From: "Mike Pagano" <mpagano@gentoo.org>
To: gentoo-commits@lists.gentoo.org
Subject: [gentoo-commits] proj/linux-patches:4.4 commit in: /
Date: Sun, 11 Aug 2019 10:58:01 +0000 (UTC) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1565521057.dfbe70571efea1bce9d1d371801d4c350cb4d589.mpagano@gentoo> (raw)
commit: dfbe70571efea1bce9d1d371801d4c350cb4d589
Author: Mike Pagano <mpagano <AT> gentoo <DOT> org>
AuthorDate: Sun Aug 11 10:57:37 2019 +0000
Commit: Mike Pagano <mpagano <AT> gentoo <DOT> org>
CommitDate: Sun Aug 11 10:57:37 2019 +0000
URL: https://gitweb.gentoo.org/proj/linux-patches.git/commit/?id=dfbe7057
Linux patch 4.4.189
Signed-off-by: Mike Pagano <mpagano <AT> gentoo.org>
0000_README | 4 +
1188_linux-4.4.189.patch | 840 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 844 insertions(+)
diff --git a/0000_README b/0000_README
index a8c41eb..91e5cbd 100644
--- a/0000_README
+++ b/0000_README
@@ -795,6 +795,10 @@ Patch: 1187_linux-4.4.188.patch
From: http://www.kernel.org
Desc: Linux 4.4.188
+Patch: 1188_linux-4.4.189.patch
+From: http://www.kernel.org
+Desc: Linux 4.4.189
+
Patch: 1500_XATTR_USER_PREFIX.patch
From: https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=470644
Desc: Support for namespace user.pax.* on tmpfs.
diff --git a/1188_linux-4.4.189.patch b/1188_linux-4.4.189.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1c12460
--- /dev/null
+++ b/1188_linux-4.4.189.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,840 @@
+diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+index 175d57049168..7a9fd54a0186 100644
+--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
++++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+@@ -2184,6 +2184,7 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
+ improves system performance, but it may also
+ expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
+ Equivalent to: nopti [X86]
++ nospectre_v1 [X86]
+ nospectre_v2 [X86]
+ spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
+ spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86]
+@@ -2498,9 +2499,9 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
+
+ nohugeiomap [KNL,x86] Disable kernel huge I/O mappings.
+
+- nospectre_v1 [PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1 (bounds
+- check bypass). With this option data leaks are possible
+- in the system.
++ nospectre_v1 [X86,PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1
++ (bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks are
++ possible in the system.
+
+ nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC_FSL_BOOK3E] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
+ (indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
+diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
+index 87d663191986..81a0ada6536f 100644
+--- a/Makefile
++++ b/Makefile
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ VERSION = 4
+ PATCHLEVEL = 4
+-SUBLEVEL = 188
++SUBLEVEL = 189
+ EXTRAVERSION =
+ NAME = Blurry Fish Butt
+
+diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
+index ad83c245781c..0a66f8241f18 100644
+--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
++++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
+@@ -41,9 +41,10 @@
+
+ /* CPU feature register tracking */
+ enum ftr_type {
+- FTR_EXACT, /* Use a predefined safe value */
+- FTR_LOWER_SAFE, /* Smaller value is safe */
+- FTR_HIGHER_SAFE,/* Bigger value is safe */
++ FTR_EXACT, /* Use a predefined safe value */
++ FTR_LOWER_SAFE, /* Smaller value is safe */
++ FTR_HIGHER_SAFE, /* Bigger value is safe */
++ FTR_HIGHER_OR_ZERO_SAFE, /* Bigger value is safe, but 0 is biggest */
+ };
+
+ #define FTR_STRICT true /* SANITY check strict matching required */
+diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
+index c1eddc07d996..062484d34450 100644
+--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
++++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
+@@ -126,10 +126,12 @@ static struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64mmfr1[] = {
+ };
+
+ static struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_ctr[] = {
+- U_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 31, 1, 1), /* RAO */
+- ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 28, 3, 0),
+- U_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_SAFE, 24, 4, 0), /* CWG */
+- U_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 20, 4, 0), /* ERG */
++ U_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 31, 1, 1), /* RES1 */
++ ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 30, 1, 0),
++ U_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 29, 1, 1), /* DIC */
++ U_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 28, 1, 1), /* IDC */
++ U_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_OR_ZERO_SAFE, 24, 4, 0), /* CWG */
++ U_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_OR_ZERO_SAFE, 20, 4, 0), /* ERG */
+ U_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 16, 4, 1), /* DminLine */
+ /*
+ * Linux can handle differing I-cache policies. Userspace JITs will
+@@ -339,6 +341,10 @@ static s64 arm64_ftr_safe_value(struct arm64_ftr_bits *ftrp, s64 new, s64 cur)
+ case FTR_LOWER_SAFE:
+ ret = new < cur ? new : cur;
+ break;
++ case FTR_HIGHER_OR_ZERO_SAFE:
++ if (!cur || !new)
++ break;
++ /* Fallthrough */
+ case FTR_HIGHER_SAFE:
+ ret = new > cur ? new : cur;
+ break;
+diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+index 3c71dd947c7b..5e24cd248728 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
++++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
++#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
++
+ /*
+
+ x86 function call convention, 64-bit:
+@@ -199,6 +201,23 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
+ .byte 0xf1
+ .endm
+
++/*
++ * Mitigate Spectre v1 for conditional swapgs code paths.
