if we're above the trickle threshold.
+- * We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh,
+- * or when the calling thread is about to terminate.
+- */
+- wait_event_interruptible(random_write_wait, kthread_should_stop() ||
+- ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) <= random_write_wakeup_bits);
+- mix_pool_bytes(poolp, buffer, count);
+- credit_entropy_bits(poolp, entropy);
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);
++#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
+diff --git a/drivers/hv/hv.c b/drivers/hv/hv.c
+index 12bc9fa211117..08bcefca313db 100644
+--- a/drivers/hv/hv.c
++++ b/drivers/hv/hv.c
+@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static void hv_stimer0_isr(void)
+
+ hv_cpu = this_cpu_ptr(hv_context.cpu_context);
+ hv_cpu->clk_evt->event_handler(hv_cpu->clk_evt);
+- add_interrupt_randomness(stimer0_vector, 0);
++ add_interrupt_randomness(stimer0_vector);
+ }
+
+ static int hv_ce_set_next_event(unsigned long delta,
+diff --git a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
+index 0c17743b4a65c..fca092cfe2004 100644
+--- a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
++++ b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
+@@ -1146,7 +1146,7 @@ static void vmbus_isr(void)
+ tasklet_schedule(&hv_cpu->msg_dpc);
+ }
+
+- add_interrupt_randomness(HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR, 0);
++ add_interrupt_randomness(HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR);
+ }
+
+ /*
+diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/hwmon.c b/drivers/hwmon/hwmon.c
+index fb82d8ee0dd6d..c4051a3e63c29 100644
+--- a/drivers/hwmon/hwmon.c
++++ b/drivers/hwmon/hwmon.c
+@@ -695,12 +695,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hwmon_device_register_with_groups);
+
+ /**
+ * hwmon_device_register_with_info - register w/ hwmon
+- * @dev: the parent device (mandatory)
+- * @name: hwmon name attribute (mandatory)
+- * @drvdata: driver data to attach to created device (optional)
+- * @chip: pointer to hwmon chip information (mandatory)
++ * @dev: the parent device
++ * @name: hwmon name attribute
++ * @drvdata: driver data to attach to created device
++ * @chip: pointer to hwmon chip information
+ * @extra_groups: pointer to list of additional non-standard attribute groups
+- * (optional)
+ *
+ * hwmon_device_unregister() must be called when the device is no
+ * longer needed.
+@@ -713,10 +712,13 @@ hwmon_device_register_with_info(struct device *dev, const char *name,
+ const struct hwmon_chip_info *chip,
+ const struct attribute_group **extra_groups)
+ {
+- if (!dev || !name || !chip)
++ if (!name)
++ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
++
++ if (chip && (!chip->ops || !chip->ops->is_visible || !chip->info))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+- if (!chip->ops || !chip->ops->is_visible || !chip->info)
++ if (chip && !dev)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ return __hwmon_device_register(dev, name, drvdata, chip, extra_groups);
+diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-realview.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-realview.c
+index b4c1924f02554..38fab02ffe9d0 100644
+--- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-realview.c
++++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-realview.c
+@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ realview_gic_of_init(struct device_node *node, struct device_node *parent)
+
+ /* The PB11MPCore GIC needs to be configured in the syscon */
+ map = syscon_node_to_regmap(np);
++ of_node_put(np);
+ if (!IS_ERR(map)) {
+ /* new irq mode with no DCC */
+ regmap_write(map, REALVIEW_SYS_LOCK_OFFSET,
+diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
+index 05b9a4cdc8fd5..8d8b8d192e2e3 100644
+--- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
++++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
+@@ -1205,12 +1205,15 @@ static void __init gic_populate_ppi_partitions(struct device_node *gic_node)
+ continue;
+
+ cpu = of_cpu_node_to_id(cpu_node);
+- if (WARN_ON(cpu < 0))
++ if (WARN_ON(cpu < 0)) {
++ of_node_put(cpu_node);
+ continue;
++ }
+
+ pr_cont("%pOF[%d] ", cpu_node, cpu);
+
+ cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, &part->mask);
++ of_node_put(cpu_node);
+ }
+
+ pr_cont("}\n");
+diff --git a/drivers/misc/atmel-ssc.c b/drivers/misc/atmel-ssc.c
+index f9caf233e2cc0..48521861beb52 100644
+--- a/drivers/misc/atmel-ssc.c
++++ b/drivers/misc/atmel-ssc.c
+@@ -235,9 +235,9 @@ static int ssc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
+ clk_disable_unprepare(ssc->clk);
+
+ ssc->irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
+- if (!ssc->irq) {
++ if (ssc->irq < 0) {
+ dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "could not get irq\n");
+- return -ENXIO;
++ return ssc->irq;
+ }
+
+ mutex_lock(&user_lock);
+diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bgmac-bcma.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bgmac-bcma.c
+index 6fe074c1588bb..77de92eb08b21 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bgmac-bcma.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bgmac-bcma.c
+@@ -323,7 +323,6 @@ static void bgmac_remove(struct bcma_device *core)
+ bcma_mdio_mii_unregister(bgmac->mii_bus);
+ bgmac_enet_remove(bgmac);
+ bcma_set_drvdata(core, NULL);
+- kfree(bgmac);
+ }
+
+ static struct bcma_driver bgmac_bcma_driver = {
+diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_ethtool.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_ethtool.c
+index 5242d3dfeb22d..6a70e62836f8f 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_ethtool.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_ethtool.c
+@@ -2195,15 +2195,16 @@ static void i40e_diag_test(struct net_device *netdev,
+
+ set_bit(__I40E_TESTING, pf->state);
+
++ if (test_bit(__I40E_RESET_RECOVERY_PENDING, pf->state) ||
++ test_bit(__I40E_RESET_INTR_RECEIVED, pf->state)) {
++ dev_warn(&pf->pdev->dev,
++ "Cannot start offline testing when PF is in reset state.\n");
++ goto skip_ol_tests;
++ }
++
+ if (i40e_active_vfs(pf) || i40e_active_vmdqs(pf)) {
+ dev_warn(&pf->pdev->dev,
+ "Please take active VFs and Netqueues offline and restart the adapter before running NIC diagnostics\n");
+- data[I40E_ETH_TEST_REG] = 1;
+- data[I40E_ETH_TEST_EEPROM] = 1;
+- data[I40E_ETH_TEST_INTR] = 1;
+- data[I40E_ETH_TEST_LINK] = 1;
+- eth_test->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED;
+- clear_bit(__I40E_TESTING, pf->state);
+ goto skip_ol_tests;
+ }
+
+@@ -2250,9 +2251,17 @@ static void i40e_diag_test(struct net_device *netdev,
+ data[I40E_ETH_TEST_INTR] = 0;
+ }
+
+-skip_ol_tests:
+-
+ netif_info(pf, drv, netdev, "testing finished\n");
++ return;
++
++skip_ol_tests:
++ data[I40E_ETH_TEST_REG] = 1;
++ data[I40E_ETH_TEST_EEPROM] = 1;
++ data[I40E_ETH_TEST_INTR] = 1;
++ data[I40E_ETH_TEST_LINK] = 1;
++ eth_test->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED;
++ clear_bit(__I40E_TESTING, pf->state);
++ netif_info(pf, drv, netdev, "testing failed\n");
+ }
+
+ static void i40e_get_wol(struct net_device *netdev,
+diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c
+index 21ea0cdea6668..3615c6533cf4f 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c
+@@ -7508,6 +7508,11 @@ static int i40e_configure_clsflower(struct i40e_vsi *vsi,
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
++ if (!tc) {
++ dev_err(&pf->pdev->dev, "Unable to add filter because of invalid destination");
++ return -EINVAL;
++ }
++
+ if (test_bit(__I40E_RESET_RECOVERY_PENDING, pf->state) ||
+ test_bit(__I40E_RESET_INTR_RECEIVED, pf->state))
+ return -EBUSY;
+diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c
+index f2eaf8c13cc22..53cff913abf0b 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c
+@@ -597,6 +597,17 @@ static inline void mtk_rx_get_desc(struct mtk_rx_dma *rxd,
+ rxd->rxd4 = READ_ONCE(dma_rxd->rxd4);
+ }
+
++static void *mtk_max_lro_buf_alloc(gfp_t gfp_mask)
++{
++ unsigned int size = mtk_max_frag_size(MTK_MAX_LRO_RX_LENGTH);
++ unsigned long data;
++
++ data = __get_free_pages(gfp_mask | __GFP_COMP | __GFP_NOWARN,
++ get_order(size));
++
++ return (void *)data;
++}
++
+ /* the qdma core needs scratch memory to be setup */
+ static int mtk_init_fq_dma(struct mtk_eth *eth)
+ {
+@@ -1005,7 +1016,10 @@ static int mtk_poll_rx(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget,
+ goto release_desc;
+
+ /* alloc new buffer */
+- new_data = napi_alloc_frag(ring->frag_size);
++ if (ring->frag_size <= PAGE_SIZE)
++ new_data = napi_alloc_frag(ring->frag_size);
++ else
++ new_data = mtk_max_lro_buf_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (unlikely(!new_data)) {
+ netdev->stats.rx_dropped++;
+ goto release_desc;
+@@ -1312,7 +1326,10 @@ static int mtk_rx_alloc(struct mtk_eth *eth, int ring_no, int rx_flag)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < rx_dma_size; i++) {
+- ring->data[i] = netdev_alloc_frag(ring->frag_size);
++ if (ring->frag_size <= PAGE_SIZE)
++ ring->data[i] = netdev_alloc_frag(ring->frag_size);
++ else
++ ring->data[i] = mtk_max_lro_buf_alloc(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ring->data[i])
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_cnt.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_cnt.h
+index 81465e267b100..b7eb3674e2856 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_cnt.h
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_cnt.h
+@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@
+ #include "spectrum.h"
+
+ enum mlxsw_sp_counter_sub_pool_id {
+- MLXSW_SP_COUNTER_SUB_POOL_FLOW,
+ MLXSW_SP_COUNTER_SUB_POOL_RIF,
++ MLXSW_SP_COUNTER_SUB_POOL_FLOW,
+ };
+
+ int mlxsw_sp_counter_alloc(struct mlxsw_sp *mlxsw_sp,
+diff --git a/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/usb.c b/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/usb.c
+index 888e298f610b8..f26986eb53f19 100644
+--- a/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/usb.c
++++ b/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/usb.c
+@@ -401,13 +401,25 @@ static void nfcmrvl_play_deferred(struct nfcmrvl_usb_drv_data *drv_data)
+ int err;
+
+ while ((urb = usb_get_from_anchor(&drv_data->deferred))) {
++ usb_anchor_urb(urb, &drv_data->tx_anchor);
++
+ err = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
+- if (err)
++ if (err) {
++ kfree(urb->setup_packet);
++ usb_unanchor_urb(urb);
++ usb_free_urb(urb);
+ break;
++ }
+
+ drv_data->tx_in_flight++;
++ usb_free_urb(urb);
++ }
++
++ /* Cleanup the rest deferred urbs. */
++ while ((urb = usb_get_from_anchor(&drv_data->deferred))) {
++ kfree(urb->setup_packet);
++ usb_free_urb(urb);
+ }
+- usb_scuttle_anchored_urbs(&drv_data->deferred);
+ }
+
+ static int nfcmrvl_resume(struct usb_interface *intf)
+diff --git a/drivers/of/fdt.c b/drivers/of/fdt.c
+index 1eb6af6439ad6..2e9ea7f1e719b 100644
+--- a/drivers/of/fdt.c
++++ b/drivers/of/fdt.c
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
+ #include <linux/debugfs.h>
+ #include <linux/serial_core.h>
+ #include <linux/sysfs.h>
++#include <linux/random.h>
+
+ #include <asm/setup.h> /* for COMMAND_LINE_SIZE */
+ #include <asm/page.h>
+@@ -1077,6 +1078,7 @@ int __init early_init_dt_scan_chosen(unsigned long node, const char *uname,
+ {
+ int l;
+ const char *p;
++ const void *rng_seed;
+
+ pr_debug("search \"chosen\", depth: %d, uname: %s\n", depth, uname);
+
+@@ -1111,6 +1113,14 @@ int __init early_init_dt_scan_chosen(unsigned long node, const char *uname,
+
+ pr_debug("Command line is: %s\n", (char*)data);
+
++ rng_seed = of_get_flat_dt_prop(node, "rng-seed", &l);
++ if (rng_seed && l > 0) {
++ add_bootloader_randomness(rng_seed, l);
++
++ /* try to clear seed so it won't be found. */
++ fdt_nop_property(initial_boot_params, node, "rng-seed");
++ }
++
+ /* break now */
+ return 1;
+ }
+@@ -1213,8 +1223,6 @@ bool __init early_init_dt_verify(void *params)
+
+ /* Setup flat device-tree pointer */
+ initial_boot_params = params;
+- of_fdt_crc32 = crc32_be(~0, initial_boot_params,
+- fdt_totalsize(initial_boot_params));
+ return true;
+ }
+
+@@ -1240,6 +1248,8 @@ bool __init early_init_dt_scan(void *params)
+ return false;
+
+ early_init_dt_scan_nodes();
++ of_fdt_crc32 = crc32_be(~0, initial_boot_params,
++ fdt_totalsize(initial_boot_params));
+ return true;
+ }
+
+diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ipr.c b/drivers/scsi/ipr.c
+index 1b04a8223eb01..c6cde552b995e 100644
+--- a/drivers/scsi/ipr.c
++++ b/drivers/scsi/ipr.c
+@@ -9783,7 +9783,7 @@ static int ipr_alloc_mem(struct ipr_ioa_cfg *ioa_cfg)
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (!ioa_cfg->hrrq[i].host_rrq) {
+- while (--i > 0)
++ while (--i >= 0)
+ dma_free_coherent(&pdev->dev,
+ sizeof(u32) * ioa_cfg->hrrq[i].size,
+ ioa_cfg->hrrq[i].host_rrq,
+@@ -10056,7 +10056,7 @@ static int ipr_request_other_msi_irqs(struct ipr_ioa_cfg *ioa_cfg,
+ ioa_cfg->vectors_info[i].desc,
+ &ioa_cfg->hrrq[i]);
+ if (rc) {
+- while (--i >= 0)
++ while (--i > 0)
+ free_irq(pci_irq_vector(pdev, i),
+ &ioa_cfg->hrrq[i]);
+ return rc;
+diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nportdisc.c b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nportdisc.c
+index 9442fb30e7cd8..f666518d84b0a 100644
+--- a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nportdisc.c
++++ b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nportdisc.c
+@@ -662,7 +662,8 @@ lpfc_rcv_logo(struct lpfc_vport *vport, struct lpfc_nodelist *ndlp,
+ else
+ lpfc_els_rsp_acc(vport, ELS_CMD_ACC, cmdiocb, ndlp, NULL);
+ if (ndlp->nlp_DID == Fabric_DID) {
+- if (vport->port_state <= LPFC_FDISC)
++ if (vport->port_state <= LPFC_FDISC ||
++ vport->fc_flag & FC_PT2PT)
+ goto out;
+ lpfc_linkdown_port(vport);
+ spin_lock_irq(shost->host_lock);
+diff --git a/drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c b/drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c
+index 4e86994e10e81..6e96229c58e05 100644
+--- a/drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c
++++ b/drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c
+@@ -4559,7 +4559,7 @@ pmcraid_register_interrupt_handler(struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance)
+ return 0;
+
+ out_unwind:
+- while (--i > 0)
++ while (--i >= 0)
+ free_irq(pci_irq_vector(pdev, i), &pinstance->hrrq_vector[i]);
+ pci_free_irq_vectors(pdev);
+ return rc;
+diff --git a/drivers/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.h b/drivers/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.h
+index 75966d3f326e0..d87c12324c032 100644
+--- a/drivers/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.h
++++ b/drivers/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.h
+@@ -333,8 +333,8 @@ struct PVSCSIRingReqDesc {
+ u8 tag;
+ u8 bus;
+ u8 target;
+- u8 vcpuHint;
+- u8 unused[59];
++ u16 vcpuHint;
++ u8 unused[58];
+ } __packed;
+
+ /*
+diff --git a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c
+index 7769eadfaf61d..ccc65cfc519f5 100644
+--- a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c
++++ b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c
+@@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ static int vmk80xx_alloc_usb_buffers(struct comedi_device *dev)
+ if (!devpriv->usb_rx_buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+- size = max(usb_endpoint_maxp(devpriv->ep_rx), MIN_BUF_SIZE);
++ size = max(usb_endpoint_maxp(devpriv->ep_tx), MIN_BUF_SIZE);
+ devpriv->usb_tx_buf = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!devpriv->usb_tx_buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+diff --git a/drivers/tty/goldfish.c b/drivers/tty/goldfish.c
+index abc84d84f6386..9180ca5e4dcd4 100644
+--- a/drivers/tty/goldfish.c
++++ b/drivers/tty/goldfish.c
+@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ static int goldfish_tty_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
+ tty_unregister_device(goldfish_tty_driver, qtty->console.index);
+ iounmap(qtty->base);
+ qtty->base = NULL;
+- free_irq(qtty->irq, pdev);
++ free_irq(qtty->irq, qtty);
+ tty_port_destroy(&qtty->port);
+ goldfish_tty_current_line_count--;
+ if (goldfish_tty_current_line_count == 0)
+diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c
+index 34687c354f5e9..5a2e67a8ddc75 100644
+--- a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c
++++ b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c
+@@ -1522,6 +1522,8 @@ static inline void __stop_tx(struct uart_8250_port *p)
+
+ if (em485) {
+ unsigned char lsr = serial_in(p, UART_LSR);
++ p->lsr_saved_flags |= lsr & LSR_SAVE_FLAGS;
++
+ /*
+ * To provide required timeing and allow FIFO transfer,
+ * __stop_tx_rs485() must be called only when both FIFO and
+diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc2/hcd.c b/drivers/usb/dwc2/hcd.c
+index 22c4d554865ee..cfda883185838 100644
+--- a/drivers/usb/dwc2/hcd.c
++++ b/drivers/usb/dwc2/hcd.c
+@@ -5236,7 +5236,7 @@ int dwc2_hcd_init(struct dwc2_hsotg *hsotg)
+ res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
+ if (!res) {
+ retval = -EINVAL;
+- goto error1;
++ goto error2;
+ }
+ hcd->rsrc_start = res->start;
+ hcd->rsrc_len = resource_size(res);
+diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c
+index 1b3e674e6330d..2fe91f120bb1d 100644
+--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c
++++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c
+@@ -772,9 +772,13 @@ struct eth_dev *gether_setup_name(struct usb_gadget *g,
+ dev->qmult = qmult;
+ snprintf(net->name, sizeof(net->name), "%s%%d", netname);
+
+- if (get_ether_addr(dev_addr, net->dev_addr))
++ if (get_ether_addr(dev_addr, net->dev_addr)) {
++ net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_RANDOM;
+ dev_warn(&g->dev,
+ "using random %s ethernet address\n", "self");
++ } else {
++ net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_SET;
++ }
+ if (get_ether_addr(host_addr, dev->host_mac))
+ dev_warn(&g->dev,
+ "using random %s ethernet address\n", "host");
+@@ -831,6 +835,9 @@ struct net_device *gether_setup_name_default(const char *netname)
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->tx_reqs);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->rx_reqs);
+
++ /* by default we always have a random MAC address */
++ net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_RANDOM;
++
+ skb_queue_head_init(&dev->rx_frames);
+
+ /* network device setup */
+@@ -868,7 +875,6 @@ int gether_register_netdev(struct net_device *net)
+ g = dev->gadget;
+
+ memcpy(net->dev_addr, dev->dev_mac, ETH_ALEN);
+- net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_RANDOM;
+
+ status = register_netdev(net);
+ if (status < 0) {
+@@ -908,6 +914,7 @@ int gether_set_dev_addr(struct net_device *net, const char *dev_addr)
+ if (get_ether_addr(dev_addr, new_addr))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ memcpy(dev->dev_mac, new_addr, ETH_ALEN);
++ net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_SET;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gether_set_dev_addr);
+diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c
+index cf56819f16e4c..f7735d5ac6beb 100644
+--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c
++++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c
+@@ -3021,6 +3021,7 @@ static int lpc32xx_udc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
+ }
+
+ udc->isp1301_i2c_client = isp1301_get_client(isp1301_node);
++ of_node_put(isp1301_node);
+ if (!udc->isp1301_i2c_client) {
+ retval = -EPROBE_DEFER;
+ goto phy_fail;
+diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c b/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c
+index 6d1d6efa30554..a4421e1a6c07a 100644
+--- a/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c
++++ b/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c
+@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id edgeport_2port_id_table[] = {
+ { USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_8S) },
+ { USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416) },
+ { USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416B) },
++ { USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_E5805A) },
+ { }
+ };
+
+@@ -206,6 +207,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table_combined[] = {
+ { USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_8S) },
+ { USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416) },
+ { USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416B) },
++ { USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_E5805A) },
+ { }
+ };
+
+diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/io_usbvend.h b/drivers/usb/serial/io_usbvend.h
+index c38e87ac5ea9e..7ca5ca49adff8 100644
+--- a/drivers/usb/serial/io_usbvend.h
++++ b/drivers/usb/serial/io_usbvend.h
+@@ -212,6 +212,7 @@
+ //
+ // Definitions for other product IDs
+ #define ION_DEVICE_ID_MT4X56USB 0x1403 // OEM device
++#define ION_DEVICE_ID_E5805A 0x1A01 // OEM device (rebranded Edgeport/4)
+
+
+ #define GENERATION_ID_FROM_USB_PRODUCT_ID(ProductId) \
+diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
+index 427a38ab198ba..4f99818ca70ed 100644
+--- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
++++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
+@@ -432,6 +432,8 @@ static void option_instat_callback(struct urb *urb);
+ #define CINTERION_PRODUCT_CLS8 0x00b0
+ #define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_MBIM 0x00b3
+ #define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_RMNET 0x00b7
++#define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_2_MBIM 0x00b8
++#define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_2_RMNET 0x00b9
+ #define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV32_WA 0x00f1
+ #define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV32_WB 0x00f2
+
+@@ -1979,6 +1981,10 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = {
+ .driver_info = RSVD(3)},
+ { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_RMNET, 0xff),
+ .driver_info = RSVD(0)},
++ { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_2_MBIM, 0xff),
++ .driver_info = RSVD(3)},
++ { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_2_RMNET, 0xff),
++ .driver_info = RSVD(0)},
+ { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV32_WA, 0xff),
+ .driver_info = RSVD(3)},
+ { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV32_WB, 0xff),
+diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c
+index 4cd9ea5c75be7..c69c755bf5538 100644
+--- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c
++++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c
+@@ -663,6 +663,7 @@ static int vm_cmdline_set(const char *device,
+ if (!vm_cmdline_parent_registered) {
+ err = device_register(&vm_cmdline_parent);
+ if (err) {
++ put_device(&vm_cmdline_parent);
+ pr_err("Failed to register parent device!\n");
+ return err;
+ }
+diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c
+index b7cc63f556eea..40618ccffeb8b 100644
+--- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c
++++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c
+@@ -257,8 +257,7 @@ void vp_del_vqs(struct virtio_device *vdev)
+
+ if (vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks) {
+ for (i = 0; i < vp_dev->msix_vectors; i++)
+- if (vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks[i])
+- free_cpumask_var(vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks[i]);
++ free_cpumask_var(vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks[i]);
+ }
+
+ if (vp_dev->msix_enabled) {
+diff --git a/fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c b/fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c
+index a950a927a626f..c94e0748fc321 100644
+--- a/fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c
++++ b/fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c
+@@ -656,14 +656,10 @@ v9fs_stat2inode_dotl(struct p9_stat_dotl *stat, struct inode *inode,
+ if (stat->st_result_mask & P9_STATS_NLINK)
+ set_nlink(inode, stat->st_nlink);
+ if (stat->st_result_mask & P9_STATS_MODE) {
+- inode->i_mode = stat->st_mode;
+- if ((S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) ||
+- (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode)))
+- init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode,
+- inode->i_rdev);
++ mode = stat->st_mode & S_IALLUGO;
++ mode |= inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO;
++ inode->i_mode = mode;
+ }
+- if (stat->st_result_mask & P9_STATS_RDEV)
+- inode->i_rdev = new_decode_dev(stat->st_rdev);
+ if (!(flags & V9FS_STAT2INODE_KEEP_ISIZE) &&
+ stat->st_result_mask & P9_STATS_SIZE)
+ v9fs_i_size_write(inode, stat->st_size);
+diff --git a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
+index db8243627b085..4ea4fe92eb8c9 100644
+--- a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
+@@ -3170,6 +3170,15 @@ ext4_mb_normalize_request(struct ext4_allocation_context *ac,
+ size = size >> bsbits;
+ start = start_off >> bsbits;
+
++ /*
++ * For tiny groups (smaller than 8MB) the chosen allocation
++ * alignment may be larger than group size. Make sure the
++ * alignment does not move allocation to a different group which
++ * makes mballoc fail assertions later.
