[gentoo-commits] proj/hardened-refpolicy:master commit in: policy/modules/admin/

["Jason Zaman" <perfinion@gentoo.org>]

commit:     5a876bd1d15b448dd0cf6fc86b0ce31dc730f8d0
Author:     Kenton Groombridge <me <AT> concord <DOT> sh>
AuthorDate: Sun Aug  8 21:35:23 2021 +0000
Commit:     Jason Zaman <perfinion <AT> gentoo <DOT> org>
CommitDate: Sat Nov 20 22:58:24 2021 +0000
URL:        https://gitweb.gentoo.org/proj/hardened-refpolicy.git/commit/?id=5a876bd1

su: add tunable to control user exec domain access

Signed-off-by: Kenton Groombridge <me <AT> concord.sh>
Signed-off-by: Jason Zaman <perfinion <AT> gentoo.org>

 policy/modules/admin/su.if | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 policy/modules/admin/su.te | 10 ++++++++++
 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/su.if b/policy/modules/admin/su.if
index 2d0143d6..62a6cf9d 100644
--- a/policy/modules/admin/su.if
+++ b/policy/modules/admin/su.if
@@ -156,8 +156,6 @@ template(`su_role_template',`
 	domain_interactive_fd($1_su_t)
 	role $4 types $1_su_t;
 
-	allow $2 $1_su_t:process signal;
-
 	allow $1_su_t self:capability { audit_control audit_write chown dac_override fowner net_bind_service setgid setuid sys_nice sys_resource };
 	dontaudit $1_su_t self:capability { net_admin sys_tty_config };
 	allow $1_su_t self:process { setexec setsched setrlimit };
@@ -165,18 +163,8 @@ template(`su_role_template',`
 	allow $1_su_t self:netlink_audit_socket { nlmsg_relay create_netlink_socket_perms };
 	allow $1_su_t self:key { search write };
 
-	allow $1_su_t $2:key search;
-
-	# Transition from the user domain to this domain.
-	domtrans_pattern($2, su_exec_t, $1_su_t)
-
-	ps_process_pattern($2, $1_su_t)
-
 	# By default, revert to the calling domain when a shell is executed.
 	corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_su_t, $2)
-	allow $2 $1_su_t:fd use;
-	allow $2 $1_su_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms;
-	allow $2 $1_su_t:process sigchld;
 
 	kernel_read_system_state($1_su_t)
 	kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_su_t)
@@ -235,6 +223,34 @@ template(`su_role_template',`
 		auth_use_pam_systemd($1_su_t)
 	')
 
+	tunable_policy(`su_allow_user_exec_domains',`
+		allow $3 $1_su_t:process signal;
+
+		allow $1_su_t $3:key search;
+
+		# Transition from the user domain to this domain.
+		domtrans_pattern($3, su_exec_t, $1_su_t)
+
+		ps_process_pattern($3, $1_su_t)
+
+		allow $3 $1_su_t:fd use;
+		allow $3 $1_su_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms;
+		allow $3 $1_su_t:process sigchld;
+	',`
+		allow $2 $1_su_t:process signal;
+
+		allow $1_su_t $2:key search;
+
+		# Transition from the user domain to this domain.
+		domtrans_pattern($2, su_exec_t, $1_su_t)
+
+		ps_process_pattern($2, $1_su_t)
+
+		allow $2 $1_su_t:fd use;
+		allow $2 $1_su_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms;
+		allow $2 $1_su_t:process sigchld;
+	')
+
 	tunable_policy(`allow_polyinstantiation',`
 		fs_mount_xattr_fs($1_su_t)
 		fs_unmount_xattr_fs($1_su_t)

diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/su.te b/policy/modules/admin/su.te
index 295f31bd..479469c5 100644
--- a/policy/modules/admin/su.te
+++ b/policy/modules/admin/su.te
@@ -1,5 +1,15 @@
 policy_module(su, 1.16.0)
 
+## <desc>
+##	<p>
+##	Determine whether the user application
+##	exec domain attribute should be respected
+##	for su access. If not enabled, only user
+##	domains themselves may use su.
+##	</p>
+## </desc>
+gen_tunable(su_allow_user_exec_domains, false)
+
 ########################################
 #
 # Declarations