++ *
++ * FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY is used in the user entry swapgs code path, to
++ * prevent a speculative swapgs when coming from kernel space.
++ *
++ * FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY is used in the kernel entry non-swapgs code path,
++ * to prevent the swapgs from getting speculatively skipped when coming from
++ * user space.
++ */
++.macro FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
++ ALTERNATIVE "", "lfence", X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER
++.endm
++.macro FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
++ ALTERNATIVE "", "lfence", X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL
++.endm
++
+ #else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+
+ /*
+diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+index 375ed605c83d..afb805b0148b 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
++++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+@@ -551,6 +551,7 @@ END(irq_entries_start)
+ * tracking that we're in kernel mode.
+ */
+ SWAPGS
++ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
+ SWITCH_KERNEL_CR3
+
+ /*
+@@ -566,8 +567,10 @@ END(irq_entries_start)
+ #ifdef CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING
+ call enter_from_user_mode
+ #endif
+-
++ jmp 2f
+ 1:
++ FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
++2:
+ /*
+ * Save previous stack pointer, optionally switch to interrupt stack.
+ * irq_count is used to check if a CPU is already on an interrupt stack
+@@ -1077,6 +1080,13 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_entry)
+ movq %rax, %cr3
+ 2:
+ #endif
++ /*
++ * The above doesn't do an unconditional CR3 write, even in the PTI
++ * case. So do an lfence to prevent GS speculation, regardless of
++ * whether PTI is enabled.
++ */
++ FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
++
+ ret
+ END(paranoid_entry)
+
+@@ -1133,12 +1143,12 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
+ testb $3, CS+8(%rsp)
+ jz .Lerror_kernelspace
+
+-.Lerror_entry_from_usermode_swapgs:
+ /*
+ * We entered from user mode or we're pretending to have entered
+ * from user mode due to an IRET fault.
+ */
+ SWAPGS
++ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
+
+ .Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs:
+ /*
+@@ -1152,6 +1162,8 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
+ #endif
+ ret
+
++.Lerror_entry_done_lfence:
++ FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
+ .Lerror_entry_done:
+ TRACE_IRQS_OFF
+ ret
+@@ -1170,14 +1182,16 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
+ cmpq %rax, RIP+8(%rsp)
+ je .Lbstep_iret
+ cmpq $gs_change, RIP+8(%rsp)
+- jne .Lerror_entry_done
++ jne .Lerror_entry_done_lfence
+
+ /*
+ * hack: gs_change can fail with user gsbase. If this happens, fix up
+ * gsbase and proceed. We'll fix up the exception and land in
+ * gs_change's error handler with kernel gsbase.
+ */
+- jmp .Lerror_entry_from_usermode_swapgs
++ SWAPGS
++ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
++ jmp .Lerror_entry_done
+
+ .Lbstep_iret:
+ /* Fix truncated RIP */
+@@ -1190,6 +1204,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
+ * Switch to kernel gsbase:
+ */
+ SWAPGS
++ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
+
+ /*
+ * Pretend that the exception came from user mode: set up pt_regs
+@@ -1286,6 +1301,7 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
+ * to switch CR3 here.