++ */
++ start = max(start, rounddown(ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical,
++ (ext4_lblk_t)EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(ac->ac_sb)));
++
+ /* don't cover already allocated blocks in selected range */
+ if (ar->pleft && start <= ar->lleft) {
+ size -= ar->lleft + 1 - start;
+diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c
+index 621271c2989b4..5f85994191504 100644
+--- a/fs/ext4/namei.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c
+@@ -1743,7 +1743,8 @@ static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *do_split(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir,
+ struct dx_hash_info *hinfo)
+ {
+ unsigned blocksize = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize;
+- unsigned count, continued;
++ unsigned continued;
++ int count;
+ struct buffer_head *bh2;
+ ext4_lblk_t newblock;
+ u32 hash2;
+diff --git a/fs/ext4/resize.c b/fs/ext4/resize.c
+index 5f954620efbf2..d37493b39ab97 100644
+--- a/fs/ext4/resize.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/resize.c
+@@ -52,6 +52,16 @@ int ext4_resize_begin(struct super_block *sb)
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
+ return -EPERM;
+
++ /*
++ * If the reserved GDT blocks is non-zero, the resize_inode feature
++ * should always be set.
++ */
++ if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es->s_reserved_gdt_blocks &&
++ !ext4_has_feature_resize_inode(sb)) {
++ ext4_error(sb, "resize_inode disabled but reserved GDT blocks non-zero");
++ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
++ }
++
+ /*
+ * If we are not using the primary superblock/GDT copy don't resize,
+ * because the user tools have no way of handling this. Probably a
+diff --git a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c
+index a7d638bfb46b9..cfb1fe5dfb1e1 100644
+--- a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c
++++ b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c
+@@ -2045,6 +2045,12 @@ lookup_again:
+ case -ERECALLCONFLICT:
+ case -EAGAIN:
+ break;
++ case -ENODATA:
++ /* The server returned NFS4ERR_LAYOUTUNAVAILABLE */
++ pnfs_layout_set_fail_bit(
++ lo, pnfs_iomode_to_fail_bit(iomode));
++ lseg = NULL;
++ goto out_put_layout_hdr;
+ default:
+ if (!nfs_error_is_fatal(PTR_ERR(lseg))) {
+ pnfs_layout_clear_fail_bit(lo, pnfs_iomode_to_fail_bit(iomode));
+diff --git a/include/crypto/blake2s.h b/include/crypto/blake2s.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000..d439496fa6baa
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/include/crypto/blake2s.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
++/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT */
++/*
++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
++ */
++
++#ifndef _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H
++#define _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H
++
++#include <linux/bug.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/string.h>
++
++enum blake2s_lengths {
++ BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE = 64,
++ BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE = 32,
++ BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE = 32,
++
++ BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE = 16,
++ BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE = 20,
++ BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE = 28,
++ BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE = 32,
++};
++
++struct blake2s_state {
++ u32 h[8];
++ u32 t[2];
++ u32 f[2];
++ u8 buf[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE];
++ unsigned int buflen;
++ unsigned int outlen;
++};
++
++enum blake2s_iv {
++ BLAKE2S_IV0 = 0x6A09E667UL,
++ BLAKE2S_IV1 = 0xBB67AE85UL,
++ BLAKE2S_IV2 = 0x3C6EF372UL,
++ BLAKE2S_IV3 = 0xA54FF53AUL,
++ BLAKE2S_IV4 = 0x510E527FUL,
++ BLAKE2S_IV5 = 0x9B05688CUL,
++ BLAKE2S_IV6 = 0x1F83D9ABUL,
++ BLAKE2S_IV7 = 0x5BE0CD19UL,
++};
++
++void blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *in, size_t inlen);
++void blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out);
++
++static inline void blake2s_init_param(struct blake2s_state *state,
++ const u32 param)
++{
++ *state = (struct blake2s_state){{
++ BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ param,
++ BLAKE2S_IV1,
++ BLAKE2S_IV2,
++ BLAKE2S_IV3,
++ BLAKE2S_IV4,
++ BLAKE2S_IV5,
++ BLAKE2S_IV6,
++ BLAKE2S_IV7,
++ }};
++}
++
++static inline void blake2s_init(struct blake2s_state *state,
++ const size_t outlen)
++{
++ blake2s_init_param(state, 0x01010000 | outlen);
++ state->outlen = outlen;
++}
++
++static inline void blake2s_init_key(struct blake2s_state *state,
++ const size_t outlen, const void *key,
++ const size_t keylen)
++{
++ WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && (!outlen || outlen > BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE ||
++ !key || !keylen || keylen > BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE));
++
++ blake2s_init_param(state, 0x01010000 | keylen << 8 | outlen);
++ memcpy(state->buf, key, keylen);
++ state->buflen = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
++ state->outlen = outlen;
++}
++
++static inline void blake2s(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key,
++ const size_t outlen, const size_t inlen,
++ const size_t keylen)
++{
++ struct blake2s_state state;
++
++ WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && ((!in && inlen > 0) || !out || !outlen ||
++ outlen > BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE || keylen > BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE ||
++ (!key && keylen)));
++
++ if (keylen)
++ blake2s_init_key(&state, outlen, key, keylen);
++ else
++ blake2s_init(&state, outlen);
++
++ blake2s_update(&state, in, inlen);
++ blake2s_final(&state, out);
++}
++
++#endif /* _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H */
+diff --git a/include/crypto/chacha20.h b/include/crypto/chacha20.h
+index f76302d99e2be..3dd5ab189543f 100644
+--- a/include/crypto/chacha20.h
++++ b/include/crypto/chacha20.h
+@@ -24,4 +24,19 @@ int crypto_chacha20_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keysize);
+ int crypto_chacha20_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req);
+
++enum chacha_constants { /* expand 32-byte k */
++ CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA = 0x61707865U,
++ CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3 = 0x3320646eU,
++ CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY = 0x79622d32U,
++ CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K = 0x6b206574U
++};
++
++static inline void chacha_init_consts(u32 *state)
++{
++ state[0] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA;
++ state[1] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3;
++ state[2] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY;
++ state[3] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K;
++}
++
+ #endif
+diff --git a/include/crypto/drbg.h b/include/crypto/drbg.h
+index 3fb581bf3b875..a6c3b8e7deb64 100644
+--- a/include/crypto/drbg.h
++++ b/include/crypto/drbg.h
+@@ -105,6 +105,12 @@ struct drbg_test_data {
+ struct drbg_string *testentropy; /* TEST PARAMETER: test entropy */
+ };
+
++enum drbg_seed_state {
++ DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED,
++ DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL, /* Seeded with !rng_is_initialized() */
++ DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL,
++};
++
+ struct drbg_state {
+ struct mutex drbg_mutex; /* lock around DRBG */
+ unsigned char *V; /* internal state 10.1.1.1 1a) */
+@@ -127,14 +133,14 @@ struct drbg_state {
+ struct crypto_wait ctr_wait; /* CTR mode async wait obj */
+ struct scatterlist sg_in, sg_out; /* CTR mode SGLs */
+
+- bool seeded; /* DRBG fully seeded? */
++ enum drbg_seed_state seeded; /* DRBG fully seeded? */
+ bool pr; /* Prediction resistance enabled? */
+- struct work_struct seed_work; /* asynchronous seeding support */
++ bool fips_primed; /* Continuous test primed? */
++ unsigned char *prev; /* FIPS 140-2 continuous test value */
+ struct crypto_rng *jent;
+ const struct drbg_state_ops *d_ops;
+ const struct drbg_core *core;
+ struct drbg_string test_data;
+- struct random_ready_callback random_ready;
+ };
+
+ static inline __u8 drbg_statelen(struct drbg_state *drbg)
+@@ -182,11 +188,7 @@ static inline size_t drbg_max_addtl(struct drbg_state *drbg)
+ static inline size_t drbg_max_requests(struct drbg_state *drbg)
+ {
+ /* SP800-90A requires 2**48 maximum requests before reseeding */
+-#if (__BITS_PER_LONG == 32)
+- return SIZE_MAX;
+-#else
+- return (1UL<<48);
+-#endif
++ return (1<<20);
+ }
+
+ /*
+diff --git a/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h b/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000..3ba066845b699
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
++/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT */
++
++#ifndef _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_BLAKE2S_H
++#define _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_BLAKE2S_H
++
++#include <crypto/blake2s.h>
++
++void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block,
++ size_t nblocks, const u32 inc);
++
++void blake2s_compress_arch(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block,
++ size_t nblocks, const u32 inc);
++
++static inline void blake2s_set_lastblock(struct blake2s_state *state)
++{
++ state->f[0] = -1;
++}
++
++#endif /* _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_BLAKE2S_H */
+diff --git a/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h b/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
+index b51da879d7be0..60efd9810d536 100644
+--- a/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
++++ b/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
+@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ enum cpuhp_state {
+ CPUHP_LUSTRE_CFS_DEAD,
+ CPUHP_AP_ARM_CACHE_B15_RAC_DEAD,
+ CPUHP_PADATA_DEAD,
++ CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE,
+ CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP,
+ CPUHP_POWER_NUMA_PREPARE,
+ CPUHP_HRTIMERS_PREPARE,
+@@ -171,6 +172,7 @@ enum cpuhp_state {
+ CPUHP_AP_PERF_POWERPC_THREAD_IMC_ONLINE,
+ CPUHP_AP_WATCHDOG_ONLINE,
+ CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE,
++ CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE,
+ CPUHP_AP_RCUTREE_ONLINE,
+ CPUHP_AP_BASE_CACHEINFO_ONLINE,
+ CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN,
+diff --git a/include/linux/hw_random.h b/include/linux/hw_random.h
+index bee0827766a39..31587f36c06e5 100644
+--- a/include/linux/hw_random.h
++++ b/include/linux/hw_random.h
+@@ -59,7 +59,5 @@ extern int devm_hwrng_register(struct device *dev, struct hwrng *rng);
+ /** Unregister a Hardware Random Number Generator driver. */
+ extern void hwrng_unregister(struct hwrng *rng);
+ extern void devm_hwrng_unregister(struct device *dve, struct hwrng *rng);
+-/** Feed random bits into the pool. */
+-extern void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy);
+
+ #endif /* LINUX_HWRANDOM_H_ */
+diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
+index c736c677b876d..26a5fba226644 100644
+--- a/include/linux/mm.h
++++ b/include/linux/mm.h
+@@ -2308,6 +2308,8 @@ extern int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm,
+ unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
+ unsigned long flags, struct page **pages);
+
++unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
++
+ extern unsigned long get_unmapped_area(struct file *, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
+
+ extern unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
+diff --git a/include/linux/prandom.h b/include/linux/prandom.h
+index e20339c78a84c..709e8e69fb39b 100644
+--- a/include/linux/prandom.h
++++ b/include/linux/prandom.h
+@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
+
+ #include <linux/types.h>
+ #include <linux/percpu.h>
++#include <linux/siphash.h>
+
+ u32 prandom_u32(void);
+ void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
+@@ -21,15 +22,10 @@ void prandom_reseed_late(void);
+ * The core SipHash round function. Each line can be executed in
+ * parallel given enough CPU resources.
+ */
+-#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
+- v0 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 13), v2 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 16), \
+- v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol64(v0, 32), v3 ^= v2, \
+- v0 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 21), v2 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 17), \
+- v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol64(v2, 32) \
+-)
++#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
+
+-#define PRND_K0 (0x736f6d6570736575 ^ 0x6c7967656e657261)
+-#define PRND_K1 (0x646f72616e646f6d ^ 0x7465646279746573)
++#define PRND_K0 (SIPHASH_CONST_0 ^ SIPHASH_CONST_2)
++#define PRND_K1 (SIPHASH_CONST_1 ^ SIPHASH_CONST_3)
+
+ #elif BITS_PER_LONG == 32
+ /*
+@@ -37,14 +33,9 @@ void prandom_reseed_late(void);
+ * This is weaker, but 32-bit machines are not used for high-traffic
+ * applications, so there is less output for an attacker to analyze.
+ */
+-#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
+- v0 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 5), v2 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 8), \
+- v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol32(v0, 16), v3 ^= v2, \
+- v0 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 7), v2 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 13), \
+- v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol32(v2, 16) \
+-)
+-#define PRND_K0 0x6c796765
+-#define PRND_K1 0x74656462
++#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
++#define PRND_K0 (HSIPHASH_CONST_0 ^ HSIPHASH_CONST_2)
++#define PRND_K1 (HSIPHASH_CONST_1 ^ HSIPHASH_CONST_3)
+
+ #else
+ #error Unsupported BITS_PER_LONG
+diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
+index 37209b3b22ae4..3feafab498ad9 100644
+--- a/include/linux/random.h
++++ b/include/linux/random.h
+@@ -1,50 +1,35 @@
+ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+-/*
+- * include/linux/random.h
+- *
+- * Include file for the random number generator.
+- */
++
+ #ifndef _LINUX_RANDOM_H
+ #define _LINUX_RANDOM_H
+
++#include <linux/bug.h>
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
+ #include <linux/list.h>
+ #include <linux/once.h>
+
+ #include <uapi/linux/random.h>
+
+-struct random_ready_callback {
+- struct list_head list;
+- void (*func)(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
+- struct module *owner;
+-};
++struct notifier_block;
+
+-extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
++void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
++void __init add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
++void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
++ unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
++void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy;
++void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy);
+
+-#if defined(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
++#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
+ static inline void add_latent_entropy(void)
+ {
+- add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy,
+- sizeof(latent_entropy));
++ add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy, sizeof(latent_entropy));
+ }
+ #else
+-static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) {}
+-#endif
+-
+-extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+- unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
+-extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) __latent_entropy;
+-
+-extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
+-extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
+-extern bool rng_is_initialized(void);
+-extern int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
+-extern void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
+-extern int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
+-
+-#ifndef MODULE
+-extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
++static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) { }
+ #endif
+
++void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len);
++size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t len);
+ u32 get_random_u32(void);
+ u64 get_random_u64(void);
+ static inline unsigned int get_random_int(void)
+@@ -76,36 +61,38 @@ static inline unsigned long get_random_long(void)
+
+ static inline unsigned long get_random_canary(void)
+ {
+- unsigned long val = get_random_long();
+-
+- return val & CANARY_MASK;
++ return get_random_long() & CANARY_MASK;
+ }
+
++int __init random_init(const char *command_line);
++bool rng_is_initialized(void);
++int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
++int register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
++int unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
++
+ /* Calls wait_for_random_bytes() and then calls get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes).
+ * Returns the result of the call to wait_for_random_bytes. */
+-static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, int nbytes)
++static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+ {
+ int ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
+ get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+-#define declare_get_random_var_wait(var) \
+- static inline int get_random_ ## var ## _wait(var *out) { \
++#define declare_get_random_var_wait(name, ret_type) \
++ static inline int get_random_ ## name ## _wait(ret_type *out) { \
+ int ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); \
+ if (unlikely(ret)) \
+ return ret; \
+- *out = get_random_ ## var(); \
++ *out = get_random_ ## name(); \
+ return 0; \
+ }
+-declare_get_random_var_wait(u32)
+-declare_get_random_var_wait(u64)
+-declare_get_random_var_wait(int)
+-declare_get_random_var_wait(long)
++declare_get_random_var_wait(u32, u32)
++declare_get_random_var_wait(u64, u32)
++declare_get_random_var_wait(int, unsigned int)
++declare_get_random_var_wait(long, unsigned long)
+ #undef declare_get_random_var
+
+-unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
+-
+ /*
+ * This is designed to be standalone for just prandom
+ * users, but for now we include it from <linux/random.h>
+@@ -116,30 +103,39 @@ unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
+ #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
+ # include <asm/archrandom.h>
+ #else
+-static inline bool arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
+-{
+- return 0;
+-}
+-static inline bool arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
+-{
+- return 0;
+-}
+-static inline bool arch_has_random(void)
+-{
+- return 0;
+-}
+-static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
+-{
+- return 0;
+-}
+-static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
++static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; }
++static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v) { return false; }
++static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; }
++static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) { return false; }
++#endif
++
++/*
++ * Called from the boot CPU during startup; not valid to call once
++ * secondary CPUs are up and preemption is possible.
++ */
++#ifndef arch_get_random_seed_long_early
++static inline bool __init arch_get_random_seed_long_early(unsigned long *v)
+ {
+- return 0;
++ WARN_ON(system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING);
++ return arch_get_random_seed_long(v);
+ }
+-static inline bool arch_has_random_seed(void)
++#endif
++
++#ifndef arch_get_random_long_early
++static inline bool __init arch_get_random_long_early(unsigned long *v)
+ {
+- return 0;
++ WARN_ON(system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING);
++ return arch_get_random_long(v);
+ }
+ #endif
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
++int random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
++int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
++#endif
++
++#ifndef MODULE
++extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
++#endif
++
+ #endif /* _LINUX_RANDOM_H */
+diff --git a/include/linux/siphash.h b/include/linux/siphash.h
+index 0cda61855d907..0bb5ecd507bef 100644
+--- a/include/linux/siphash.h
++++ b/include/linux/siphash.h
+@@ -136,4 +136,32 @@ static inline u32 hsiphash(const void *data, size_t len,
+ return ___hsiphash_aligned(data, len, key);
+ }
+
++/*
++ * These macros expose the raw SipHash and HalfSipHash permutations.
++ * Do not use them directly! If you think you have a use for them,
++ * be sure to CC the maintainer of this file explaining why.
++ */
++
++#define SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(a, b, c, d) ( \
++ (a) += (b), (b) = rol64((b), 13), (b) ^= (a), (a) = rol64((a), 32), \
++ (c) += (d), (d) = rol64((d), 16), (d) ^= (c), \
++ (a) += (d), (d) = rol64((d), 21), (d) ^= (a), \
++ (c) += (b), (b) = rol64((b), 17), (b) ^= (c), (c) = rol64((c), 32))
++
++#define SIPHASH_CONST_0 0x736f6d6570736575ULL
++#define SIPHASH_CONST_1 0x646f72616e646f6dULL
++#define SIPHASH_CONST_2 0x6c7967656e657261ULL
++#define SIPHASH_CONST_3 0x7465646279746573ULL
++
++#define HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(a, b, c, d) ( \
++ (a) += (b), (b) = rol32((b), 5), (b) ^= (a), (a) = rol32((a), 16), \
++ (c) += (d), (d) = rol32((d), 8), (d) ^= (c), \
++ (a) += (d), (d) = rol32((d), 7), (d) ^= (a), \
++ (c) += (b), (b) = rol32((b), 13), (b) ^= (c), (c) = rol32((c), 16))
++
++#define HSIPHASH_CONST_0 0U
++#define HSIPHASH_CONST_1 0U
++#define HSIPHASH_CONST_2 0x6c796765U
++#define HSIPHASH_CONST_3 0x74656462U
++
+ #endif /* _LINUX_SIPHASH_H */
+diff --git a/include/linux/timex.h b/include/linux/timex.h
+index 39c25dbebfe80..c7616cfb48d20 100644
+--- a/include/linux/timex.h
++++ b/include/linux/timex.h
+@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@
+ #include <linux/types.h>
+ #include <linux/param.h>
+
++unsigned long random_get_entropy_fallback(void);
++
+ #include <asm/timex.h>
+
+ #ifndef random_get_entropy
+@@ -74,8 +76,14 @@
+ *
+ * By default we use get_cycles() for this purpose, but individual
+ * architectures may override this in their asm/timex.h header file.
++ * If a given arch does not have get_cycles(), then we fallback to
++ * using random_get_entropy_fallback().
+ */
+-#define random_get_entropy() get_cycles()
++#ifdef get_cycles
++#define random_get_entropy() ((unsigned long)get_cycles())
++#else
++#define random_get_entropy() random_get_entropy_fallback()
++#endif
+ #endif
+
+ /*
+diff --git a/include/trace/events/random.h b/include/trace/events/random.h
+deleted file mode 100644
+index 0560dfc33f1c3..0000000000000
+--- a/include/trace/events/random.h
++++ /dev/null
+@@ -1,316 +0,0 @@
+-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+-#undef TRACE_SYSTEM
+-#define TRACE_SYSTEM random
+-
+-#if !defined(_TRACE_RANDOM_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ)
+-#define _TRACE_RANDOM_H
+-
+-#include <linux/writeback.h>
+-#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
+-
+-TRACE_EVENT(add_device_randomness,
+- TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP),
+-
+- TP_ARGS(bytes, IP),
+-
+- TP_STRUCT__entry(
+- __field( int, bytes )
+- __field(unsigned long, IP )
+- ),
+-
+- TP_fast_assign(
+- __entry->bytes = bytes;
+- __entry->IP = IP;
+- ),
+-
+- TP_printk("bytes %d caller %pS",
+- __entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
+-);
+-
+-DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__mix_pool_bytes,
+- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
+-
+- TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP),
+-
+- TP_STRUCT__entry(
+- __field( const char *, pool_name )
+- __field( int, bytes )
+- __field(unsigned long, IP )
+- ),
+-
+- TP_fast_assign(
+- __entry->pool_name = pool_name;
+- __entry->bytes = bytes;
+- __entry->IP = IP;
+- ),
+-
+- TP_printk("%s pool: bytes %d caller %pS",
+- __entry->pool_name, __entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
+-);
+-
+-DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes,
+- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
+-
+- TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP)
+-);
+-
+-DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes_nolock,
+- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
+-
+- TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP)
+-);
+-
+-TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits,
+- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bits, int entropy_count,
+- int entropy_total, unsigned long IP),
+-
+- TP_ARGS(pool_name, bits, entropy_count, entropy_total, IP),
+-
+- TP_STRUCT__entry(
+- __field( const char *, pool_name )
+- __field( int, bits )
+- __field( int, entropy_count )
+- __field( int, entropy_total )
+- __field(unsigned long, IP )
+- ),
+-
+- TP_fast_assign(
+- __entry->pool_name = pool_name;
+- __entry->bits = bits;
+- __entry->entropy_count = entropy_count;
+- __entry->entropy_total = entropy_total;
+- __entry->IP = IP;
+- ),
+-
+- TP_printk("%s pool: bits %d entropy_count %d entropy_total %d "
+- "caller %pS", __entry->pool_name, __entry->bits,
+- __entry->entropy_count, __entry->entropy_total,
+- (void *)__entry->IP)
+-);
+-
+-TRACE_EVENT(push_to_pool,
+- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int pool_bits, int input_bits),
+-
+- TP_ARGS(pool_name, pool_bits, input_bits),
+-
+- TP_STRUCT__entry(
+- __field( const char *, pool_name )
+- __field( int, pool_bits )
+- __field( int, input_bits )
+- ),
+-
+- TP_fast_assign(
+- __entry->pool_name = pool_name;
+- __entry->pool_bits = pool_bits;
+- __entry->input_bits = input_bits;
+- ),
+-
+- TP_printk("%s: pool_bits %d input_pool_bits %d",
+- __entry->pool_name, __entry->pool_bits,
+- __entry->input_bits)
+-);
+-
+-TRACE_EVENT(debit_entropy,
+- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int debit_bits),
+-
+- TP_ARGS(pool_name, debit_bits),
+-
+- TP_STRUCT__entry(
+- __field( const char *, pool_name )
+- __field( int, debit_bits )
+- ),
+-
+- TP_fast_assign(
+- __entry->pool_name = pool_name;
+- __entry->debit_bits = debit_bits;
+- ),
+-
+- TP_printk("%s: debit_bits %d", __entry->pool_name,
+- __entry->debit_bits)
+-);
+-
+-TRACE_EVENT(add_input_randomness,
+- TP_PROTO(int input_bits),
+-
+- TP_ARGS(input_bits),
+-
+- TP_STRUCT__entry(
+- __field( int, input_bits )
+- ),
+-
+- TP_fast_assign(
+- __entry->input_bits = input_bits;
+- ),
+-
+- TP_printk("input_pool_bits %d", __entry->input_bits)
+-);
+-
+-TRACE_EVENT(add_disk_randomness,
+- TP_PROTO(dev_t dev, int input_bits),
+-
+- TP_ARGS(dev, input_bits),
+-
+- TP_STRUCT__entry(
+- __field( dev_t, dev )
+- __field( int, input_bits )
+- ),
+-
+- TP_fast_assign(
+- __entry->dev = dev;
+- __entry->input_bits = input_bits;
+- ),
+-
+- TP_printk("dev %d,%d input_pool_bits %d", MAJOR(__entry->dev),
+- MINOR(__entry->dev), __entry->input_bits)
+-);
+-
+-TRACE_EVENT(xfer_secondary_pool,
+- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int xfer_bits, int request_bits,
+- int pool_entropy, int input_entropy),
+-
+- TP_ARGS(pool_name, xfer_bits, request_bits, pool_entropy,
+- input_entropy),
+-
+- TP_STRUCT__entry(
+- __field( const char *, pool_name )
+- __field( int, xfer_bits )
+- __field( int, request_bits )
+- __field( int, pool_entropy )
+- __field( int, input_entropy )
+- ),
+-
+- TP_fast_assign(
+- __entry->pool_name = pool_name;
+- __entry->xfer_bits = xfer_bits;
+- __entry->request_bits = request_bits;
+- __entry->pool_entropy = pool_entropy;
+- __entry->input_entropy = input_entropy;
+- ),
+-
+- TP_printk("pool %s xfer_bits %d request_bits %d pool_entropy %d "
+- "input_entropy %d", __entry->pool_name, __entry->xfer_bits,
+- __entry->request_bits, __entry->pool_entropy,
+- __entry->input_entropy)
+-);
+-
+-DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__get_random_bytes,
+- TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
+-
+- TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP),
+-
+- TP_STRUCT__entry(
+- __field( int, nbytes )
+- __field(unsigned long, IP )
+- ),
+-
+- TP_fast_assign(
+- __entry->nbytes = nbytes;
+- __entry->IP = IP;
+- ),
+-
+- TP_printk("nbytes %d caller %pS", __entry->nbytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
+-);
+-
+-DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes,
+- TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
+-
+- TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP)
+-);
+-
+-DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes_arch,
+- TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
+-
+- TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP)
+-);
+-
+-DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__extract_entropy,
+- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
+- unsigned long IP),
+-
+- TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP),
+-
+- TP_STRUCT__entry(
+- __field( const char *, pool_name )
+- __field( int, nbytes )
+- __field( int, entropy_count )
+- __field(unsigned long, IP )
+- ),
+-
+- TP_fast_assign(
+- __entry->pool_name = pool_name;
+- __entry->nbytes = nbytes;
+- __entry->entropy_count = entropy_count;
+- __entry->IP = IP;
+- ),
+-
+- TP_printk("%s pool: nbytes %d entropy_count %d caller %pS",
+- __entry->pool_name, __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count,
+- (void *)__entry->IP)
+-);
+-
+-
+-DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy,
+- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
+- unsigned long IP),
+-
+- TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP)
+-);
+-
+-DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy_user,
+- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
+- unsigned long IP),
+-
+- TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP)
+-);
+-
+-TRACE_EVENT(random_read,
+- TP_PROTO(int got_bits, int need_bits, int pool_left, int input_left),
+-
+- TP_ARGS(got_bits, need_bits, pool_left, input_left),
+-
+- TP_STRUCT__entry(
+- __field( int, got_bits )
+- __field( int, need_bits )
+- __field( int, pool_left )
+- __field( int, input_left )
+- ),
+-
+- TP_fast_assign(
+- __entry->got_bits = got_bits;
+- __entry->need_bits = need_bits;
+- __entry->pool_left = pool_left;
+- __entry->input_left = input_left;
+- ),
+-
+- TP_printk("got_bits %d still_needed_bits %d "
+- "blocking_pool_entropy_left %d input_entropy_left %d",
+- __entry->got_bits, __entry->got_bits, __entry->pool_left,
+- __entry->input_left)
+-);
+-
+-TRACE_EVENT(urandom_read,
+- TP_PROTO(int got_bits, int pool_left, int input_left),
+-
+- TP_ARGS(got_bits, pool_left, input_left),
+-
+- TP_STRUCT__entry(
+- __field( int, got_bits )
+- __field( int, pool_left )
+- __field( int, input_left )
+- ),
+-
+- TP_fast_assign(
+- __entry->got_bits = got_bits;
+- __entry->pool_left = pool_left;
+- __entry->input_left = input_left;
+- ),
+-
+- TP_printk("got_bits %d nonblocking_pool_entropy_left %d "
+- "input_entropy_left %d", __entry->got_bits,
+- __entry->pool_left, __entry->input_left)
+-);
+-
+-#endif /* _TRACE_RANDOM_H */
+-
+-/* This part must be outside protection */
+-#include <trace/define_trace.h>
+diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/random.h b/include/uapi/linux/random.h
+index 26ee91300e3ec..dcc1b3e6106fe 100644
+--- a/include/uapi/linux/random.h
++++ b/include/uapi/linux/random.h
+@@ -48,9 +48,11 @@ struct rand_pool_info {
+ * Flags for getrandom(2)
+ *
+ * GRND_NONBLOCK Don't block and return EAGAIN instead
+- * GRND_RANDOM Use the /dev/random pool instead of /dev/urandom
++ * GRND_RANDOM No effect
++ * GRND_INSECURE Return non-cryptographic random bytes
+ */
+ #define GRND_NONBLOCK 0x0001
+ #define GRND_RANDOM 0x0002
++#define GRND_INSECURE 0x0004
+
+ #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_RANDOM_H */
+diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
+index 272ec131211c0..489a5aa7ba53c 100644
+--- a/init/main.c
++++ b/init/main.c
+@@ -549,13 +549,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
+ page_address_init();
+ pr_notice("%s", linux_banner);
+ setup_arch(&command_line);
+- /*
+- * Set up the the initial canary and entropy after arch
+- * and after adding latent and command line entropy.
+- */
+- add_latent_entropy();
+- add_device_randomness(command_line, strlen(command_line));
+- boot_init_stack_canary();
+ mm_init_cpumask(&init_mm);
+ setup_command_line(command_line);
+ setup_nr_cpu_ids();
+@@ -641,6 +634,17 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
+ softirq_init();
+ timekeeping_init();
+ time_init();
++
++ /*
++ * For best initial stack canary entropy, prepare it after:
++ * - setup_arch() for any UEFI RNG entropy and boot cmdline access
++ * - timekeeping_init() for ktime entropy used in random_init()
++ * - time_init() for making random_get_entropy() work on some platforms
++ * - random_init() to initialize the RNG from from early entropy sources
++ */
++ random_init(command_line);
++ boot_init_stack_canary();
++
+ perf_event_init();
+ profile_init();
+ call_function_init();
+diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
+index d6fd362afc81f..c9ca190ec0347 100644
+--- a/kernel/cpu.c
++++ b/kernel/cpu.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+ #include <linux/slab.h>
+ #include <linux/percpu-rwsem.h>
+ #include <linux/cpuset.h>
++#include <linux/random.h>
+
+ #include <trace/events/power.h>
+ #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+@@ -1404,6 +1405,11 @@ static struct cpuhp_step cpuhp_hp_states[] = {
+ .startup.single = perf_event_init_cpu,
+ .teardown.single = perf_event_exit_cpu,
+ },
++ [CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE] = {
++ .name = "random:prepare",
++ .startup.single = random_prepare_cpu,
++ .teardown.single = NULL,
++ },
+ [CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP] = {
+ .name = "workqueue:prepare",
+ .startup.single = workqueue_prepare_cpu,
+@@ -1520,6 +1526,11 @@ static struct cpuhp_step cpuhp_hp_states[] = {
+ .startup.single = workqueue_online_cpu,
+ .teardown.single = workqueue_offline_cpu,
+ },
++ [CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE] = {
++ .name = "random:online",
++ .startup.single = random_online_cpu,
++ .teardown.single = NULL,
++ },
+ [CPUHP_AP_RCUTREE_ONLINE] = {
+ .name = "RCU/tree:online",
+ .startup.single = rcutree_online_cpu,
+diff --git a/kernel/irq/handle.c b/kernel/irq/handle.c
+index 38554bc353755..e2f7afcb1ae69 100644
+--- a/kernel/irq/handle.c
++++ b/kernel/irq/handle.c
+@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ irqreturn_t handle_irq_event_percpu(struct irq_desc *desc)
+
+ retval = __handle_irq_event_percpu(desc, &flags);
+
+- add_interrupt_randomness(desc->irq_data.irq, flags);
++ add_interrupt_randomness(desc->irq_data.irq);
+
+ if (!noirqdebug)
+ note_interrupt(desc, retval);
+diff --git a/kernel/time/timekeeping.c b/kernel/time/timekeeping.c
+index f246818e35dbc..087f71183c3f2 100644
+--- a/kernel/time/timekeeping.c
++++ b/kernel/time/timekeeping.c
+@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
+ #include <linux/clocksource.h>
+ #include <linux/jiffies.h>
+ #include <linux/time.h>
++#include <linux/timex.h>
+ #include <linux/tick.h>
+ #include <linux/stop_machine.h>
+ #include <linux/pvclock_gtod.h>
+@@ -2308,6 +2309,20 @@ static int timekeeping_validate_timex(const struct timex *txc)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++/**
++ * random_get_entropy_fallback - Returns the raw clock source value,
++ * used by random.c for platforms with no valid random_get_entropy().
++ */
++unsigned long random_get_entropy_fallback(void)
++{
++ struct tk_read_base *tkr = &tk_core.timekeeper.tkr_mono;
++ struct clocksource *clock = READ_ONCE(tkr->clock);
++
++ if (unlikely(timekeeping_suspended || !clock))
++ return 0;
++ return clock->read(clock);
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(random_get_entropy_fallback);
+
+ /**
+ * do_adjtimex() - Accessor function to NTP __do_adjtimex function
+diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
+index 621859a453f82..9a4277034c647 100644
+--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
++++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
+@@ -1277,8 +1277,7 @@ config WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
+ so architecture maintainers really need to do what they can
+ to get the CRNG seeded sooner after the system is booted.
+ However, since users cannot do anything actionable to
+- address this, by default the kernel will issue only a single
+- warning for the first use of unseeded randomness.
++ address this, by default this option is disabled.
+
+ Say Y here if you want to receive warnings for all uses of
+ unseeded randomness. This will be of use primarily for
+diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
+index 1d7a705d72074..e08544c509a84 100644
+--- a/lib/Makefile
++++ b/lib/Makefile
+@@ -283,3 +283,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_LIB_LSHRDI3) += lshrdi3.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_LIB_MULDI3) += muldi3.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_LIB_CMPDI2) += cmpdi2.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_LIB_UCMPDI2) += ucmpdi2.o
++
++obj-y += crypto/
+diff --git a/lib/crypto/Makefile b/lib/crypto/Makefile
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000..d0bca68618f03
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/lib/crypto/Makefile
+@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
++# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
++
++obj-y += libblake2s.o
++libblake2s-y += blake2s.o blake2s-generic.o
++ifneq ($(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS),y)
++libblake2s-y += blake2s-selftest.o
++endif
+diff --git a/lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c b/lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000..04ff8df245136
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT
++/*
++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
++ *
++ * This is an implementation of the BLAKE2s hash and PRF functions.