+ */
+ cld
++ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
+ movq %rsp, %rdx
+ movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
+ pushq 5*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->ss */
+@@ -1574,6 +1590,7 @@ end_repeat_nmi:
+ movq %rax, %cr3
+ 2:
+ #endif
++ FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
+
+ /* paranoidentry do_nmi, 0; without TRACE_IRQS_OFF */
+ call do_nmi
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+index d9f7d1770e98..113cb01ebaac 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+@@ -192,17 +192,17 @@
+ #define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE ( 7*32+ 8) /* AMD HW-PState */
+ #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
+
++#define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER ( 7*32+10) /* "" LFENCE in user entry SWAPGS path */
++#define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL ( 7*32+11) /* "" LFENCE in kernel entry SWAPGS path */
++
+ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
+ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
+
+ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT ( 7*32+15) /* Intel Processor Trace */
+-#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */
+-
+ #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */
+ #define X86_FEATURE_SSBD ( 7*32+17) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
+
+-/* Because the ALTERNATIVE scheme is for members of the X86_FEATURE club... */
+-#define X86_FEATURE_KAISER ( 7*32+31) /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION w/o nokaiser */
++#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */
+
+ #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled*/
+ #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW ( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */
+@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@
+ #define X86_FEATURE_ZEN ( 7*32+28) /* "" CPU is AMD family 0x17 (Zen) */
+ #define X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV ( 7*32+29) /* "" L1TF workaround PTE inversion */
+ #define X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED ( 7*32+30) /* Enhanced IBRS */
++#define X86_FEATURE_KAISER ( 7*32+31) /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION w/o nokaiser */
+
+ /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
+ #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
+@@ -338,5 +339,6 @@
+ #define X86_BUG_L1TF X86_BUG(18) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */
+ #define X86_BUG_MDS X86_BUG(19) /* CPU is affected by Microarchitectural data sampling */
+ #define X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY X86_BUG(20) /* CPU is only affected by the MSDBS variant of BUG_MDS */
++#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS X86_BUG(21) /* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */
+
+ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+index ab2df0f9ac45..917c63aa1599 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
+ #include <asm/intel-family.h>
+ #include <asm/e820.h>
+
++static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
+ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
+ static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
+ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
+@@ -87,17 +88,11 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
+ x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
+
+- /* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */
++ /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
++ spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
+ spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
+-
+- /*
+- * Select proper mitigation for any exposure to the Speculative Store
+- * Bypass vulnerability.
+- */
+ ssb_select_mitigation();
+-
+ l1tf_select_mitigation();
+-
+ mds_select_mitigation();
+
+ arch_smt_update();
+@@ -251,6 +246,98 @@ static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
+ }
+ early_param("mds", mds_cmdline);
+
++#undef pr_fmt
++#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V1 : " fmt
++
++enum spectre_v1_mitigation {
++ SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE,
++ SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO,
++};
++
++static enum spectre_v1_mitigation spectre_v1_mitigation =
++ SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO;
++
++static const char * const spectre_v1_strings[] = {
++ [SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable: __user pointer sanitization and usercopy barriers only; no swapgs barriers",
++ [SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO] = "Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization",
++};
++
++/*
++ * Does SMAP provide full mitigation against speculative kernel access to
++ * userspace?
++ */
++static bool smap_works_speculatively(void)
++{
++ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMAP))
++ return false;
++
++ /*
++ * On CPUs which are vulnerable to Meltdown, SMAP does not
++ * prevent speculative access to user data in the L1 cache.
++ * Consider SMAP to be non-functional as a mitigation on these
++ * CPUs.
++ */
++ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
++ return false;
++
++ return true;
++}
++
++static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void)
++{
++ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
++ spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
++ return;
++ }
++
++ if (spectre_v1_mitigation == SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO) {
++ /*
++ * With Spectre v1, a user can speculatively control either
++ * path of a conditional swapgs with a user-controlled GS
++ * value. The mitigation is to add lfences to both code paths.
++ *
++ * If FSGSBASE is enabled, the user can put a kernel address in
++ * GS, in which case SMAP provides no protection.
++ *
++ * [ NOTE: Don't check for X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE until the
++ * FSGSBASE enablement patches have been merged. ]
++ *
++ * If FSGSBASE is disabled, the user can only put a user space
++ * address in GS. That makes an attack harder, but still
++ * possible if there's no SMAP protection.
++ */
++ if (!smap_works_speculatively()) {
++ /*
++ * Mitigation can be provided from SWAPGS itself or
++ * PTI as the CR3 write in the Meltdown mitigation
++ * is serializing.