++ *
++ * Information: https://blake2.net/
++ *
++ */
++
++#include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/string.h>
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/init.h>
++#include <linux/bug.h>
++#include <asm/unaligned.h>
++
++static const u8 blake2s_sigma[10][16] = {
++ { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 },
++ { 14, 10, 4, 8, 9, 15, 13, 6, 1, 12, 0, 2, 11, 7, 5, 3 },
++ { 11, 8, 12, 0, 5, 2, 15, 13, 10, 14, 3, 6, 7, 1, 9, 4 },
++ { 7, 9, 3, 1, 13, 12, 11, 14, 2, 6, 5, 10, 4, 0, 15, 8 },
++ { 9, 0, 5, 7, 2, 4, 10, 15, 14, 1, 11, 12, 6, 8, 3, 13 },
++ { 2, 12, 6, 10, 0, 11, 8, 3, 4, 13, 7, 5, 15, 14, 1, 9 },
++ { 12, 5, 1, 15, 14, 13, 4, 10, 0, 7, 6, 3, 9, 2, 8, 11 },
++ { 13, 11, 7, 14, 12, 1, 3, 9, 5, 0, 15, 4, 8, 6, 2, 10 },
++ { 6, 15, 14, 9, 11, 3, 0, 8, 12, 2, 13, 7, 1, 4, 10, 5 },
++ { 10, 2, 8, 4, 7, 6, 1, 5, 15, 11, 9, 14, 3, 12, 13, 0 },
++};
++
++static inline void blake2s_increment_counter(struct blake2s_state *state,
++ const u32 inc)
++{
++ state->t[0] += inc;
++ state->t[1] += (state->t[0] < inc);
++}
++
++void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block,
++ size_t nblocks, const u32 inc)
++{
++ u32 m[16];
++ u32 v[16];
++ int i;
++
++ WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) &&
++ (nblocks > 1 && inc != BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE));
++
++ while (nblocks > 0) {
++ blake2s_increment_counter(state, inc);
++ memcpy(m, block, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
++ le32_to_cpu_array(m, ARRAY_SIZE(m));
++ memcpy(v, state->h, 32);
++ v[ 8] = BLAKE2S_IV0;
++ v[ 9] = BLAKE2S_IV1;
++ v[10] = BLAKE2S_IV2;
++ v[11] = BLAKE2S_IV3;
++ v[12] = BLAKE2S_IV4 ^ state->t[0];
++ v[13] = BLAKE2S_IV5 ^ state->t[1];
++ v[14] = BLAKE2S_IV6 ^ state->f[0];
++ v[15] = BLAKE2S_IV7 ^ state->f[1];
++
++#define G(r, i, a, b, c, d) do { \
++ a += b + m[blake2s_sigma[r][2 * i + 0]]; \
++ d = ror32(d ^ a, 16); \
++ c += d; \
++ b = ror32(b ^ c, 12); \
++ a += b + m[blake2s_sigma[r][2 * i + 1]]; \
++ d = ror32(d ^ a, 8); \
++ c += d; \
++ b = ror32(b ^ c, 7); \
++} while (0)
++
++#define ROUND(r) do { \
++ G(r, 0, v[0], v[ 4], v[ 8], v[12]); \
++ G(r, 1, v[1], v[ 5], v[ 9], v[13]); \
++ G(r, 2, v[2], v[ 6], v[10], v[14]); \
++ G(r, 3, v[3], v[ 7], v[11], v[15]); \
++ G(r, 4, v[0], v[ 5], v[10], v[15]); \
++ G(r, 5, v[1], v[ 6], v[11], v[12]); \
++ G(r, 6, v[2], v[ 7], v[ 8], v[13]); \
++ G(r, 7, v[3], v[ 4], v[ 9], v[14]); \
++} while (0)
++ ROUND(0);
++ ROUND(1);
++ ROUND(2);
++ ROUND(3);
++ ROUND(4);
++ ROUND(5);
++ ROUND(6);
++ ROUND(7);
++ ROUND(8);
++ ROUND(9);
++
++#undef G
++#undef ROUND
++
++ for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i)
++ state->h[i] ^= v[i] ^ v[i + 8];
++
++ block += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
++ --nblocks;
++ }
++}
++
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_compress_generic);
++
++MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
++MODULE_DESCRIPTION("BLAKE2s hash function");
++MODULE_AUTHOR("Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>");
+diff --git a/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c b/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000..7a9edc96ddddf
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,591 @@
++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT
++/*
++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
++ */
++
++#include <crypto/blake2s.h>
++#include <linux/string.h>
++
++/*
++ * blake2s_testvecs[] generated with the program below (using libb2-dev and
++ * libssl-dev [OpenSSL])
++ *
++ * #include <blake2.h>
++ * #include <stdint.h>
++ * #include <stdio.h>
++ *
++ * #include <openssl/evp.h>
++ *
++ * #define BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT 256
++ *
++ * static void print_vec(const uint8_t vec[], int len)
++ * {
++ * int i;
++ *
++ * printf(" { ");
++ * for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
++ * if (i && (i % 12) == 0)
++ * printf("\n ");
++ * printf("0x%02x, ", vec[i]);
++ * }
++ * printf("},\n");
++ * }
++ *
++ * int main(void)
++ * {
++ * uint8_t key[BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES];
++ * uint8_t buf[BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT];
++ * uint8_t hash[BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES];
++ * int i, j;
++ *
++ * key[0] = key[1] = 1;
++ * for (i = 2; i < BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES; ++i)
++ * key[i] = key[i - 2] + key[i - 1];
++ *
++ * for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT; ++i)
++ * buf[i] = (uint8_t)i;
++ *
++ * printf("static const u8 blake2s_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {\n");
++ *
++ * for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT; ++i) {
++ * int outlen = 1 + i % BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES;
++ * int keylen = (13 * i) % (BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES + 1);
++ *
++ * blake2s(hash, buf, key + BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES - keylen, outlen, i,
++ * keylen);
++ * print_vec(hash, outlen);
++ * }
++ * printf("};\n\n");
++ *
++ * return 0;
++ *}
++ */
++static const u8 blake2s_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {
++ { 0xa1, },
++ { 0x7c, 0x89, },
++ { 0x74, 0x0e, 0xd4, },
++ { 0x47, 0x0c, 0x21, 0x15, },
++ { 0x18, 0xd6, 0x9c, 0xa6, 0xc4, },
++ { 0x13, 0x5d, 0x16, 0x63, 0x2e, 0xf9, },
++ { 0x2c, 0xb5, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x99, 0xe2, 0x73, },
++ { 0x9a, 0x0f, 0xd2, 0x39, 0xd6, 0x68, 0x1b, 0x92, },
++ { 0xc8, 0xde, 0x7a, 0xea, 0x2f, 0xf4, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0x2b, },
++ { 0x5b, 0xf9, 0x43, 0x52, 0x0c, 0x12, 0xba, 0xb5, 0x93, 0x9f, },
++ { 0xc6, 0x2c, 0x4e, 0x80, 0xfc, 0x32, 0x5b, 0x33, 0xb8, 0xb8, 0x0a, },
++ { 0xa7, 0x5c, 0xfd, 0x3a, 0xcc, 0xbf, 0x90, 0xca, 0xb7, 0x97, 0xde, 0xd8, },
++ { 0x66, 0xca, 0x3c, 0xc4, 0x19, 0xef, 0x92, 0x66, 0x3f, 0x21, 0x8f, 0xda,
++ 0xb7, },
++ { 0xba, 0xe5, 0xbb, 0x30, 0x25, 0x94, 0x6d, 0xc3, 0x89, 0x09, 0xc4, 0x25,
++ 0x52, 0x3e, },
++ { 0xa2, 0xef, 0x0e, 0x52, 0x0b, 0x5f, 0xa2, 0x01, 0x6d, 0x0a, 0x25, 0xbc,
++ 0x57, 0xe2, 0x27, },
++ { 0x4f, 0xe0, 0xf9, 0x52, 0x12, 0xda, 0x84, 0xb7, 0xab, 0xae, 0xb0, 0xa6,
++ 0x47, 0x2a, 0xc7, 0xf5, },
++ { 0x56, 0xe7, 0xa8, 0x1c, 0x4c, 0xca, 0xed, 0x90, 0x31, 0xec, 0x87, 0x43,
++ 0xe7, 0x72, 0x08, 0xec, 0xbe, },
++ { 0x7e, 0xdf, 0x80, 0x1c, 0x93, 0x33, 0xfd, 0x53, 0x44, 0xba, 0xfd, 0x96,
++ 0xe1, 0xbb, 0xb5, 0x65, 0xa5, 0x00, },
++ { 0xec, 0x6b, 0xed, 0xf7, 0x7b, 0x62, 0x1d, 0x7d, 0xf4, 0x82, 0xf3, 0x1e,
++ 0x18, 0xff, 0x2b, 0xc4, 0x06, 0x20, 0x2a, },
++ { 0x74, 0x98, 0xd7, 0x68, 0x63, 0xed, 0x87, 0xe4, 0x5d, 0x8d, 0x9e, 0x1d,
++ 0xfd, 0x2a, 0xbb, 0x86, 0xac, 0xe9, 0x2a, 0x89, },
++ { 0x89, 0xc3, 0x88, 0xce, 0x2b, 0x33, 0x1e, 0x10, 0xd1, 0x37, 0x20, 0x86,
++ 0x28, 0x43, 0x70, 0xd9, 0xfb, 0x96, 0xd9, 0xb5, 0xd3, },
++ { 0xcb, 0x56, 0x74, 0x41, 0x8d, 0x80, 0x01, 0x9a, 0x6b, 0x38, 0xe1, 0x41,
++ 0xad, 0x9c, 0x62, 0x74, 0xce, 0x35, 0xd5, 0x6c, 0x89, 0x6e, },
++ { 0x79, 0xaf, 0x94, 0x59, 0x99, 0x26, 0xe1, 0xc9, 0x34, 0xfe, 0x7c, 0x22,
++ 0xf7, 0x43, 0xd7, 0x65, 0xd4, 0x48, 0x18, 0xac, 0x3d, 0xfd, 0x93, },
++ { 0x85, 0x0d, 0xff, 0xb8, 0x3e, 0x87, 0x41, 0xb0, 0x95, 0xd3, 0x3d, 0x00,
++ 0x47, 0x55, 0x9e, 0xd2, 0x69, 0xea, 0xbf, 0xe9, 0x7a, 0x2d, 0x61, 0x45, },
++ { 0x03, 0xe0, 0x85, 0xec, 0x54, 0xb5, 0x16, 0x53, 0xa8, 0xc4, 0x71, 0xe9,
++ 0x6a, 0xe7, 0xcb, 0xc4, 0x15, 0x02, 0xfc, 0x34, 0xa4, 0xa4, 0x28, 0x13,
++ 0xd1, },
++ { 0xe3, 0x34, 0x4b, 0xe1, 0xd0, 0x4b, 0x55, 0x61, 0x8f, 0xc0, 0x24, 0x05,
++ 0xe6, 0xe0, 0x3d, 0x70, 0x24, 0x4d, 0xda, 0xb8, 0x91, 0x05, 0x29, 0x07,
++ 0x01, 0x3e, },
++ { 0x61, 0xff, 0x01, 0x72, 0xb1, 0x4d, 0xf6, 0xfe, 0xd1, 0xd1, 0x08, 0x74,
++ 0xe6, 0x91, 0x44, 0xeb, 0x61, 0xda, 0x40, 0xaf, 0xfc, 0x8c, 0x91, 0x6b,
++ 0xec, 0x13, 0xed, },
++ { 0xd4, 0x40, 0xd2, 0xa0, 0x7f, 0xc1, 0x58, 0x0c, 0x85, 0xa0, 0x86, 0xc7,
++ 0x86, 0xb9, 0x61, 0xc9, 0xea, 0x19, 0x86, 0x1f, 0xab, 0x07, 0xce, 0x37,
++ 0x72, 0x67, 0x09, 0xfc, },
++ { 0x9e, 0xf8, 0x18, 0x67, 0x93, 0x10, 0x9b, 0x39, 0x75, 0xe8, 0x8b, 0x38,
++ 0x82, 0x7d, 0xb8, 0xb7, 0xa5, 0xaf, 0xe6, 0x6a, 0x22, 0x5e, 0x1f, 0x9c,
++ 0x95, 0x29, 0x19, 0xf2, 0x4b, },
++ { 0xc8, 0x62, 0x25, 0xf5, 0x98, 0xc9, 0xea, 0xe5, 0x29, 0x3a, 0xd3, 0x22,
++ 0xeb, 0xeb, 0x07, 0x7c, 0x15, 0x07, 0xee, 0x15, 0x61, 0xbb, 0x05, 0x30,
++ 0x99, 0x7f, 0x11, 0xf6, 0x0a, 0x1d, },
++ { 0x68, 0x70, 0xf7, 0x90, 0xa1, 0x8b, 0x1f, 0x0f, 0xbb, 0xce, 0xd2, 0x0e,
++ 0x33, 0x1f, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x78, 0xa8, 0xa6, 0x81, 0x66, 0xab, 0x8d, 0xcd,
++ 0x58, 0x55, 0x3a, 0x0b, 0x7a, 0xdb, 0xb5, },
++ { 0xdd, 0x35, 0xd2, 0xb4, 0xf6, 0xc7, 0xea, 0xab, 0x64, 0x24, 0x4e, 0xfe,
++ 0xe5, 0x3d, 0x4e, 0x95, 0x8b, 0x6d, 0x6c, 0xbc, 0xb0, 0xf8, 0x88, 0x61,
++ 0x09, 0xb7, 0x78, 0xa3, 0x31, 0xfe, 0xd9, 0x2f, },
++ { 0x0a, },
++ { 0x6e, 0xd4, },
++ { 0x64, 0xe9, 0xd1, },
++ { 0x30, 0xdd, 0x71, 0xef, },
++ { 0x11, 0xb5, 0x0c, 0x87, 0xc9, },
++ { 0x06, 0x1c, 0x6d, 0x04, 0x82, 0xd0, },
++ { 0x5c, 0x42, 0x0b, 0xee, 0xc5, 0x9c, 0xb2, },
++ { 0xe8, 0x29, 0xd6, 0xb4, 0x5d, 0xf7, 0x2b, 0x93, },
++ { 0x18, 0xca, 0x27, 0x72, 0x43, 0x39, 0x16, 0xbc, 0x6a, },
++ { 0x39, 0x8f, 0xfd, 0x64, 0xf5, 0x57, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x45, 0xf8, },
++ { 0xbb, 0x3a, 0x78, 0x6b, 0x02, 0x1d, 0x0b, 0x16, 0xe3, 0xb2, 0x9a, },
++ { 0xb8, 0xb4, 0x0b, 0xe5, 0xd4, 0x1d, 0x0d, 0x85, 0x49, 0x91, 0x35, 0xfa, },
++ { 0x6d, 0x48, 0x2a, 0x0c, 0x42, 0x08, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0x78, 0x6f, 0x18, 0xaf,
++ 0xe2, },
++ { 0x10, 0x45, 0xd4, 0x58, 0x88, 0xec, 0x4e, 0x1e, 0xf6, 0x14, 0x92, 0x64,
++ 0x7e, 0xb0, },
++ { 0x8b, 0x0b, 0x95, 0xee, 0x92, 0xc6, 0x3b, 0x91, 0xf1, 0x1e, 0xeb, 0x51,
++ 0x98, 0x0a, 0x8d, },
++ { 0xa3, 0x50, 0x4d, 0xa5, 0x1d, 0x03, 0x68, 0xe9, 0x57, 0x78, 0xd6, 0x04,
++ 0xf1, 0xc3, 0x94, 0xd8, },
++ { 0xb8, 0x66, 0x6e, 0xdd, 0x46, 0x15, 0xae, 0x3d, 0x83, 0x7e, 0xcf, 0xe7,
++ 0x2c, 0xe8, 0x8f, 0xc7, 0x34, },
++ { 0x2e, 0xc0, 0x1f, 0x29, 0xea, 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xe2, 0xc2, 0x93, 0xeb, 0x41,
++ 0x0d, 0xf0, 0x0a, 0x13, 0x0e, 0xa2, },
++ { 0x71, 0xb8, 0x33, 0xa9, 0x1b, 0xac, 0xf1, 0xb5, 0x42, 0x8f, 0x5e, 0x81,
++ 0x34, 0x43, 0xb7, 0xa4, 0x18, 0x5c, 0x47, },
++ { 0xda, 0x45, 0xb8, 0x2e, 0x82, 0x1e, 0xc0, 0x59, 0x77, 0x9d, 0xfa, 0xb4,
++ 0x1c, 0x5e, 0xa0, 0x2b, 0x33, 0x96, 0x5a, 0x58, },
++ { 0xe3, 0x09, 0x05, 0xa9, 0xeb, 0x48, 0x13, 0xad, 0x71, 0x88, 0x81, 0x9a,
++ 0x3e, 0x2c, 0xe1, 0x23, 0x99, 0x13, 0x35, 0x9f, 0xb5, },
++ { 0xb7, 0x86, 0x2d, 0x16, 0xe1, 0x04, 0x00, 0x47, 0x47, 0x61, 0x31, 0xfb,
++ 0x14, 0xac, 0xd8, 0xe9, 0xe3, 0x49, 0xbd, 0xf7, 0x9c, 0x3f, },
++ { 0x7f, 0xd9, 0x95, 0xa8, 0xa7, 0xa0, 0xcc, 0xba, 0xef, 0xb1, 0x0a, 0xa9,
++ 0x21, 0x62, 0x08, 0x0f, 0x1b, 0xff, 0x7b, 0x9d, 0xae, 0xb2, 0x95, },
++ { 0x85, 0x99, 0xea, 0x33, 0xe0, 0x56, 0xff, 0x13, 0xc6, 0x61, 0x8c, 0xf9,
++ 0x57, 0x05, 0x03, 0x11, 0xf9, 0xfb, 0x3a, 0xf7, 0xce, 0xbb, 0x52, 0x30, },
++ { 0xb2, 0x72, 0x9c, 0xf8, 0x77, 0x4e, 0x8f, 0x6b, 0x01, 0x6c, 0xff, 0x4e,
++ 0x4f, 0x02, 0xd2, 0xbc, 0xeb, 0x51, 0x28, 0x99, 0x50, 0xab, 0xc4, 0x42,
++ 0xe3, },
++ { 0x8b, 0x0a, 0xb5, 0x90, 0x8f, 0xf5, 0x7b, 0xdd, 0xba, 0x47, 0x37, 0xc9,
++ 0x2a, 0xd5, 0x4b, 0x25, 0x08, 0x8b, 0x02, 0x17, 0xa7, 0x9e, 0x6b, 0x6e,
++ 0xe3, 0x90, },
++ { 0x90, 0xdd, 0xf7, 0x75, 0xa7, 0xa3, 0x99, 0x5e, 0x5b, 0x7d, 0x75, 0xc3,
++ 0x39, 0x6b, 0xa0, 0xe2, 0x44, 0x53, 0xb1, 0x9e, 0xc8, 0xf1, 0x77, 0x10,
++ 0x58, 0x06, 0x9a, },
++ { 0x99, 0x52, 0xf0, 0x49, 0xa8, 0x8c, 0xec, 0xa6, 0x97, 0x32, 0x13, 0xb5,
++ 0xf7, 0xa3, 0x8e, 0xfb, 0x4b, 0x59, 0x31, 0x3d, 0x01, 0x59, 0x98, 0x5d,
++ 0x53, 0x03, 0x1a, 0x39, },
++ { 0x9f, 0xe0, 0xc2, 0xe5, 0x5d, 0x93, 0xd6, 0x9b, 0x47, 0x8f, 0x9b, 0xe0,
++ 0x26, 0x35, 0x84, 0x20, 0x1d, 0xc5, 0x53, 0x10, 0x0f, 0x22, 0xb9, 0xb5,
++ 0xd4, 0x36, 0xb1, 0xac, 0x73, },
++ { 0x30, 0x32, 0x20, 0x3b, 0x10, 0x28, 0xec, 0x1f, 0x4f, 0x9b, 0x47, 0x59,
++ 0xeb, 0x7b, 0xee, 0x45, 0xfb, 0x0c, 0x49, 0xd8, 0x3d, 0x69, 0xbd, 0x90,
++ 0x2c, 0xf0, 0x9e, 0x8d, 0xbf, 0xd5, },
++ { 0x2a, 0x37, 0x73, 0x7f, 0xf9, 0x96, 0x19, 0xaa, 0x25, 0xd8, 0x13, 0x28,
++ 0x01, 0x29, 0x89, 0xdf, 0x6e, 0x0c, 0x9b, 0x43, 0x44, 0x51, 0xe9, 0x75,
++ 0x26, 0x0c, 0xb7, 0x87, 0x66, 0x0b, 0x5f, },
++ { 0x23, 0xdf, 0x96, 0x68, 0x91, 0x86, 0xd0, 0x93, 0x55, 0x33, 0x24, 0xf6,
++ 0xba, 0x08, 0x75, 0x5b, 0x59, 0x11, 0x69, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xe5, 0x2c, 0x77,
++ 0x02, 0xf6, 0x47, 0xee, 0x81, 0xdd, 0xb9, 0x06, },
++ { 0x9d, },
++ { 0x9d, 0x7d, },
++ { 0xfd, 0xc3, 0xda, },
++ { 0xe8, 0x82, 0xcd, 0x21, },
++ { 0xc3, 0x1d, 0x42, 0x4c, 0x74, },
++ { 0xe9, 0xda, 0xf1, 0xa2, 0xe5, 0x7c, },
++ { 0x52, 0xb8, 0x6f, 0x81, 0x5c, 0x3a, 0x4c, },
++ { 0x5b, 0x39, 0x26, 0xfc, 0x92, 0x5e, 0xe0, 0x49, },
++ { 0x59, 0xe4, 0x7c, 0x93, 0x1c, 0xf9, 0x28, 0x93, 0xde, },
++ { 0xde, 0xdf, 0xb2, 0x43, 0x61, 0x0b, 0x86, 0x16, 0x4c, 0x2e, },
++ { 0x14, 0x8f, 0x75, 0x51, 0xaf, 0xb9, 0xee, 0x51, 0x5a, 0xae, 0x23, },
++ { 0x43, 0x5f, 0x50, 0xd5, 0x70, 0xb0, 0x5b, 0x87, 0xf5, 0xd9, 0xb3, 0x6d, },
++ { 0x66, 0x0a, 0x64, 0x93, 0x79, 0x71, 0x94, 0x40, 0xb7, 0x68, 0x2d, 0xd3,
++ 0x63, },
++ { 0x15, 0x00, 0xc4, 0x0c, 0x7d, 0x1b, 0x10, 0xa9, 0x73, 0x1b, 0x90, 0x6f,
++ 0xe6, 0xa9, },
++ { 0x34, 0x75, 0xf3, 0x86, 0x8f, 0x56, 0xcf, 0x2a, 0x0a, 0xf2, 0x62, 0x0a,
++ 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x20, },
++ { 0xb1, 0xde, 0xc9, 0xf5, 0xdb, 0xf3, 0x2f, 0x4c, 0xd6, 0x41, 0x7d, 0x39,
++ 0x18, 0x3e, 0xc7, 0xc3, },
++ { 0xc5, 0x89, 0xb2, 0xf8, 0xb8, 0xc0, 0xa3, 0xb9, 0x3b, 0x10, 0x6d, 0x7c,
++ 0x92, 0xfc, 0x7f, 0x34, 0x41, },
++ { 0xc4, 0xd8, 0xef, 0xba, 0xef, 0xd2, 0xaa, 0xc5, 0x6c, 0x8e, 0x3e, 0xbb,
++ 0x12, 0xfc, 0x0f, 0x72, 0xbf, 0x0f, },
++ { 0xdd, 0x91, 0xd1, 0x15, 0x9e, 0x7d, 0xf8, 0xc1, 0xb9, 0x14, 0x63, 0x96,
++ 0xb5, 0xcb, 0x83, 0x1d, 0x35, 0x1c, 0xec, },
++ { 0xa9, 0xf8, 0x52, 0xc9, 0x67, 0x76, 0x2b, 0xad, 0xfb, 0xd8, 0x3a, 0xa6,
++ 0x74, 0x02, 0xae, 0xb8, 0x25, 0x2c, 0x63, 0x49, },
++ { 0x77, 0x1f, 0x66, 0x70, 0xfd, 0x50, 0x29, 0xaa, 0xeb, 0xdc, 0xee, 0xba,
++ 0x75, 0x98, 0xdc, 0x93, 0x12, 0x3f, 0xdc, 0x7c, 0x38, },
++ { 0xe2, 0xe1, 0x89, 0x5c, 0x37, 0x38, 0x6a, 0xa3, 0x40, 0xac, 0x3f, 0xb0,
++ 0xca, 0xfc, 0xa7, 0xf3, 0xea, 0xf9, 0x0f, 0x5d, 0x8e, 0x39, },
++ { 0x0f, 0x67, 0xc8, 0x38, 0x01, 0xb1, 0xb7, 0xb8, 0xa2, 0xe7, 0x0a, 0x6d,
++ 0xd2, 0x63, 0x69, 0x9e, 0xcc, 0xf0, 0xf2, 0xbe, 0x9b, 0x98, 0xdd, },
++ { 0x13, 0xe1, 0x36, 0x30, 0xfe, 0xc6, 0x01, 0x8a, 0xa1, 0x63, 0x96, 0x59,
++ 0xc2, 0xa9, 0x68, 0x3f, 0x58, 0xd4, 0x19, 0x0c, 0x40, 0xf3, 0xde, 0x02, },
++ { 0xa3, 0x9e, 0xce, 0xda, 0x42, 0xee, 0x8c, 0x6c, 0x5a, 0x7d, 0xdc, 0x89,
++ 0x02, 0x77, 0xdd, 0xe7, 0x95, 0xbb, 0xff, 0x0d, 0xa4, 0xb5, 0x38, 0x1e,
++ 0xaf, },
++ { 0x9a, 0xf6, 0xb5, 0x9a, 0x4f, 0xa9, 0x4f, 0x2c, 0x35, 0x3c, 0x24, 0xdc,
++ 0x97, 0x6f, 0xd9, 0xa1, 0x7d, 0x1a, 0x85, 0x0b, 0xf5, 0xda, 0x2e, 0xe7,
++ 0xb1, 0x1d, },
++ { 0x84, 0x1e, 0x8e, 0x3d, 0x45, 0xa5, 0xf2, 0x27, 0xf3, 0x31, 0xfe, 0xb9,
++ 0xfb, 0xc5, 0x45, 0x99, 0x99, 0xdd, 0x93, 0x43, 0x02, 0xee, 0x58, 0xaf,
++ 0xee, 0x6a, 0xbe, },
++ { 0x07, 0x2f, 0xc0, 0xa2, 0x04, 0xc4, 0xab, 0x7c, 0x26, 0xbb, 0xa8, 0xd8,
++ 0xe3, 0x1c, 0x75, 0x15, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x02, 0x6a, 0xf0, 0x86, 0xe9, 0xcd,
++ 0x5c, 0xef, 0xa3, 0x25, },
++ { 0x2f, 0x3b, 0x1f, 0xb5, 0x91, 0x8f, 0x86, 0xe0, 0xdc, 0x31, 0x48, 0xb6,
++ 0xa1, 0x8c, 0xfd, 0x75, 0xbb, 0x7d, 0x3d, 0xc1, 0xf0, 0x10, 0x9a, 0xd8,
++ 0x4b, 0x0e, 0xe3, 0x94, 0x9f, },
++ { 0x29, 0xbb, 0x8f, 0x6c, 0xd1, 0xf2, 0xb6, 0xaf, 0xe5, 0xe3, 0x2d, 0xdc,
++ 0x6f, 0xa4, 0x53, 0x88, 0xd8, 0xcf, 0x4d, 0x45, 0x42, 0x62, 0xdb, 0xdf,
++ 0xf8, 0x45, 0xc2, 0x13, 0xec, 0x35, },
++ { 0x06, 0x3c, 0xe3, 0x2c, 0x15, 0xc6, 0x43, 0x03, 0x81, 0xfb, 0x08, 0x76,
++ 0x33, 0xcb, 0x02, 0xc1, 0xba, 0x33, 0xe5, 0xe0, 0xd1, 0x92, 0xa8, 0x46,
++ 0x28, 0x3f, 0x3e, 0x9d, 0x2c, 0x44, 0x54, },
++ { 0xea, 0xbb, 0x96, 0xf8, 0xd1, 0x8b, 0x04, 0x11, 0x40, 0x78, 0x42, 0x02,
++ 0x19, 0xd1, 0xbc, 0x65, 0x92, 0xd3, 0xc3, 0xd6, 0xd9, 0x19, 0xe7, 0xc3,
++ 0x40, 0x97, 0xbd, 0xd4, 0xed, 0xfa, 0x5e, 0x28, },
++ { 0x02, },
++ { 0x52, 0xa8, },
++ { 0x38, 0x25, 0x0d, },
++ { 0xe3, 0x04, 0xd4, 0x92, },
++ { 0x97, 0xdb, 0xf7, 0x81, 0xca, },
++ { 0x8a, 0x56, 0x9d, 0x62, 0x56, 0xcc, },
++ { 0xa1, 0x8e, 0x3c, 0x72, 0x8f, 0x63, 0x03, },
++ { 0xf7, 0xf3, 0x39, 0x09, 0x0a, 0xa1, 0xbb, 0x23, },
++ { 0x6b, 0x03, 0xc0, 0xe9, 0xd9, 0x83, 0x05, 0x22, 0x01, },
++ { 0x1b, 0x4b, 0xf5, 0xd6, 0x4f, 0x05, 0x75, 0x91, 0x4c, 0x7f, },
++ { 0x4c, 0x8c, 0x25, 0x20, 0x21, 0xcb, 0xc2, 0x4b, 0x3a, 0x5b, 0x8d, },
++ { 0x56, 0xe2, 0x77, 0xa0, 0xb6, 0x9f, 0x81, 0xec, 0x83, 0x75, 0xc4, 0xf9, },
++ { 0x71, 0x70, 0x0f, 0xad, 0x4d, 0x35, 0x81, 0x9d, 0x88, 0x69, 0xf9, 0xaa,
++ 0xd3, },
++ { 0x50, 0x6e, 0x86, 0x6e, 0x43, 0xc0, 0xc2, 0x44, 0xc2, 0xe2, 0xa0, 0x1c,
++ 0xb7, 0x9a, },
++ { 0xe4, 0x7e, 0x72, 0xc6, 0x12, 0x8e, 0x7c, 0xfc, 0xbd, 0xe2, 0x08, 0x31,
++ 0x3d, 0x47, 0x3d, },
++ { 0x08, 0x97, 0x5b, 0x80, 0xae, 0xc4, 0x1d, 0x50, 0x77, 0xdf, 0x1f, 0xd0,
++ 0x24, 0xf0, 0x17, 0xc0, },
++ { 0x01, 0xb6, 0x29, 0xf4, 0xaf, 0x78, 0x5f, 0xb6, 0x91, 0xdd, 0x76, 0x76,
++ 0xd2, 0xfd, 0x0c, 0x47, 0x40, },
++ { 0xa1, 0xd8, 0x09, 0x97, 0x7a, 0xa6, 0xc8, 0x94, 0xf6, 0x91, 0x7b, 0xae,
++ 0x2b, 0x9f, 0x0d, 0x83, 0x48, 0xf7, },
++ { 0x12, 0xd5, 0x53, 0x7d, 0x9a, 0xb0, 0xbe, 0xd9, 0xed, 0xe9, 0x9e, 0xee,
++ 0x61, 0x5b, 0x42, 0xf2, 0xc0, 0x73, 0xc0, },
++ { 0xd5, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x5c, 0x6e, 0xa5, 0x69, 0x2b, 0x3b, 0x8c, 0xd6, 0x7d,
++ 0x1d, 0xbe, 0x2c, 0xa1, 0x02, 0x21, 0xcd, 0x29, },
++ { 0xa4, 0x98, 0x80, 0xca, 0x22, 0xcf, 0x6a, 0xab, 0x5e, 0x40, 0x0d, 0x61,
++ 0x08, 0x21, 0xef, 0xc0, 0x6c, 0x52, 0xb4, 0xb0, 0x53, },
++ { 0xbf, 0xaf, 0x8f, 0x3b, 0x7a, 0x97, 0x33, 0xe5, 0xca, 0x07, 0x37, 0xfd,
++ 0x15, 0xdf, 0xce, 0x26, 0x2a, 0xb1, 0xa7, 0x0b, 0xb3, 0xac, },
++ { 0x16, 0x22, 0xe1, 0xbc, 0x99, 0x4e, 0x01, 0xf0, 0xfa, 0xff, 0x8f, 0xa5,
++ 0x0c, 0x61, 0xb0, 0xad, 0xcc, 0xb1, 0xe1, 0x21, 0x46, 0xfa, 0x2e, },
++ { 0x11, 0x5b, 0x0b, 0x2b, 0xe6, 0x14, 0xc1, 0xd5, 0x4d, 0x71, 0x5e, 0x17,
++ 0xea, 0x23, 0xdd, 0x6c, 0xbd, 0x1d, 0xbe, 0x12, 0x1b, 0xee, 0x4c, 0x1a, },
++ { 0x40, 0x88, 0x22, 0xf3, 0x20, 0x6c, 0xed, 0xe1, 0x36, 0x34, 0x62, 0x2c,
++ 0x98, 0x83, 0x52, 0xe2, 0x25, 0xee, 0xe9, 0xf5, 0xe1, 0x17, 0xf0, 0x5c,
++ 0xae, },
++ { 0xc3, 0x76, 0x37, 0xde, 0x95, 0x8c, 0xca, 0x2b, 0x0c, 0x23, 0xe7, 0xb5,
++ 0x38, 0x70, 0x61, 0xcc, 0xff, 0xd3, 0x95, 0x7b, 0xf3, 0xff, 0x1f, 0x9d,
++ 0x59, 0x00, },
++ { 0x0c, 0x19, 0x52, 0x05, 0x22, 0x53, 0xcb, 0x48, 0xd7, 0x10, 0x0e, 0x7e,
++ 0x14, 0x69, 0xb5, 0xa2, 0x92, 0x43, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x4b, 0x8f, 0x51, 0x2c,
++ 0x5a, 0x2c, 0x3b, },
++ { 0xe1, 0x9d, 0x70, 0x70, 0x28, 0xec, 0x86, 0x40, 0x55, 0x33, 0x56, 0xda,
++ 0x88, 0xca, 0xee, 0xc8, 0x6a, 0x20, 0xb1, 0xe5, 0x3d, 0x57, 0xf8, 0x3c,
++ 0x10, 0x07, 0x2a, 0xc4, },
++ { 0x0b, 0xae, 0xf1, 0xc4, 0x79, 0xee, 0x1b, 0x3d, 0x27, 0x35, 0x8d, 0x14,
++ 0xd6, 0xae, 0x4e, 0x3c, 0xe9, 0x53, 0x50, 0xb5, 0xcc, 0x0c, 0xf7, 0xdf,
++ 0xee, 0xa1, 0x74, 0xd6, 0x71, },
++ { 0xe6, 0xa4, 0xf4, 0x99, 0x98, 0xb9, 0x80, 0xea, 0x96, 0x7f, 0x4f, 0x33,
++ 0xcf, 0x74, 0x25, 0x6f, 0x17, 0x6c, 0xbf, 0xf5, 0x5c, 0x38, 0xd0, 0xff,
++ 0x96, 0xcb, 0x13, 0xf9, 0xdf, 0xfd, },
++ { 0xbe, 0x92, 0xeb, 0xba, 0x44, 0x2c, 0x24, 0x74, 0xd4, 0x03, 0x27, 0x3c,
++ 0x5d, 0x5b, 0x03, 0x30, 0x87, 0x63, 0x69, 0xe0, 0xb8, 0x94, 0xf4, 0x44,
++ 0x7e, 0xad, 0xcd, 0x20, 0x12, 0x16, 0x79, },
++ { 0x30, 0xf1, 0xc4, 0x8e, 0x05, 0x90, 0x2a, 0x97, 0x63, 0x94, 0x46, 0xff,
++ 0xce, 0xd8, 0x67, 0xa7, 0xac, 0x33, 0x8c, 0x95, 0xb7, 0xcd, 0xa3, 0x23,
++ 0x98, 0x9d, 0x76, 0x6c, 0x9d, 0xa8, 0xd6, 0x8a, },
++ { 0xbe, },
++ { 0x17, 0x6c, },
++ { 0x1a, 0x42, 0x4f, },
++ { 0xba, 0xaf, 0xb7, 0x65, },
++ { 0xc2, 0x63, 0x43, 0x6a, 0xea, },
++ { 0xe4, 0x4d, 0xad, 0xf2, 0x0b, 0x02, },
++ { 0x04, 0xc7, 0xc4, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x2b, 0xce, },
++ { 0x66, 0xf6, 0x67, 0xcb, 0x03, 0x53, 0xc8, 0xf1, },
++ { 0x56, 0xa3, 0x60, 0x78, 0xc9, 0x5f, 0x70, 0x1b, 0x5e, },
++ { 0x99, 0xff, 0x81, 0x7c, 0x13, 0x3c, 0x29, 0x79, 0x4b, 0x65, },
++ { 0x51, 0x10, 0x50, 0x93, 0x01, 0x93, 0xb7, 0x01, 0xc9, 0x18, 0xb7, },
++ { 0x8e, 0x3c, 0x42, 0x1e, 0x5e, 0x7d, 0xc1, 0x50, 0x70, 0x1f, 0x00, 0x98, },
++ { 0x5f, 0xd9, 0x9b, 0xc8, 0xd7, 0xb2, 0x72, 0x62, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0xba, 0x92,
++ 0xe9, },
++ { 0x70, 0x2b, 0xba, 0xfe, 0xad, 0x5d, 0x96, 0x3f, 0x27, 0xc2, 0x41, 0x6d,
++ 0xc4, 0xb3, },
++ { 0xae, 0xe0, 0xd5, 0xd4, 0xc7, 0xae, 0x15, 0x5e, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0x33, 0x60,
++ 0xd7, 0xd3, 0x5e, },
++ { 0x79, 0x8e, 0xbc, 0x9e, 0x20, 0xb9, 0x19, 0x4b, 0x63, 0x80, 0xf3, 0x16,
++ 0xaf, 0x39, 0xbd, 0x92, },
++ { 0xc2, 0x0e, 0x85, 0xa0, 0x0b, 0x9a, 0xb0, 0xec, 0xde, 0x38, 0xd3, 0x10,
++ 0xd9, 0xa7, 0x66, 0x27, 0xcf, },
++ { 0x0e, 0x3b, 0x75, 0x80, 0x67, 0x14, 0x0c, 0x02, 0x90, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x02,
++ 0x81, 0xf6, 0xa6, 0x87, 0xce, 0x58, },
++ { 0x79, 0xb5, 0xe9, 0x5d, 0x52, 0x4d, 0xf7, 0x59, 0xf4, 0x2e, 0x27, 0xdd,
++ 0xb3, 0xed, 0x57, 0x5b, 0x82, 0xea, 0x6f, },
++ { 0xa2, 0x97, 0xf5, 0x80, 0x02, 0x3d, 0xde, 0xa3, 0xf9, 0xf6, 0xab, 0xe3,
++ 0x57, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x9b, 0x10, 0x42, 0x6f, 0xf2, },
++ { 0x12, 0x7a, 0xfc, 0xb7, 0x67, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x78, 0x1a, 0xfe, 0x88, 0x4f,
++ 0xc6, 0xac, 0x52, 0x96, 0x64, 0x28, 0x97, 0x84, 0x06, },
++ { 0xc5, 0x04, 0x44, 0x6b, 0xb2, 0xa5, 0xa4, 0x66, 0xe1, 0x76, 0xa2, 0x51,
++ 0xf9, 0x59, 0x69, 0x97, 0x56, 0x0b, 0xbf, 0x50, 0xb3, 0x34, },
++ { 0x21, 0x32, 0x6b, 0x42, 0xb5, 0xed, 0x71, 0x8d, 0xf7, 0x5a, 0x35, 0xe3,
++ 0x90, 0xe2, 0xee, 0xaa, 0x89, 0xf6, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0x4d, 0x73, 0xf4, },
++ { 0x4c, 0xa6, 0x09, 0xf4, 0x48, 0xe7, 0x46, 0xbc, 0x49, 0xfc, 0xe5, 0xda,
++ 0xd1, 0x87, 0x13, 0x17, 0x4c, 0x59, 0x71, 0x26, 0x5b, 0x2c, 0x42, 0xb7, },
++ { 0x13, 0x63, 0xf3, 0x40, 0x02, 0xe5, 0xa3, 0x3a, 0x5e, 0x8e, 0xf8, 0xb6,
++ 0x8a, 0x49, 0x60, 0x76, 0x34, 0x72, 0x94, 0x73, 0xf6, 0xd9, 0x21, 0x6a,
++ 0x26, },
++ { 0xdf, 0x75, 0x16, 0x10, 0x1b, 0x5e, 0x81, 0xc3, 0xc8, 0xde, 0x34, 0x24,
++ 0xb0, 0x98, 0xeb, 0x1b, 0x8f, 0xa1, 0x9b, 0x05, 0xee, 0xa5, 0xe9, 0x35,
++ 0xf4, 0x1d, },
++ { 0xcd, 0x21, 0x93, 0x6e, 0x5b, 0xa0, 0x26, 0x2b, 0x21, 0x0e, 0xa0, 0xb9,
++ 0x1c, 0xb5, 0xbb, 0xb8, 0xf8, 0x1e, 0xff, 0x5c, 0xa8, 0xf9, 0x39, 0x46,
++ 0x4e, 0x29, 0x26, },
++ { 0x73, 0x7f, 0x0e, 0x3b, 0x0b, 0x5c, 0xf9, 0x60, 0xaa, 0x88, 0xa1, 0x09,
++ 0xb1, 0x5d, 0x38, 0x7b, 0x86, 0x8f, 0x13, 0x7a, 0x8d, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x98,
++ 0x1a, 0x5b, 0xff, 0xc9, },
++ { 0xd3, 0x3c, 0x61, 0x71, 0x44, 0x7e, 0x31, 0x74, 0x98, 0x9d, 0x9a, 0xd2,
++ 0x27, 0xf3, 0x46, 0x43, 0x42, 0x51, 0xd0, 0x5f, 0xe9, 0x1c, 0x5c, 0x69,
++ 0xbf, 0xf6, 0xbe, 0x3c, 0x40, },
++ { 0x31, 0x99, 0x31, 0x9f, 0xaa, 0x43, 0x2e, 0x77, 0x3e, 0x74, 0x26, 0x31,
++ 0x5e, 0x61, 0xf1, 0x87, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x9b, 0xcd, 0xd0, 0x3a, 0xee, 0x20,
++ 0x7e, 0x10, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x7e, 0xfa, },
++ { 0xa4, 0x27, 0x80, 0x67, 0x81, 0x2a, 0xa7, 0x62, 0xf7, 0x6e, 0xda, 0xd4,
++ 0x5c, 0x39, 0x74, 0xad, 0x7e, 0xbe, 0xad, 0xa5, 0x84, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x30,
++ 0x5d, 0xdb, 0xe2, 0x05, 0x43, 0xf7, 0x1b, },
++ { 0x0b, 0x37, 0xd8, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x83, 0xd6, 0x80, 0xf2, 0x35, 0xc2, 0xb0,
++ 0x37, 0xef, 0xef, 0x5e, 0x43, 0x93, 0xf0, 0x49, 0x45, 0x0a, 0xef, 0xb5,
++ 0x76, 0x70, 0x12, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xdb, 0xf5, 0x7a, },
++ { 0x1f, },
++ { 0x82, 0x60, },
++ { 0xcc, 0xe3, 0x08, },
++ { 0x56, 0x17, 0xe4, 0x59, },
++ { 0xe2, 0xd7, 0x9e, 0xc4, 0x4c, },
++ { 0xb2, 0xad, 0xd3, 0x78, 0x58, 0x5a, },
++ { 0xce, 0x43, 0xb4, 0x02, 0x96, 0xab, 0x3c, },
++ { 0xe6, 0x05, 0x1a, 0x73, 0x22, 0x32, 0xbb, 0x77, },
++ { 0x23, 0xe7, 0xda, 0xfe, 0x2c, 0xef, 0x8c, 0x22, 0xec, },
++ { 0xe9, 0x8e, 0x55, 0x38, 0xd1, 0xd7, 0x35, 0x23, 0x98, 0xc7, },
++ { 0xb5, 0x81, 0x1a, 0xe5, 0xb5, 0xa5, 0xd9, 0x4d, 0xca, 0x41, 0xe7, },
++ { 0x41, 0x16, 0x16, 0x95, 0x8d, 0x9e, 0x0c, 0xea, 0x8c, 0x71, 0x9a, 0xc1, },
++ { 0x7c, 0x33, 0xc0, 0xa4, 0x00, 0x62, 0xea, 0x60, 0x67, 0xe4, 0x20, 0xbc,
++ 0x5b, },
++ { 0xdb, 0xb1, 0xdc, 0xfd, 0x08, 0xc0, 0xde, 0x82, 0xd1, 0xde, 0x38, 0xc0,
++ 0x90, 0x48, },
++ { 0x37, 0x18, 0x2e, 0x0d, 0x61, 0xaa, 0x61, 0xd7, 0x86, 0x20, 0x16, 0x60,
++ 0x04, 0xd9, 0xd5, },
++ { 0xb0, 0xcf, 0x2c, 0x4c, 0x5e, 0x5b, 0x4f, 0x2a, 0x23, 0x25, 0x58, 0x47,
++ 0xe5, 0x31, 0x06, 0x70, },
++ { 0x91, 0xa0, 0xa3, 0x86, 0x4e, 0xe0, 0x72, 0x38, 0x06, 0x67, 0x59, 0x5c,
++ 0x70, 0x25, 0xdb, 0x33, 0x27, },
++ { 0x44, 0x58, 0x66, 0xb8, 0x58, 0xc7, 0x13, 0xed, 0x4c, 0xc0, 0xf4, 0x9a,
++ 0x1e, 0x67, 0x75, 0x33, 0xb6, 0xb8, },
++ { 0x7f, 0x98, 0x4a, 0x8e, 0x50, 0xa2, 0x5c, 0xcd, 0x59, 0xde, 0x72, 0xb3,
++ 0x9d, 0xc3, 0x09, 0x8a, 0xab, 0x56, 0xf1, },
++ { 0x80, 0x96, 0x49, 0x1a, 0x59, 0xa2, 0xc5, 0xd5, 0xa7, 0x20, 0x8a, 0xb7,