++ *
++ * If neither is there, mitigate with an LFENCE to
++ * stop speculation through swapgs.
++ */
++ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS) &&
++ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER))
++ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER);
++
++ /*
++ * Enable lfences in the kernel entry (non-swapgs)
++ * paths, to prevent user entry from speculatively
++ * skipping swapgs.
++ */
++ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL);
++ }
++ }
++
++ pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]);
++}
++
++static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str)
++{
++ spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
++ return 0;
++}
++early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline);
++
+ #undef pr_fmt
+ #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt
+
+@@ -1154,7 +1241,7 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
+ break;
+
+ case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1:
+- return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
++ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]);
+
+ case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+index 4bce77bc7e61..3965235973c8 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+@@ -853,6 +853,7 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+ #define NO_L1TF BIT(3)
+ #define NO_MDS BIT(4)
+ #define MSBDS_ONLY BIT(5)
++#define NO_SWAPGS BIT(6)
+
+ #define VULNWL(_vendor, _family, _model, _whitelist) \
+ { X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, _family, _model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, _whitelist }
+@@ -876,29 +877,37 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL, NO_SPECULATION),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL_MID, NO_SPECULATION),
+
+- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+- VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+- VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
++ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
++ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
++ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
++ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
++ VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
++ VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
+
+ VULNWL_INTEL(CORE_YONAH, NO_SSB),
+
+- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID, NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
++ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID, NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
+
+- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
+- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
+- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
++ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
++ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
++ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
++
++ /*
++ * Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously
++ * being documented as such in the APM). But according to AMD, %gs is
++ * updated non-speculatively, and the issuing of %gs-relative memory
++ * operands will be blocked until the %gs update completes, which is
++ * good enough for our purposes.
++ */
+
+ /* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
+- VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+- VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+- VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+- VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
++ VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
++ VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
++ VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
++ VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
+
+ /* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
+- VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
++ VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
+ {}
+ };
+
+@@ -935,6 +944,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
+ }
+
++ if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
++ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
++
+ if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
+ return;
+
+diff --git a/block/blk-core.c b/block/blk-core.c
+index 50d77c90070d..7662f97dded6 100644
+--- a/block/blk-core.c
++++ b/block/blk-core.c
+@@ -870,6 +870,7 @@ blk_init_allocated_queue(struct request_queue *q, request_fn_proc *rfn,
+
+ fail:
+ blk_free_flush_queue(q->fq);
++ q->fq = NULL;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(blk_init_allocated_queue);
+diff --git a/drivers/atm/iphase.c b/drivers/atm/iphase.c
+index 7d00f2994738..860a33a90ebf 100644
+--- a/drivers/atm/iphase.c
++++ b/drivers/atm/iphase.c
+@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
+ #include <asm/byteorder.h>
+ #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+ #include <linux/jiffies.h>
++#include <linux/nospec.h>
+ #include "iphase.h"
+ #include "suni.h"
+ #define swap_byte_order(x) (((x & 0xff) << 8) | ((x & 0xff00) >> 8))
+@@ -2755,8 +2756,11 @@ static int ia_ioctl(struct atm_dev *dev, unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg)