++ 0x27, 0x62, 0x84, 0x43, 0xc6, 0xe1, 0x1b, 0x5d, },
++ { 0x6b, 0xb7, 0x2b, 0x26, 0x62, 0x14, 0x70, 0x19, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0xac, 0xac,
++ 0x63, 0x58, 0x5e, 0x94, 0xb5, 0xb7, 0xe8, 0xe8, 0xa2, },
++ { 0x20, 0xa8, 0xc0, 0xfd, 0x63, 0x3d, 0x6e, 0x98, 0xcf, 0x0c, 0x49, 0x98,
++ 0xe4, 0x5a, 0xfe, 0x8c, 0xaa, 0x70, 0x82, 0x1c, 0x7b, 0x74, },
++ { 0xc8, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0xdf, 0x69, 0x30, 0x01, 0xc2, 0x0f, 0x7e, 0x2f, 0x11,
++ 0xcc, 0x3e, 0x17, 0xa5, 0x69, 0x40, 0x3f, 0x0e, 0x79, 0x7f, 0xcf, },
++ { 0xdb, 0x61, 0xc0, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x49, 0x07, 0x31, 0x1d, 0x91, 0x42, 0x8a,
++ 0xfc, 0x5e, 0xd3, 0xf8, 0x56, 0x1f, 0x2b, 0x73, 0xfd, 0x9f, 0xb2, 0x8e, },
++ { 0x0c, 0x89, 0x55, 0x0c, 0x1f, 0x59, 0x2c, 0x9d, 0x1b, 0x29, 0x1d, 0x41,
++ 0x1d, 0xe6, 0x47, 0x8f, 0x8c, 0x2b, 0xea, 0x8f, 0xf0, 0xff, 0x21, 0x70,
++ 0x88, },
++ { 0x12, 0x18, 0x95, 0xa6, 0x59, 0xb1, 0x31, 0x24, 0x45, 0x67, 0x55, 0xa4,
++ 0x1a, 0x2d, 0x48, 0x67, 0x1b, 0x43, 0x88, 0x2d, 0x8e, 0xa0, 0x70, 0xb3,
++ 0xc6, 0xbb, },
++ { 0xe7, 0xb1, 0x1d, 0xb2, 0x76, 0x4d, 0x68, 0x68, 0x68, 0x23, 0x02, 0x55,
++ 0x3a, 0xe2, 0xe5, 0xd5, 0x4b, 0x43, 0xf9, 0x34, 0x77, 0x5c, 0xa1, 0xf5,
++ 0x55, 0xfd, 0x4f, },
++ { 0x8c, 0x87, 0x5a, 0x08, 0x3a, 0x73, 0xad, 0x61, 0xe1, 0xe7, 0x99, 0x7e,
++ 0xf0, 0x5d, 0xe9, 0x5d, 0x16, 0x43, 0x80, 0x2f, 0xd0, 0x66, 0x34, 0xe2,
++ 0x42, 0x64, 0x3b, 0x1a, },
++ { 0x39, 0xc1, 0x99, 0xcf, 0x22, 0xbf, 0x16, 0x8f, 0x9f, 0x80, 0x7f, 0x95,
++ 0x0a, 0x05, 0x67, 0x27, 0xe7, 0x15, 0xdf, 0x9d, 0xb2, 0xfe, 0x1c, 0xb5,
++ 0x1d, 0x60, 0x8f, 0x8a, 0x1d, },
++ { 0x9b, 0x6e, 0x08, 0x09, 0x06, 0x73, 0xab, 0x68, 0x02, 0x62, 0x1a, 0xe4,
++ 0xd4, 0xdf, 0xc7, 0x02, 0x4c, 0x6a, 0x5f, 0xfd, 0x23, 0xac, 0xae, 0x6d,
++ 0x43, 0xa4, 0x7a, 0x50, 0x60, 0x3c, },
++ { 0x1d, 0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe1, 0xb1, 0x4b, 0xe3, 0xf2, 0xe2, 0x1a, 0x73, 0x1b,
++ 0xa0, 0x92, 0xa7, 0xf5, 0xff, 0x8f, 0x8b, 0x5d, 0xdf, 0xa8, 0x04, 0xb3,
++ 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xcc, 0x12, 0xfa, 0x35, 0x46, },
++ { 0x49, 0x45, 0x97, 0x11, 0x0f, 0x1c, 0x60, 0x8e, 0xe8, 0x47, 0x30, 0xcf,
++ 0x60, 0xa8, 0x71, 0xc5, 0x1b, 0xe9, 0x39, 0x4d, 0x49, 0xb6, 0x12, 0x1f,
++ 0x24, 0xab, 0x37, 0xff, 0x83, 0xc2, 0xe1, 0x3a, },
++ { 0x60, },
++ { 0x24, 0x26, },
++ { 0x47, 0xeb, 0xc9, },
++ { 0x4a, 0xd0, 0xbc, 0xf0, },
++ { 0x8e, 0x2b, 0xc9, 0x85, 0x3c, },
++ { 0xa2, 0x07, 0x15, 0xb8, 0x12, 0x74, },
++ { 0x0f, 0xdb, 0x5b, 0x33, 0x69, 0xfe, 0x4b, },
++ { 0xa2, 0x86, 0x54, 0xf4, 0xfd, 0xb2, 0xd4, 0xe6, },
++ { 0xbb, 0x84, 0x78, 0x49, 0x27, 0x8e, 0x61, 0xda, 0x60, },
++ { 0x04, 0xc3, 0xcd, 0xaa, 0x8f, 0xa7, 0x03, 0xc9, 0xf9, 0xb6, },
++ { 0xf8, 0x27, 0x1d, 0x61, 0xdc, 0x21, 0x42, 0xdd, 0xad, 0x92, 0x40, },
++ { 0x12, 0x87, 0xdf, 0xc2, 0x41, 0x45, 0x5a, 0x36, 0x48, 0x5b, 0x51, 0x2b, },
++ { 0xbb, 0x37, 0x5d, 0x1f, 0xf1, 0x68, 0x7a, 0xc4, 0xa5, 0xd2, 0xa4, 0x91,
++ 0x8d, },
++ { 0x5b, 0x27, 0xd1, 0x04, 0x54, 0x52, 0x9f, 0xa3, 0x47, 0x86, 0x33, 0x33,
++ 0xbf, 0xa0, },
++ { 0xcf, 0x04, 0xea, 0xf8, 0x03, 0x2a, 0x43, 0xff, 0xa6, 0x68, 0x21, 0x4c,
++ 0xd5, 0x4b, 0xed, },
++ { 0xaf, 0xb8, 0xbc, 0x63, 0x0f, 0x18, 0x4d, 0xe2, 0x7a, 0xdd, 0x46, 0x44,
++ 0xc8, 0x24, 0x0a, 0xb7, },
++ { 0x3e, 0xdc, 0x36, 0xe4, 0x89, 0xb1, 0xfa, 0xc6, 0x40, 0x93, 0x2e, 0x75,
++ 0xb2, 0x15, 0xd1, 0xb1, 0x10, },
++ { 0x6c, 0xd8, 0x20, 0x3b, 0x82, 0x79, 0xf9, 0xc8, 0xbc, 0x9d, 0xe0, 0x35,
++ 0xbe, 0x1b, 0x49, 0x1a, 0xbc, 0x3a, },
++ { 0x78, 0x65, 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x35, 0x67, 0xdc, 0x78, 0xd4, 0x41, 0xf6, 0xc9,
++ 0xde, 0xde, 0x1f, 0x18, 0x13, 0x31, 0x11, },
++ { 0x8a, 0x7f, 0xb1, 0x33, 0x8f, 0x0c, 0x3c, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x61, 0xf0, 0x47,
++ 0x29, 0x1b, 0x29, 0xbc, 0x1c, 0x47, 0xef, 0x7a, },
++ { 0x65, 0x91, 0xf1, 0xe6, 0xb3, 0x96, 0xd3, 0x8c, 0xc2, 0x4a, 0x59, 0x35,
++ 0x72, 0x8e, 0x0b, 0x9a, 0x87, 0xca, 0x34, 0x7b, 0x63, },
++ { 0x5f, 0x08, 0x87, 0x80, 0x56, 0x25, 0x89, 0x77, 0x61, 0x8c, 0x64, 0xa1,
++ 0x59, 0x6d, 0x59, 0x62, 0xe8, 0x4a, 0xc8, 0x58, 0x99, 0xd1, },
++ { 0x23, 0x87, 0x1d, 0xed, 0x6f, 0xf2, 0x91, 0x90, 0xe2, 0xfe, 0x43, 0x21,
++ 0xaf, 0x97, 0xc6, 0xbc, 0xd7, 0x15, 0xc7, 0x2d, 0x08, 0x77, 0x91, },
++ { 0x90, 0x47, 0x9a, 0x9e, 0x3a, 0xdf, 0xf3, 0xc9, 0x4c, 0x1e, 0xa7, 0xd4,
++ 0x6a, 0x32, 0x90, 0xfe, 0xb7, 0xb6, 0x7b, 0xfa, 0x96, 0x61, 0xfb, 0xa4, },
++ { 0xb1, 0x67, 0x60, 0x45, 0xb0, 0x96, 0xc5, 0x15, 0x9f, 0x4d, 0x26, 0xd7,
++ 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xf5, 0x6d, 0x21, 0x00, 0x94, 0x31, 0x64, 0x94, 0xd3, 0xa7,
++ 0xd3, },
++ { 0x02, 0x3e, 0xaf, 0xf3, 0x79, 0x73, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0xcc, 0x7a, 0x7f, 0xfb,
++ 0x79, 0x2b, 0x85, 0x8c, 0x88, 0x72, 0x06, 0xbe, 0xfe, 0xaf, 0xc1, 0x16,
++ 0xa6, 0xd6, },
++ { 0x2a, 0xb0, 0x1a, 0xe5, 0xaa, 0x6e, 0xb3, 0xae, 0x53, 0x85, 0x33, 0x80,
++ 0x75, 0xae, 0x30, 0xe6, 0xb8, 0x72, 0x42, 0xf6, 0x25, 0x4f, 0x38, 0x88,
++ 0x55, 0xd1, 0xa9, },
++ { 0x90, 0xd8, 0x0c, 0xc0, 0x93, 0x4b, 0x4f, 0x9e, 0x65, 0x6c, 0xa1, 0x54,
++ 0xa6, 0xf6, 0x6e, 0xca, 0xd2, 0xbb, 0x7e, 0x6a, 0x1c, 0xd3, 0xce, 0x46,
++ 0xef, 0xb0, 0x00, 0x8d, },
++ { 0xed, 0x9c, 0x49, 0xcd, 0xc2, 0xde, 0x38, 0x0e, 0xe9, 0x98, 0x6c, 0xc8,
++ 0x90, 0x9e, 0x3c, 0xd4, 0xd3, 0xeb, 0x88, 0x32, 0xc7, 0x28, 0xe3, 0x94,
++ 0x1c, 0x9f, 0x8b, 0xf3, 0xcb, },
++ { 0xac, 0xe7, 0x92, 0x16, 0xb4, 0x14, 0xa0, 0xe4, 0x04, 0x79, 0xa2, 0xf4,
++ 0x31, 0xe6, 0x0c, 0x26, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0x2f, 0x69, 0x1b, 0x55, 0x94, 0x67,
++ 0xda, 0x0c, 0xd7, 0x32, 0x1f, 0xef, },
++ { 0x68, 0x63, 0x85, 0x57, 0x95, 0x9e, 0x42, 0x27, 0x41, 0x43, 0x42, 0x02,
++ 0xa5, 0x78, 0xa7, 0xc6, 0x43, 0xc1, 0x6a, 0xba, 0x70, 0x80, 0xcd, 0x04,
++ 0xb6, 0x78, 0x76, 0x29, 0xf3, 0xe8, 0xa0, },
++ { 0xe6, 0xac, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0xf0, 0xc0, 0xf7, 0xf7, 0xe3, 0x3e, 0x4e, 0x28,
++ 0x0f, 0x59, 0xb2, 0x67, 0x9e, 0x84, 0x34, 0x42, 0x96, 0x30, 0x2b, 0xca,
++ 0x49, 0xb6, 0xc5, 0x9a, 0x84, 0x59, 0xa7, 0x81, },
++ { 0x7e, },
++ { 0x1e, 0x21, },
++ { 0x26, 0xd3, 0xdd, },
++ { 0x2c, 0xd4, 0xb3, 0x3d, },
++ { 0x86, 0x7b, 0x76, 0x3c, 0xf0, },
++ { 0x12, 0xc3, 0x70, 0x1d, 0x55, 0x18, },
++ { 0x96, 0xc2, 0xbd, 0x61, 0x55, 0xf4, 0x24, },
++ { 0x20, 0x51, 0xf7, 0x86, 0x58, 0x8f, 0x07, 0x2a, },
++ { 0x93, 0x15, 0xa8, 0x1d, 0xda, 0x97, 0xee, 0x0e, 0x6c, },
++ { 0x39, 0x93, 0xdf, 0xd5, 0x0e, 0xca, 0xdc, 0x7a, 0x92, 0xce, },
++ { 0x60, 0xd5, 0xfd, 0xf5, 0x1b, 0x26, 0x82, 0x26, 0x73, 0x02, 0xbc, },
++ { 0x98, 0xf2, 0x34, 0xe1, 0xf5, 0xfb, 0x00, 0xac, 0x10, 0x4a, 0x38, 0x9f, },
++ { 0xda, 0x3a, 0x92, 0x8a, 0xd0, 0xcd, 0x12, 0xcd, 0x15, 0xbb, 0xab, 0x77,
++ 0x66, },
++ { 0xa2, 0x92, 0x1a, 0xe5, 0xca, 0x0c, 0x30, 0x75, 0xeb, 0xaf, 0x00, 0x31,
++ 0x55, 0x66, },
++ { 0x06, 0xea, 0xfd, 0x3e, 0x86, 0x38, 0x62, 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x12, 0xa4, 0x12,
++ 0x43, 0xbf, 0xa1, },
++ { 0xe4, 0x71, 0x7b, 0x94, 0xdb, 0xa0, 0xd2, 0xff, 0x9b, 0xeb, 0xad, 0x8e,
++ 0x95, 0x8a, 0xc5, 0xed, },
++ { 0x25, 0x5a, 0x77, 0x71, 0x41, 0x0e, 0x7a, 0xe9, 0xed, 0x0c, 0x10, 0xef,
++ 0xf6, 0x2b, 0x3a, 0xba, 0x60, },
++ { 0xee, 0xe2, 0xa3, 0x67, 0x64, 0x1d, 0xc6, 0x04, 0xc4, 0xe1, 0x68, 0xd2,
++ 0x6e, 0xd2, 0x91, 0x75, 0x53, 0x07, },
++ { 0xe0, 0xf6, 0x4d, 0x8f, 0x68, 0xfc, 0x06, 0x7e, 0x18, 0x79, 0x7f, 0x2b,
++ 0x6d, 0xef, 0x46, 0x7f, 0xab, 0xb2, 0xad, },
++ { 0x3d, 0x35, 0x88, 0x9f, 0x2e, 0xcf, 0x96, 0x45, 0x07, 0x60, 0x71, 0x94,
++ 0x00, 0x8d, 0xbf, 0xf4, 0xef, 0x46, 0x2e, 0x3c, },
++ { 0x43, 0xcf, 0x98, 0xf7, 0x2d, 0xf4, 0x17, 0xe7, 0x8c, 0x05, 0x2d, 0x9b,
++ 0x24, 0xfb, 0x4d, 0xea, 0x4a, 0xec, 0x01, 0x25, 0x29, },
++ { 0x8e, 0x73, 0x9a, 0x78, 0x11, 0xfe, 0x48, 0xa0, 0x3b, 0x1a, 0x26, 0xdf,
++ 0x25, 0xe9, 0x59, 0x1c, 0x70, 0x07, 0x9f, 0xdc, 0xa0, 0xa6, },
++ { 0xe8, 0x47, 0x71, 0xc7, 0x3e, 0xdf, 0xb5, 0x13, 0xb9, 0x85, 0x13, 0xa8,
++ 0x54, 0x47, 0x6e, 0x59, 0x96, 0x09, 0x13, 0x5f, 0x82, 0x16, 0x0b, },
++ { 0xfb, 0xc0, 0x8c, 0x03, 0x21, 0xb3, 0xc4, 0xb5, 0x43, 0x32, 0x6c, 0xea,
++ 0x7f, 0xa8, 0x43, 0x91, 0xe8, 0x4e, 0x3f, 0xbf, 0x45, 0x58, 0x6a, 0xa3, },
++ { 0x55, 0xf8, 0xf3, 0x00, 0x76, 0x09, 0xef, 0x69, 0x5d, 0xd2, 0x8a, 0xf2,
++ 0x65, 0xc3, 0xcb, 0x9b, 0x43, 0xfd, 0xb1, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0xa1, 0x94, 0xb0,
++ 0xd7, },
++ { 0xaa, 0x13, 0xc1, 0x51, 0x40, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0x4c, 0x0a, 0x95, 0x64, 0x7b,
++ 0xd1, 0x96, 0xb6, 0x56, 0xb4, 0x5b, 0xcf, 0xd6, 0xd9, 0x15, 0x97, 0xdd,
++ 0xb6, 0xef, },
++ { 0xaf, 0xb7, 0x36, 0xb0, 0x04, 0xdb, 0xd7, 0x9c, 0x9a, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xf6,
++ 0x1f, 0x12, 0x21, 0x2d, 0x59, 0x30, 0x54, 0xab, 0x27, 0x61, 0xa3, 0x57,
++ 0xef, 0xf8, 0x53, },
++ { 0x97, 0x34, 0x45, 0x3e, 0xce, 0x7c, 0x35, 0xa2, 0xda, 0x9f, 0x4b, 0x46,
++ 0x6c, 0x11, 0x67, 0xff, 0x2f, 0x76, 0x58, 0x15, 0x71, 0xfa, 0x44, 0x89,
++ 0x89, 0xfd, 0xf7, 0x99, },
++ { 0x1f, 0xb1, 0x62, 0xeb, 0x83, 0xc5, 0x9c, 0x89, 0xf9, 0x2c, 0xd2, 0x03,
++ 0x61, 0xbc, 0xbb, 0xa5, 0x74, 0x0e, 0x9b, 0x7e, 0x82, 0x3e, 0x70, 0x0a,
++ 0xa9, 0x8f, 0x2b, 0x59, 0xfb, },
++ { 0xf8, 0xca, 0x5e, 0x3a, 0x4f, 0x9e, 0x10, 0x69, 0x10, 0xd5, 0x4c, 0xeb,
++ 0x1a, 0x0f, 0x3c, 0x6a, 0x98, 0xf5, 0xb0, 0x97, 0x5b, 0x37, 0x2f, 0x0d,
++ 0xbd, 0x42, 0x4b, 0x69, 0xa1, 0x82, },
++ { 0x12, 0x8c, 0x6d, 0x52, 0x08, 0xef, 0x74, 0xb2, 0xe6, 0xaa, 0xd3, 0xb0,
++ 0x26, 0xb0, 0xd9, 0x94, 0xb6, 0x11, 0x45, 0x0e, 0x36, 0x71, 0x14, 0x2d,
++ 0x41, 0x8c, 0x21, 0x53, 0x31, 0xe9, 0x68, },
++ { 0xee, 0xea, 0x0d, 0x89, 0x47, 0x7e, 0x72, 0xd1, 0xd8, 0xce, 0x58, 0x4c,
++ 0x94, 0x1f, 0x0d, 0x51, 0x08, 0xa3, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xe7, 0x82, 0x46, 0x92,
++ 0xd6, 0x98, 0x6b, 0x07, 0x10, 0x65, 0x52, 0x65, },
++};
++
++bool __init blake2s_selftest(void)
++{
++ u8 key[BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE];
++ u8 buf[ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_testvecs)];
++ u8 hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
++ struct blake2s_state state;
++ bool success = true;
++ int i, l;
++
++ key[0] = key[1] = 1;
++ for (i = 2; i < sizeof(key); ++i)
++ key[i] = key[i - 2] + key[i - 1];
++
++ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); ++i)
++ buf[i] = (u8)i;
++
++ for (i = l = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_testvecs); l = (l + 37) % ++i) {
++ int outlen = 1 + i % BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE;
++ int keylen = (13 * i) % (BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE + 1);
++
++ blake2s(hash, buf, key + BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE - keylen, outlen, i,
++ keylen);
++ if (memcmp(hash, blake2s_testvecs[i], outlen)) {
++ pr_err("blake2s self-test %d: FAIL\n", i + 1);
++ success = false;
++ }
++
++ if (!keylen)
++ blake2s_init(&state, outlen);
++ else
++ blake2s_init_key(&state, outlen,
++ key + BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE - keylen,
++ keylen);
++
++ blake2s_update(&state, buf, l);
++ blake2s_update(&state, buf + l, i - l);
++ blake2s_final(&state, hash);
++ if (memcmp(hash, blake2s_testvecs[i], outlen)) {
++ pr_err("blake2s init/update/final self-test %d: FAIL\n",
++ i + 1);
++ success = false;
++ }
++ }
++
++ return success;
++}
+diff --git a/lib/crypto/blake2s.c b/lib/crypto/blake2s.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000..536fce87555b3
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/lib/crypto/blake2s.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT
++/*
++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
++ *
++ * This is an implementation of the BLAKE2s hash and PRF functions.
++ *
++ * Information: https://blake2.net/
++ *
++ */
++
++#include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/string.h>
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/init.h>
++#include <linux/bug.h>
++#include <asm/unaligned.h>
++
++bool blake2s_selftest(void);
++
++void blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *in, size_t inlen)
++{
++ const size_t fill = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen;
++
++ if (unlikely(!inlen))
++ return;
++ if (inlen > fill) {
++ memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, fill);
++ blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1,
++ BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
++ state->buflen = 0;
++ in += fill;
++ inlen -= fill;
++ }
++ if (inlen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
++ const size_t nblocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