+ }
+ if (copy_from_user(&ia_cmds, arg, sizeof ia_cmds)) return -EFAULT;
+ board = ia_cmds.status;
+- if ((board < 0) || (board > iadev_count))
+- board = 0;
++
++ if ((board < 0) || (board > iadev_count))
++ board = 0;
++ board = array_index_nospec(board, iadev_count + 1);
++
+ iadev = ia_dev[board];
+ switch (ia_cmds.cmd) {
+ case MEMDUMP:
+diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
+index 00d8366a614e..e1807296a1a0 100644
+--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
++++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
+@@ -470,6 +470,7 @@
+ #define USB_PRODUCT_ID_HP_LOGITECH_OEM_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE_0A4A 0x0a4a
+ #define USB_PRODUCT_ID_HP_LOGITECH_OEM_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE_0B4A 0x0b4a
+ #define USB_PRODUCT_ID_HP_PIXART_OEM_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE 0x134a
++#define USB_PRODUCT_ID_HP_PIXART_OEM_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE_0641 0x0641
+
+ #define USB_VENDOR_ID_HUION 0x256c
+ #define USB_DEVICE_ID_HUION_TABLET 0x006e
+diff --git a/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-quirks.c b/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-quirks.c
+index c9a11315493b..5dcdfdca4fd7 100644
+--- a/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-quirks.c
++++ b/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-quirks.c
+@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ static const struct hid_blacklist {
+ { USB_VENDOR_ID_HP, USB_PRODUCT_ID_HP_LOGITECH_OEM_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE_0A4A, HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
+ { USB_VENDOR_ID_HP, USB_PRODUCT_ID_HP_LOGITECH_OEM_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE_0B4A, HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
+ { USB_VENDOR_ID_HP, USB_PRODUCT_ID_HP_PIXART_OEM_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE, HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
++ { USB_VENDOR_ID_HP, USB_PRODUCT_ID_HP_PIXART_OEM_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE_0641, HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
+ { USB_VENDOR_ID_LOGITECH, USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_C077, HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
+ { USB_VENDOR_ID_LOGITECH, USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_KEYBOARD_G710_PLUS, HID_QUIRK_NOGET },
+ { USB_VENDOR_ID_LOGITECH, USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_MOUSE_C01A, HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
+diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c
+index 4dc5e12dbfce..13de5ce3facf 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c
+@@ -1957,7 +1957,7 @@ u16 bnx2x_select_queue(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ }
+
+ /* select a non-FCoE queue */
+- return fallback(dev, skb) % (BNX2X_NUM_ETH_QUEUES(bp) * bp->max_cos);
++ return fallback(dev, skb) % (BNX2X_NUM_ETH_QUEUES(bp));
+ }
+
+ void bnx2x_set_num_queues(struct bnx2x *bp)
+diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c
+index 7c42be586be8..35bcc6dbada9 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c
+@@ -778,7 +778,7 @@ static void mlx5_unregister_device(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev)
+ struct mlx5_interface *intf;
+
+ mutex_lock(&intf_mutex);
+- list_for_each_entry(intf, &intf_list, list)
++ list_for_each_entry_reverse(intf, &intf_list, list)
+ mlx5_remove_device(intf, priv);
+ list_del(&priv->dev_list);
+ mutex_unlock(&intf_mutex);
+diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c b/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
+index 02327e6c4819..39976892b312 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
+@@ -1152,6 +1152,9 @@ static const struct proto_ops pppoe_ops = {
+ .recvmsg = pppoe_recvmsg,
+ .mmap = sock_no_mmap,
+ .ioctl = pppox_ioctl,
++#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
++ .compat_ioctl = pppox_compat_ioctl,
++#endif
+ };
+
+ static const struct pppox_proto pppoe_proto = {
+diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/pppox.c b/drivers/net/ppp/pppox.c
+index 0e1b30622477..011fbd10cb73 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/ppp/pppox.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ppp/pppox.c
+@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
+ #include <linux/string.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
+ #include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/compat.h>
+ #include <linux/errno.h>
+ #include <linux/netdevice.h>
+ #include <linux/net.h>
+@@ -103,6 +104,18 @@ int pppox_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(pppox_ioctl);
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
++int pppox_compat_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
++{
++ if (cmd == PPPOEIOCSFWD32)
++ cmd = PPPOEIOCSFWD;
++
++ return pppox_ioctl(sock, cmd, (unsigned long)compat_ptr(arg));
++}
++
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(pppox_compat_ioctl);
++#endif
++
+ static int pppox_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
+ int kern)
+ {
+diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c b/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c
+index 53c1f2bd0f24..19d0692a2d2f 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c
+@@ -674,6 +674,9 @@ static const struct proto_ops pptp_ops = {
+ .recvmsg = sock_no_recvmsg,
+ .mmap = sock_no_mmap,
+ .ioctl = pppox_ioctl,
++#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
++ .compat_ioctl = pppox_compat_ioctl,
++#endif
+ };
+
+ static const struct pppox_proto pppox_pptp_proto = {
+diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-bcm2835.c b/drivers/spi/spi-bcm2835.c
+index 1a1368f5863c..25daebd6f410 100644
+--- a/drivers/spi/spi-bcm2835.c
++++ b/drivers/spi/spi-bcm2835.c
+@@ -554,7 +554,8 @@ static int bcm2835_spi_transfer_one(struct spi_master *master,
+ bcm2835_wr(bs, BCM2835_SPI_CLK, cdiv);
+
+ /* handle all the 3-wire mode */
+- if ((spi->mode & SPI_3WIRE) && (tfr->rx_buf))
++ if (spi->mode & SPI_3WIRE && tfr->rx_buf &&
++ tfr->rx_buf != master->dummy_rx)
+ cs |= BCM2835_SPI_CS_REN;
+ else
+ cs &= ~BCM2835_SPI_CS_REN;
+diff --git a/fs/compat_ioctl.c b/fs/compat_ioctl.c
+index a52ca5cba015..5af973621c73 100644
+--- a/fs/compat_ioctl.c
++++ b/fs/compat_ioctl.c
+@@ -1016,9 +1016,6 @@ COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(PPPIOCDISCONN)
+ COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(PPPIOCATTCHAN)
+ COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(PPPIOCGCHAN)
+ COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(PPPIOCGL2TPSTATS)
+-/* PPPOX */
+-COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(PPPOEIOCSFWD)
+-COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(PPPOEIOCDFWD)
+ /* ppdev */
+ COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(PPSETMODE)
+ COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(PPRSTATUS)
+diff --git a/include/linux/if_pppox.h b/include/linux/if_pppox.h
+index b49cf923becc..93ef387eadb1 100644
+--- a/include/linux/if_pppox.h
++++ b/include/linux/if_pppox.h
+@@ -84,6 +84,9 @@ extern int register_pppox_proto(int proto_num, const struct pppox_proto *pp);
+ extern void unregister_pppox_proto(int proto_num);
+ extern void pppox_unbind_sock(struct sock *sk);/* delete ppp-channel binding */
+ extern int pppox_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
++extern int pppox_compat_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
++
++#define PPPOEIOCSFWD32 _IOW(0xB1 ,0, compat_size_t)
+
+ /* PPPoX socket states */
+ enum {
+diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
+index 77438a8406ec..0410fd29d569 100644
+--- a/include/net/tcp.h
++++ b/include/net/tcp.h
+@@ -1526,6 +1526,23 @@ static inline void tcp_check_send_head(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb_unli
+ tcp_sk(sk)->highest_sack = NULL;
+ }
+
++static inline struct sk_buff *tcp_rtx_queue_head(const struct sock *sk)
++{
++ struct sk_buff *skb = tcp_write_queue_head(sk);
++
++ if (skb == tcp_send_head(sk))
++ skb = NULL;
++
++ return skb;
++}
++
++static inline struct sk_buff *tcp_rtx_queue_tail(const struct sock *sk)
++{
++ struct sk_buff *skb = tcp_send_head(sk);
++
++ return skb ? tcp_write_queue_prev(sk, skb) : tcp_write_queue_tail(sk);
++}
++
+ static inline void __tcp_add_write_queue_tail(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ {
+ __skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
+diff --git a/net/bridge/br_vlan.c b/net/bridge/br_vlan.c
+index 1394da63614a..a7953962112a 100644
+--- a/net/bridge/br_vlan.c
++++ b/net/bridge/br_vlan.c
+@@ -580,6 +580,11 @@ void br_vlan_flush(struct net_bridge *br)
+
+ ASSERT_RTNL();
+
++ /* delete auto-added default pvid local fdb before flushing vlans
++ * otherwise it will be leaked on bridge device init failure
++ */
++ br_fdb_delete_by_port(br, NULL, 0, 1);
++
+ vg = br_vlan_group(br);
+ __vlan_flush(vg);
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(br->vlgrp, NULL);
+diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
+index db5345f5f7b0..152e1e6316e6 100644
+--- a/net/core/dev.c
++++ b/net/core/dev.c
+@@ -7768,6 +7768,8 @@ static void __net_exit default_device_exit(struct net *net)
+
+ /* Push remaining network devices to init_net */
+ snprintf(fb_name, IFNAMSIZ, "dev%d", dev->ifindex);
++ if (__dev_get_by_name(&init_net, fb_name))
++ snprintf(fb_name, IFNAMSIZ, "dev%%d");
+ err = dev_change_net_namespace(dev, &init_net, fb_name);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_emerg("%s: failed to move %s to init_net: %d\n",
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
+index 53edd60fd381..76ffce0c18ae 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
+@@ -1151,6 +1151,7 @@ int tcp_fragment(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 len,
+ struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
+ struct sk_buff *buff;
+ int nsize, old_factor;
++ long limit;
+ int nlen;
+ u8 flags;
+
+@@ -1161,7 +1162,15 @@ int tcp_fragment(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 len,
+ if (nsize < 0)
+ nsize = 0;
+
+- if (unlikely((sk->sk_wmem_queued >> 1) > sk->sk_sndbuf + 0x20000)) {
++ /* tcp_sendmsg() can overshoot sk_wmem_queued by one full size skb.