++ /* Hash one less (full) block than strictly possible */
++ blake2s_compress_generic(state, in, nblocks - 1,
++ BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
++ in += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
++ inlen -= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
++ }
++ memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, inlen);
++ state->buflen += inlen;
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_update);
++
++void blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out)
++{
++ WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && !out);
++ blake2s_set_lastblock(state);
++ memset(state->buf + state->buflen, 0,
++ BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen); /* Padding */
++ blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
++ cpu_to_le32_array(state->h, ARRAY_SIZE(state->h));
++ memcpy(out, state->h, state->outlen);
++ memzero_explicit(state, sizeof(*state));
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_final);
++
++static int __init mod_init(void)
++{
++ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS) &&
++ WARN_ON(!blake2s_selftest()))
++ return -ENODEV;
++ return 0;
++}
++
++static void __exit mod_exit(void)
++{
++}
++
++module_init(mod_init);
++module_exit(mod_exit);
++MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
++MODULE_DESCRIPTION("BLAKE2s hash function");
++MODULE_AUTHOR("Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>");
+diff --git a/lib/random32.c b/lib/random32.c
+index 9085b1172015e..339624191b515 100644
+--- a/lib/random32.c
++++ b/lib/random32.c
+@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@
+ #include <linux/jiffies.h>
+ #include <linux/random.h>
+ #include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/bitops.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/notifier.h>
+ #include <asm/unaligned.h>
+
+ /**
+@@ -544,9 +547,11 @@ static void prandom_reseed(struct timer_list *unused)
+ * To avoid worrying about whether it's safe to delay that interrupt
+ * long enough to seed all CPUs, just schedule an immediate timer event.
+ */
+-static void prandom_timer_start(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
++static int prandom_timer_start(struct notifier_block *nb,
++ unsigned long action, void *data)
+ {
+ mod_timer(&seed_timer, jiffies);
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -555,13 +560,13 @@ static void prandom_timer_start(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
+ */
+ static int __init prandom_init_late(void)
+ {
+- static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
+- .func = prandom_timer_start
++ static struct notifier_block random_ready = {
++ .notifier_call = prandom_timer_start
+ };
+- int ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
++ int ret = register_random_ready_notifier(&random_ready);
+
+ if (ret == -EALREADY) {
+- prandom_timer_start(&random_ready);
++ prandom_timer_start(&random_ready, 0, NULL);
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ return ret;
+diff --git a/lib/sha1.c b/lib/sha1.c
+index 1d96d2c02b826..bad46695476bd 100644
+--- a/lib/sha1.c
++++ b/lib/sha1.c
+@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
+ #include <linux/export.h>
+ #include <linux/bitops.h>
+ #include <linux/cryptohash.h>
++#include <linux/string.h>
+ #include <asm/unaligned.h>
+
+ /*
+@@ -55,7 +56,8 @@
+ #define SHA_ROUND(t, input, fn, constant, A, B, C, D, E) do { \
+ __u32 TEMP = input(t); setW(t, TEMP); \
+ E += TEMP + rol32(A,5) + (fn) + (constant); \
+- B = ror32(B, 2); } while (0)
++ B = ror32(B, 2); \
++ TEMP = E; E = D; D = C; C = B; B = A; A = TEMP; } while (0)
+
+ #define T_0_15(t, A, B, C, D, E) SHA_ROUND(t, SHA_SRC, (((C^D)&B)^D) , 0x5a827999, A, B, C, D, E )
+ #define T_16_19(t, A, B, C, D, E) SHA_ROUND(t, SHA_MIX, (((C^D)&B)^D) , 0x5a827999, A, B, C, D, E )
+@@ -82,6 +84,7 @@
+ void sha_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *array)
+ {
+ __u32 A, B, C, D, E;
++ unsigned int i = 0;
+
+ A = digest[0];
+ B = digest[1];
+@@ -90,94 +93,24 @@ void sha_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *array)
+ E = digest[4];
+
+ /* Round 1 - iterations 0-16 take their input from 'data' */
+- T_0_15( 0, A, B, C, D, E);
+- T_0_15( 1, E, A, B, C, D);
+- T_0_15( 2, D, E, A, B, C);
+- T_0_15( 3, C, D, E, A, B);
+- T_0_15( 4, B, C, D, E, A);
+- T_0_15( 5, A, B, C, D, E);
+- T_0_15( 6, E, A, B, C, D);
+- T_0_15( 7, D, E, A, B, C);
+- T_0_15( 8, C, D, E, A, B);
+- T_0_15( 9, B, C, D, E, A);
+- T_0_15(10, A, B, C, D, E);
+- T_0_15(11, E, A, B, C, D);
+- T_0_15(12, D, E, A, B, C);
+- T_0_15(13, C, D, E, A, B);
+- T_0_15(14, B, C, D, E, A);
+- T_0_15(15, A, B, C, D, E);
++ for (; i < 16; ++i)
++ T_0_15(i, A, B, C, D, E);
+
+ /* Round 1 - tail. Input from 512-bit mixing array */
+- T_16_19(16, E, A, B, C, D);
+- T_16_19(17, D, E, A, B, C);
+- T_16_19(18, C, D, E, A, B);
+- T_16_19(19, B, C, D, E, A);
++ for (; i < 20; ++i)
++ T_16_19(i, A, B, C, D, E);
+
+ /* Round 2 */
+- T_20_39(20, A, B, C, D, E);
+- T_20_39(21, E, A, B, C, D);
+- T_20_39(22, D, E, A, B, C);
+- T_20_39(23, C, D, E, A, B);
+- T_20_39(24, B, C, D, E, A);
+- T_20_39(25, A, B, C, D, E);
+- T_20_39(26, E, A, B, C, D);
+- T_20_39(27, D, E, A, B, C);
+- T_20_39(28, C, D, E, A, B);
+- T_20_39(29, B, C, D, E, A);
+- T_20_39(30, A, B, C, D, E);
+- T_20_39(31, E, A, B, C, D);
+- T_20_39(32, D, E, A, B, C);
+- T_20_39(33, C, D, E, A, B);
+- T_20_39(34, B, C, D, E, A);
+- T_20_39(35, A, B, C, D, E);
+- T_20_39(36, E, A, B, C, D);
+- T_20_39(37, D, E, A, B, C);
+- T_20_39(38, C, D, E, A, B);
+- T_20_39(39, B, C, D, E, A);
++ for (; i < 40; ++i)
++ T_20_39(i, A, B, C, D, E);
+
+ /* Round 3 */
+- T_40_59(40, A, B, C, D, E);
+- T_40_59(41, E, A, B, C, D);
+- T_40_59(42, D, E, A, B, C);
+- T_40_59(43, C, D, E, A, B);
+- T_40_59(44, B, C, D, E, A);
+- T_40_59(45, A, B, C, D, E);
+- T_40_59(46, E, A, B, C, D);
+- T_40_59(47, D, E, A, B, C);
+- T_40_59(48, C, D, E, A, B);
+- T_40_59(49, B, C, D, E, A);
+- T_40_59(50, A, B, C, D, E);
+- T_40_59(51, E, A, B, C, D);
+- T_40_59(52, D, E, A, B, C);
+- T_40_59(53, C, D, E, A, B);
+- T_40_59(54, B, C, D, E, A);
+- T_40_59(55, A, B, C, D, E);
+- T_40_59(56, E, A, B, C, D);
+- T_40_59(57, D, E, A, B, C);
+- T_40_59(58, C, D, E, A, B);
+- T_40_59(59, B, C, D, E, A);
++ for (; i < 60; ++i)
++ T_40_59(i, A, B, C, D, E);
+
+ /* Round 4 */
+- T_60_79(60, A, B, C, D, E);
+- T_60_79(61, E, A, B, C, D);
+- T_60_79(62, D, E, A, B, C);
+- T_60_79(63, C, D, E, A, B);
+- T_60_79(64, B, C, D, E, A);
+- T_60_79(65, A, B, C, D, E);
+- T_60_79(66, E, A, B, C, D);
+- T_60_79(67, D, E, A, B, C);
+- T_60_79(68, C, D, E, A, B);
+- T_60_79(69, B, C, D, E, A);
+- T_60_79(70, A, B, C, D, E);
+- T_60_79(71, E, A, B, C, D);
+- T_60_79(72, D, E, A, B, C);
+- T_60_79(73, C, D, E, A, B);
+- T_60_79(74, B, C, D, E, A);
+- T_60_79(75, A, B, C, D, E);
+- T_60_79(76, E, A, B, C, D);
+- T_60_79(77, D, E, A, B, C);
+- T_60_79(78, C, D, E, A, B);
+- T_60_79(79, B, C, D, E, A);
++ for (; i < 80; ++i)
++ T_60_79(i, A, B, C, D, E);
+
+ digest[0] += A;
+ digest[1] += B;
+diff --git a/lib/siphash.c b/lib/siphash.c
+index e632ee40aac1a..5b34b5c839887 100644
+--- a/lib/siphash.c
++++ b/lib/siphash.c
+@@ -18,19 +18,13 @@
+ #include <asm/word-at-a-time.h>
+ #endif
+
+-#define SIPROUND \
+- do { \
+- v0 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 13); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol64(v0, 32); \
+- v2 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 16); v3 ^= v2; \
+- v0 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 21); v3 ^= v0; \
+- v2 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 17); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol64(v2, 32); \
+- } while (0)
++#define SIPROUND SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
+
+ #define PREAMBLE(len) \
+- u64 v0 = 0x736f6d6570736575ULL; \
+- u64 v1 = 0x646f72616e646f6dULL; \
+- u64 v2 = 0x6c7967656e657261ULL; \
+- u64 v3 = 0x7465646279746573ULL; \
++ u64 v0 = SIPHASH_CONST_0; \
++ u64 v1 = SIPHASH_CONST_1; \
++ u64 v2 = SIPHASH_CONST_2; \
++ u64 v3 = SIPHASH_CONST_3; \
+ u64 b = ((u64)(len)) << 56; \
+ v3 ^= key->key[1]; \
+ v2 ^= key->key[0]; \
+@@ -389,19 +383,13 @@ u32 hsiphash_4u32(const u32 first, const u32 second, const u32 third,
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(hsiphash_4u32);
+ #else
+-#define HSIPROUND \
+- do { \
+- v0 += v1; v1 = rol32(v1, 5); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol32(v0, 16); \
+- v2 += v3; v3 = rol32(v3, 8); v3 ^= v2; \
+- v0 += v3; v3 = rol32(v3, 7); v3 ^= v0; \
+- v2 += v1; v1 = rol32(v1, 13); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol32(v2, 16); \
+- } while (0)
++#define HSIPROUND HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
+
+ #define HPREAMBLE(len) \
+- u32 v0 = 0; \
+- u32 v1 = 0; \
+- u32 v2 = 0x6c796765U; \
+- u32 v3 = 0x74656462U; \
++ u32 v0 = HSIPHASH_CONST_0; \
++ u32 v1 = HSIPHASH_CONST_1; \
++ u32 v2 = HSIPHASH_CONST_2; \
++ u32 v3 = HSIPHASH_CONST_3; \
+ u32 b = ((u32)(len)) << 24; \
+ v3 ^= key->key[1]; \
+ v2 ^= key->key[0]; \
+diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
+index c2619510636eb..5e672480d3be2 100644
+--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
++++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
+@@ -1700,14 +1700,16 @@ static void enable_ptr_key_workfn(struct work_struct *work)
+
+ static DECLARE_WORK(enable_ptr_key_work, enable_ptr_key_workfn);
+
+-static void fill_random_ptr_key(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
++static int fill_random_ptr_key(struct notifier_block *nb,
++ unsigned long action, void *data)
+ {
+ /* This may be in an interrupt handler. */
+ queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &enable_ptr_key_work);
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+-static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
+- .func = fill_random_ptr_key
++static struct notifier_block random_ready = {
++ .notifier_call = fill_random_ptr_key
+ };
+
+ static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void)
+@@ -1721,7 +1723,7 @@ static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+- ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
++ ret = register_random_ready_notifier(&random_ready);
+ if (!ret) {
+ return 0;
+ } else if (ret == -EALREADY) {
+diff --git a/mm/util.c b/mm/util.c
+index 621afcea2bfa8..e63eeb95f0f0a 100644
+--- a/mm/util.c
++++ b/mm/util.c
+@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
+ #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
+ #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+ #include <linux/userfaultfd_k.h>
++#include <linux/random.h>
+
+ #include <asm/sections.h>
+ #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+@@ -286,6 +287,38 @@ int vma_is_stack_for_current(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+ return (vma->vm_start <= KSTK_ESP(t) && vma->vm_end >= KSTK_ESP(t));
+ }
+
++/**
++ * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address
++ * @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
++ * @range: The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the
++ * random address must fall.
++ *
++ * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped.
++ *
++ * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that
++ * @start was already page aligned. We now align it regardless.
++ *
++ * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range). On error,
++ * @start is returned.
++ */
++unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
++{
++ if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) {
++ range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start;
++ start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
++ }
++
++ if (start > ULONG_MAX - range)
++ range = ULONG_MAX - start;
++
++ range >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
++
++ if (range == 0)
++ return start;
++
++ return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT);
++}
++
+ #if defined(CONFIG_MMU) && !defined(HAVE_ARCH_PICK_MMAP_LAYOUT)
+ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm, struct rlimit *rlim_stack)
+ {
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+index 0a8aec3f37cc6..5295a579ec820 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+@@ -718,12 +718,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_unhash);
+ * Note that we use 32bit integers (vs RFC 'short integers')
+ * because 2^16 is not a multiple of num_ephemeral and this
+ * property might be used by clever attacker.
+- * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement,
+- * we use 256 instead to really give more isolation and
+- * privacy, this only consumes 1 KB of kernel memory.
++ * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement, though
++ * attacks were since demonstrated, thus we use 65536 instead to really
++ * give more isolation and privacy, at the expense of 256kB of kernel
++ * memory.
+ */
+-#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 8
+-static u32 table_perturb[1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT];
++#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 16
++#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE (1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT)
++static u32 *table_perturb;
+
+ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
+ struct sock *sk, u64 port_offset,
+@@ -763,10 +765,11 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
+ if (likely(remaining > 1))
+ remaining &= ~1U;
+
+- net_get_random_once(table_perturb, sizeof(table_perturb));
+- index = hash_32(port_offset, INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT);
++ net_get_random_once(table_perturb,
++ INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE * sizeof(*table_perturb));
++ index = port_offset & (INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE - 1);
+
+- offset = READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + port_offset;
++ offset = READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + (port_offset >> 32);
+ offset %= remaining;
+
+ /* In first pass we try ports of @low parity.
+@@ -821,6 +824,12 @@ next_port:
+ return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
+
+ ok:
++ /* Here we want to add a little bit of randomness to the next source
++ * port that will be chosen. We use a max() with a random here so that
++ * on low contention the randomness is maximal and on high contention
++ * it may be inexistent.
++ */
++ i = max_t(int, i, (prandom_u32() & 7) * 2);
+ WRITE_ONCE(table_perturb[index], READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + i + 2);
+
+ /* Head lock still held and bh's disabled */
+@@ -890,6 +899,12 @@ void __init inet_hashinfo2_init(struct inet_hashinfo *h, const char *name,
+ INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&h->lhash2[i].head);
+ h->lhash2[i].count = 0;
+ }
++
++ /* this one is used for source ports of outgoing connections */
++ table_perturb = kmalloc_array(INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE,
++ sizeof(*table_perturb), GFP_KERNEL);
++ if (!table_perturb)
++ panic("TCP: failed to alloc table_perturb");
+ }
+
+ int inet_ehash_locks_alloc(struct inet_hashinfo *hashinfo)
+diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
+index 2ff25c445b821..9dae10d8880cf 100644
+--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
++++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
+@@ -519,14 +519,15 @@ static int l2tp_ip6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
+ struct ipcm6_cookie ipc6;
+ int addr_len = msg->msg_namelen;
+ int transhdrlen = 4; /* zero session-id */
+- int ulen = len + transhdrlen;
++ int ulen;
+ int err;
+
+ /* Rough check on arithmetic overflow,
+ better check is made in ip6_append_data().
+ */
+- if (len > INT_MAX)
++ if (len > INT_MAX - transhdrlen)
+ return -EMSGSIZE;
++ ulen = len + transhdrlen;
+
+ /* Mirror BSD error message compatibility */
+ if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
+diff --git a/net/openvswitch/actions.c b/net/openvswitch/actions.c
+index 8b75afe412842..091202b84b6e6 100644
+--- a/net/openvswitch/actions.c
++++ b/net/openvswitch/actions.c
+@@ -443,6 +443,7 @@ static void set_ip_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, struct iphdr *nh,
+ update_ip_l4_checksum(skb, nh, *addr, new_addr);
+ csum_replace4(&nh->check, *addr, new_addr);
+ skb_clear_hash(skb);
++ ovs_ct_clear(skb, NULL);
+ *addr = new_addr;
+ }
+
+@@ -490,6 +491,7 @@ static void set_ipv6_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 l4_proto,
+ update_ipv6_checksum(skb, l4_proto, addr, new_addr);
+
+ skb_clear_hash(skb);
++ ovs_ct_clear(skb, NULL);
+ memcpy(addr, new_addr, sizeof(__be32[4]));
+ }
+
+@@ -730,6 +732,7 @@ static int set_nsh(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sw_flow_key *flow_key,
+ static void set_tp_port(struct sk_buff *skb, __be16 *port,
+ __be16 new_port, __sum16 *check)
+ {
++ ovs_ct_clear(skb, NULL);
+ inet_proto_csum_replace2(check, skb, *port, new_port, false);
+ *port = new_port;
+ }
+@@ -769,6 +772,7 @@ static int set_udp(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sw_flow_key *flow_key,
+ uh->dest = dst;
+ flow_key->tp.src = src;
+ flow_key->tp.dst = dst;
++ ovs_ct_clear(skb, NULL);
+ }
+
+ skb_clear_hash(skb);
+@@ -831,6 +835,8 @@ static int set_sctp(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sw_flow_key *flow_key,
+ sh->checksum = old_csum ^ old_correct_csum ^ new_csum;
+
+ skb_clear_hash(skb);
++ ovs_ct_clear(skb, NULL);
++
+ flow_key->tp.src = sh->source;
+ flow_key->tp.dst = sh->dest;
+
+diff --git a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c
+index fb13fcfedaf4f..0777c8d416f1b 100644
+--- a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c
++++ b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c
+@@ -1303,7 +1303,8 @@ int ovs_ct_clear(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sw_flow_key *key)
+ if (skb_nfct(skb)) {
+ nf_conntrack_put(skb_nfct(skb));
+ nf_ct_set(skb, NULL, IP_CT_UNTRACKED);
+- ovs_ct_fill_key(skb, key);
++ if (key)
++ ovs_ct_fill_key(skb, key);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+diff --git a/net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c b/net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c
+index 180f5feb77177..eba94cf3d2d01 100644
+--- a/net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c
++++ b/net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c
+@@ -2253,6 +2253,36 @@ static struct sw_flow_actions *nla_alloc_flow_actions(int size)
+ return sfa;
+ }
+
++static void ovs_nla_free_nested_actions(const struct nlattr *actions, int len);
++
++static void ovs_nla_free_clone_action(const struct nlattr *action)
++{
++ const struct nlattr *a = nla_data(action);
++ int rem = nla_len(action);
++
++ switch (nla_type(a)) {
++ case OVS_CLONE_ATTR_EXEC:
++ /* The real list of actions follows this attribute. */
++ a = nla_next(a, &rem);
++ ovs_nla_free_nested_actions(a, rem);
++ break;
++ }
++}
++
++static void ovs_nla_free_sample_action(const struct nlattr *action)
++{
++ const struct nlattr *a = nla_data(action);
++ int rem = nla_len(action);
++
++ switch (nla_type(a)) {
++ case OVS_SAMPLE_ATTR_ARG:
++ /* The real list of actions follows this attribute. */
++ a = nla_next(a, &rem);
++ ovs_nla_free_nested_actions(a, rem);
++ break;
++ }
++}
++
+ static void ovs_nla_free_set_action(const struct nlattr *a)
+ {
+ const struct nlattr *ovs_key = nla_data(a);
+@@ -2266,25 +2296,46 @@ static void ovs_nla_free_set_action(const struct nlattr *a)
+ }
+ }
+
+-void ovs_nla_free_flow_actions(struct sw_flow_actions *sf_acts)
++static void ovs_nla_free_nested_actions(const struct nlattr *actions, int len)
+ {
+ const struct nlattr *a;
+ int rem;
+
+- if (!sf_acts)
++ /* Whenever new actions are added, the need to update this
++ * function should be considered.
++ */
++ BUILD_BUG_ON(OVS_ACTION_ATTR_MAX != 20);
++
++ if (!actions)
+ return;
+
+- nla_for_each_attr(a, sf_acts->actions, sf_acts->actions_len, rem) {
++ nla_for_each_attr(a, actions, len, rem) {
+ switch (nla_type(a)) {
+- case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_SET:
+- ovs_nla_free_set_action(a);
++ case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_CLONE:
++ ovs_nla_free_clone_action(a);
+ break;
++
+ case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_CT:
+ ovs_ct_free_action(a);
+ break;
++
++ case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_SAMPLE:
++ ovs_nla_free_sample_action(a);
++ break;
++
++ case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_SET:
++ ovs_nla_free_set_action(a);
++ break;
+ }
+ }
++}
++
++void ovs_nla_free_flow_actions(struct sw_flow_actions *sf_acts)
++{
++ if (!sf_acts)
++ return;
+
++ ovs_nla_free_nested_actions(sf_acts->actions, sf_acts->actions_len);
+ kfree(sf_acts);
+ }
+
+diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c
+index 3d65a2bccfc7b..7f9d8365c9320 100644
+--- a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c
++++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c
+@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static unsigned int rpcrdma_max_call_header_size(unsigned int maxsegs)
+
+ /* Maximum Read list size */
+ maxsegs += 2; /* segment for head and tail buffers */
+- size = maxsegs * rpcrdma_readchunk_maxsz * sizeof(__be32);
++ size += maxsegs * rpcrdma_readchunk_maxsz * sizeof(__be32);
+
+ /* Minimal Read chunk size */
+ size += sizeof(__be32); /* segment count */
+@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static unsigned int rpcrdma_max_reply_header_size(unsigned int maxsegs)
+
+ /* Maximum Write list size */
+ maxsegs += 2; /* segment for head and tail buffers */
+- size = sizeof(__be32); /* segment count */
++ size += sizeof(__be32); /* segment count */
+ size += maxsegs * rpcrdma_segment_maxsz * sizeof(__be32);
+ size += sizeof(__be32); /* list discriminator */
+
+diff --git a/scripts/faddr2line b/scripts/faddr2line
+index 226c3f559dc5d..2571caac3156c 100755
+--- a/scripts/faddr2line
++++ b/scripts/faddr2line
+@@ -95,17 +95,25 @@ __faddr2line() {
+ local print_warnings=$4
+
+ local sym_name=${func_addr%+*}
+- local offset=${func_addr#*+}
+- offset=${offset%/*}
++ local func_offset=${func_addr#*+}
++ func_offset=${func_offset%/*}
+ local user_size=
++ local file_type
++ local is_vmlinux=0
+ [[ $func_addr =~ "/" ]] && user_size=${func_addr#*/}
+
+- if [[ -z $sym_name ]] || [[ -z $offset ]] || [[ $sym_name = $func_addr ]]; then
++ if [[ -z $sym_name ]] || [[ -z $func_offset ]] || [[ $sym_name = $func_addr ]]; then
+ warn "bad func+offset $func_addr"
+ DONE=1
+ return
+ fi
+
++ # vmlinux uses absolute addresses in the section table rather than
++ # section offsets.
++ local file_type=$(${READELF} --file-header $objfile |
++ ${AWK} '$1 == "Type:" { print $2; exit }')
++ [[ $file_type = "EXEC" ]] && is_vmlinux=1
++
+ # Go through each of the object's symbols which match the func name.
+ # In rare cases there might be duplicates, in which case we print all
+ # matches.
+@@ -114,9 +122,11 @@ __faddr2line() {
+ local sym_addr=0x${fields[1]}
+ local sym_elf_size=${fields[2]}
+ local sym_sec=${fields[6]}
++ local sec_size
++ local sec_name
+
+ # Get the section size:
+- local sec_size=$(${READELF} --section-headers --wide $objfile |
++ sec_size=$(${READELF} --section-headers --wide $objfile |
+ sed 's/\[ /\[/' |
+ ${AWK} -v sec=$sym_sec '$1 == "[" sec "]" { print "0x" $6; exit }')
+
+@@ -126,6 +136,17 @@ __faddr2line() {
+ return
+ fi
+
++ # Get the section name:
++ sec_name=$(${READELF} --section-headers --wide $objfile |
++ sed 's/\[ /\[/' |
++ ${AWK} -v sec=$sym_sec '$1 == "[" sec "]" { print $2; exit }')
++
++ if [[ -z $sec_name ]]; then
++ warn "bad section name: section: $sym_sec"
++ DONE=1
++ return
++ fi
++
+ # Calculate the symbol size.
+ #
+ # Unfortunately we can't use the ELF size, because kallsyms
+@@ -174,10 +195,10 @@ __faddr2line() {
+
+ sym_size=0x$(printf %x $sym_size)
+
+- # Calculate the section address from user-supplied offset:
+- local addr=$(($sym_addr + $offset))
++ # Calculate the address from user-supplied offset:
++ local addr=$(($sym_addr + $func_offset))
+ if [[ -z $addr ]] || [[ $addr = 0 ]]; then
+- warn "bad address: $sym_addr + $offset"
++ warn "bad address: $sym_addr + $func_offset"
+ DONE=1
+ return
+ fi
+@@ -191,9 +212,9 @@ __faddr2line() {
+ fi
+
+ # Make sure the provided offset is within the symbol's range:
+- if [[ $offset -gt $sym_size ]]; then
++ if [[ $func_offset -gt $sym_size ]]; then
+ [[ $print_warnings = 1 ]] &&
+- echo "skipping $sym_name address at $addr due to size mismatch ($offset > $sym_size)"
++ echo "skipping $sym_name address at $addr due to size mismatch ($func_offset > $sym_size)"
+ continue
+ fi
+
+@@ -202,11 +223,13 @@ __faddr2line() {
+ [[ $FIRST = 0 ]] && echo
+ FIRST=0
+
+- echo "$sym_name+$offset/$sym_size:"
++ echo "$sym_name+$func_offset/$sym_size:"
+
+ # Pass section address to addr2line and strip absolute paths
+ # from the output:
+- local output=$(${ADDR2LINE} -fpie $objfile $addr | sed "s; $dir_prefix\(\./\)*; ;")
++ local args="--functions --pretty-print --inlines --exe=$objfile"
++ [[ $is_vmlinux = 0 ]] && args="$args --section=$sec_name"
++ local output=$(${ADDR2LINE} $args $addr | sed "s; $dir_prefix\(\./\)*; ;")
+ [[ -z $output ]] && continue
+
+ # Default output (non --list):
+diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c b/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c
+index 3d83c1be12922..de311299432b6 100644
+--- a/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c
++++ b/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c
+@@ -141,7 +141,9 @@ static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(mic_tlv, 1600, 100, 0);
+
+ static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(pga_tlv, -600, 50, 0);
+
+-static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(mix_tlv, -50, 50, 0);
++static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(pass_tlv, -6000, 50, 0);
++
++static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(mix_tlv, -5150, 50, 0);
+
+ static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(beep_tlv, -56, 200, 0);
+
+@@ -355,7 +357,7 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new cs42l52_snd_controls[] = {
+ CS42L52_SPKB_VOL, 0, 0x40, 0xC0, hl_tlv),
+
+ SOC_DOUBLE_R_SX_TLV("Bypass Volume", CS42L52_PASSTHRUA_VOL,
+- CS42L52_PASSTHRUB_VOL, 0, 0x88, 0x90, pga_tlv),
++ CS42L52_PASSTHRUB_VOL, 0, 0x88, 0x90, pass_tlv),
+
+ SOC_DOUBLE("Bypass Mute", CS42L52_MISC_CTL, 4, 5, 1, 0),
+
+@@ -368,7 +370,7 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new cs42l52_snd_controls[] = {
+ CS42L52_ADCB_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x78, ipd_tlv),
+ SOC_DOUBLE_R_SX_TLV("ADC Mixer Volume",
+ CS42L52_ADCA_MIXER_VOL, CS42L52_ADCB_MIXER_VOL,
+- 0, 0x19, 0x7F, ipd_tlv),
++ 0, 0x19, 0x7F, mix_tlv),
+
+ SOC_DOUBLE("ADC Switch", CS42L52_ADC_MISC_CTL, 0, 1, 1, 0),
+
+diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c b/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c
+index 04f89b751304c..deaad703a7dbf 100644
+--- a/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c
++++ b/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c
+@@ -403,9 +403,9 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new cs42l56_snd_controls[] = {
+ SOC_DOUBLE("ADC Boost Switch", CS42L56_GAIN_BIAS_CTL, 3, 2, 1, 1),
+
+ SOC_DOUBLE_R_SX_TLV("Headphone Volume", CS42L56_HPA_VOLUME,
+- CS42L56_HPB_VOLUME, 0, 0x84, 0x48, hl_tlv),
++ CS42L56_HPB_VOLUME, 0, 0x44, 0x48, hl_tlv),
+ SOC_DOUBLE_R_SX_TLV("LineOut Volume", CS42L56_LOA_VOLUME,
+- CS42L56_LOB_VOLUME, 0, 0x84, 0x48, hl_tlv),
++ CS42L56_LOB_VOLUME, 0, 0x44, 0x48, hl_tlv),
+
+ SOC_SINGLE_TLV("Bass Shelving Volume", CS42L56_TONE_CTL,
+ 0, 0x00, 1, tone_tlv),
+diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/cs53l30.c b/sound/soc/codecs/cs53l30.c
+index 8995ea45b4ca8..86e93904b001c 100644
+--- a/sound/soc/codecs/cs53l30.c
++++ b/sound/soc/codecs/cs53l30.c
+@@ -351,22 +351,22 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new cs53l30_snd_controls[] = {
+ SOC_ENUM("ADC2 NG Delay", adc2_ng_delay_enum),
+
+ SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC1A PGA Volume",
+- CS53L30_ADC1A_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x18, pga_tlv),
++ CS53L30_ADC1A_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x24, pga_tlv),
+ SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC1B PGA Volume",
+- CS53L30_ADC1B_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x18, pga_tlv),
++ CS53L30_ADC1B_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x24, pga_tlv),
+ SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC2A PGA Volume",
+- CS53L30_ADC2A_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x18, pga_tlv),
++ CS53L30_ADC2A_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x24, pga_tlv),
+ SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC2B PGA Volume",
+- CS53L30_ADC2B_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x18, pga_tlv),
++ CS53L30_ADC2B_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x24, pga_tlv),
+
+ SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC1A Digital Volume",
+- CS53L30_ADC1A_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x0C, dig_tlv),
++ CS53L30_ADC1A_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x6C, dig_tlv),
+ SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC1B Digital Volume",
+- CS53L30_ADC1B_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x0C, dig_tlv),
++ CS53L30_ADC1B_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x6C, dig_tlv),
+ SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC2A Digital Volume",
+- CS53L30_ADC2A_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x0C, dig_tlv),
++ CS53L30_ADC2A_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x6C, dig_tlv),
+ SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC2B Digital Volume",
+- CS53L30_ADC2B_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x0C, dig_tlv),
++ CS53L30_ADC2B_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x6C, dig_tlv),
+ };
+
+ static const struct snd_soc_dapm_widget cs53l30_dapm_widgets[] = {
+diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/es8328.c b/sound/soc/codecs/es8328.c
+index 3afa163f7652d..dcb01889e177b 100644
+--- a/sound/soc/codecs/es8328.c
++++ b/sound/soc/codecs/es8328.c
+@@ -165,13 +165,16 @@ static int es8328_put_deemph(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
+ if (deemph > 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
++ if (es8328->deemph == deemph)
++ return 0;
++
+ ret = es8328_set_deemph(component);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ es8328->deemph = deemph;
+
+- return 0;
++ return 1;
+ }
+
+
+diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/wm8962.c b/sound/soc/codecs/wm8962.c
+index dde015fd70a41..3f75cb3209ffa 100644
+--- a/sound/soc/codecs/wm8962.c
++++ b/sound/soc/codecs/wm8962.c
+@@ -3861,6 +3861,7 @@ static int wm8962_runtime_suspend(struct device *dev)
+ #endif
+
+ static const struct dev_pm_ops wm8962_pm = {
++ SET_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS(pm_runtime_force_suspend, pm_runtime_force_resume)
+ SET_RUNTIME_PM_OPS(wm8962_runtime_suspend, wm8962_runtime_resume, NULL)
+ };
+
+diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/wm_adsp.c b/sound/soc/codecs/wm_adsp.c
+index 02c557e1f779c..c5b0b56d9c94e 100644
+--- a/sound/soc/codecs/wm_adsp.c
++++ b/sound/soc/codecs/wm_adsp.c
+@@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ int wm_adsp_fw_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
+ struct snd_soc_component *component = snd_soc_kcontrol_component(kcontrol);
+ struct soc_enum *e = (struct soc_enum *)kcontrol->private_value;
+ struct wm_adsp *dsp = snd_soc_component_get_drvdata(component);
+- int ret = 0;
++ int ret = 1;
+
+ if (ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0] == dsp[e->shift_l].fw)
+ return 0;
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