++ * We need some allowance to not penalize applications setting small
++ * SO_SNDBUF values.
++ * Also allow first and last skb in retransmit queue to be split.
++ */
++ limit = sk->sk_sndbuf + 2 * SKB_TRUESIZE(GSO_MAX_SIZE);
++ if (unlikely((sk->sk_wmem_queued >> 1) > limit &&
++ skb != tcp_rtx_queue_head(sk) &&
++ skb != tcp_rtx_queue_tail(sk))) {
+ NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPWQUEUETOOBIG);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
+index 2764c4bd072c..d3f1222c1a8c 100644
+--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
++++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
+@@ -1805,6 +1805,9 @@ static const struct proto_ops pppol2tp_ops = {
+ .recvmsg = pppol2tp_recvmsg,
+ .mmap = sock_no_mmap,
+ .ioctl = pppox_ioctl,
++#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
++ .compat_ioctl = pppox_compat_ioctl,
++#endif
+ };
+
+ static const struct pppox_proto pppol2tp_proto = {
+diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_acct.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_acct.c
+index 088e8da06b00..0f3cb410e42e 100644
+--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_acct.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_acct.c
+@@ -97,6 +97,8 @@ nfnl_acct_new(struct sock *nfnl, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (flags & NFACCT_F_OVERQUOTA)
+ return -EINVAL;
++ if ((flags & NFACCT_F_QUOTA) && !tb[NFACCT_QUOTA])
++ return -EINVAL;
+
+ size += sizeof(u64);
+ }
+diff --git a/net/sched/sch_codel.c b/net/sched/sch_codel.c
+index 9b7e2980ee5c..3bc5dec3b17b 100644
+--- a/net/sched/sch_codel.c
++++ b/net/sched/sch_codel.c
+@@ -68,7 +68,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *dequeue(struct codel_vars *vars, struct Qdisc *sch)
+ {
+ struct sk_buff *skb = __skb_dequeue(&sch->q);
+
+- prefetch(&skb->end); /* we'll need skb_shinfo() */
++ if (skb)
++ prefetch(&skb->end); /* we'll need skb_shinfo() */
+ return skb;
+ }
+
+diff --git a/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c b/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
+index 9a65664f749c..d2bf92e71150 100644
+--- a/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
++++ b/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
+@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ struct tipc_nl_compat_msg {
+ int rep_type;
+ int rep_size;
+ int req_type;
++ int req_size;
+ struct net *net;
+ struct sk_buff *rep;
+ struct tlv_desc *req;
+@@ -252,7 +253,8 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(struct tipc_nl_compat_cmd_dump *cmd,
+ int err;
+ struct sk_buff *arg;
+
+- if (msg->req_type && !TLV_CHECK_TYPE(msg->req, msg->req_type))
++ if (msg->req_type && (!msg->req_size ||
++ !TLV_CHECK_TYPE(msg->req, msg->req_type)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ msg->rep = tipc_tlv_alloc(msg->rep_size);
+@@ -345,7 +347,8 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_doit(struct tipc_nl_compat_cmd_doit *cmd,
+ {
+ int err;
+
+- if (msg->req_type && !TLV_CHECK_TYPE(msg->req, msg->req_type))
++ if (msg->req_type && (!msg->req_size ||
++ !TLV_CHECK_TYPE(msg->req, msg->req_type)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ err = __tipc_nl_compat_doit(cmd, msg);
+@@ -1192,8 +1195,8 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
+ goto send;
+ }
+
+- len = nlmsg_attrlen(req_nlh, GENL_HDRLEN + TIPC_GENL_HDRLEN);
+- if (!len || !TLV_OK(msg.req, len)) {
++ msg.req_size = nlmsg_attrlen(req_nlh, GENL_HDRLEN + TIPC_GENL_HDRLEN);
++ if (msg.req_size && !TLV_OK(msg.req, msg.req_size)) {
+ msg.rep = tipc_get_err_tlv(TIPC_CFG_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto send;
next reply other threads:[~2019-08-11 10:58 UTC|newest]
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